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PART VIII.

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS.

47

July to September 1921.



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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART VIII.

CHAPTER I.—TURKEY.

[E 7570/143/44]

No. 1.

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 1828.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1921.*

THE French Ambassador came to the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to present a communication from M. Briand. The Greek Government having refused to accede to the suggestion made by the Powers that Greece should place herself in their hands, with a view to the suspension of hostilities in Asia Minor and the conclusion of peace with Turkey, M. Briand now proposed that a joint notification should be addressed to Athens, warning the Greeks of the dangers of the course they were pursuing, and throwing upon them the responsibility for the resumption of the war and the still further arrestation of the conclusion of peace in the East. M. Briand proposed, as a second step, that the facilities which had hitherto been given to Greek warships at Constantinople, and the use which Greece had been permitted to make of that place as a port of call and revictualling, as well as the use which had been conceded to her of the Marmora, should, in accordance with strict neutrality, be withdrawn. Only by these means, M. Briand was convinced, could matters be brought to an early head and hostilities, even at the eleventh hour, prevented.

I replied that I did not feel able to entertain either proposal. The first was superfluous, because we had already told the Greeks, in the telegram which I had drafted in Paris and which had been approved by the three Powers, that, if the Greek Government preferred to decline our mediation, the exclusive responsibility would rest upon themselves. I did not, therefore, see any point in repeating the threat at the present moment, or stating again what was an obvious truism. It could have no effect either as a rebuke or as a menace. As regards the second suggestion, the advantages accorded to the Greeks had been recommended to us from Constantinople, where it could not be said that a very pro-Greek feeling prevailed, as entirely consistent with the strict neutrality which we, at any rate in this country, had pursued; and, as long as it was open to the Turks to obtain supplies of men, money and arms from Bolshevik Russia without fear of any interruption, it seemed to me a one-sided proposal to apply this particular form of coercion to the Greeks. In my view, the only safety lay in a continuation of the policy of strict impartiality to which the British Government, at least, had all along been faithful.

As regards the general situation, I acquainted the Ambassador with the information which we had lately received from our military experts, both in Constantinople and in Smyrna, which led us to form a more favourable view of the morale and equipment of the Greek army than we had previously been led to adopt; and I remarked that, if these accounts were true, it was not for a moment to be expected that the Greek army would decline to resume a conflict in which it appeared to expect an initial victory. In all probability, although what had happened at Ismid was an unfavourable omen, the Greeks might expect to obtain some such preliminary advantage. If they held



this view of their own chances, it was out of the question to expect them, because of any representations that we were inclined to make to them, to desist; although it seemed to me extremely likely that, once the initial success had been obtained, they would, of their own accord, appeal to our good offices.

The situation, I admitted, would not be rendered any easier by such a development, because the kind of terms that we had considered when I was in Paris might be more difficult to obtain from the Greeks if victorious than if they had not fought at all. On the other hand, should the issue turn the other way and the Turks be victorious in the impending struggle, we should find them also more difficult to deal with than they might be before the fighting recommenced.

The prospect, therefore, was not, in my judgment, very encouraging either way; but, however that might be, it seemed to me a useless expedient to attempt to intervene at the present stage, and I could only hope that, before long, whatever the result of the impending hostilities might be, a more favourable opportunity might occur.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7710/143/44]

No. 2.

*Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 275.)

My Lord,

*Athens, June 25, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the Greek Government's reply to the Allied proposals regarding the cessation of hostilities.

(Copy sent to Constantinople.)

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 2.

*Note from the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

LE Gouvernement royal hellénique a pris en très sérieuse considération la proposition que les Puissances alliées ont bien voulu lui faire, et a l'honneur d'exprimer ses plus vifs remerciements de l'offre de leurs bons offices, en vue d'éviter le renouvellement des hostilités dans le Proche-Orient et d'assurer une paix honorable et durable.

Le Gouvernement royal apprécie hautement les sentiments d'humanité, conjoints au désir d'arriver dans un bref délai à la pacification, qui ont inspiré ses grands Alliés, dans leur démarche, et que le Gouvernement royal partage dans la plus large mesure.

D'ailleurs, la similitude des sentiments dont la Grèce est animée avec ceux de ses Alliés découle nécessairement de la communauté de vues, qui ont prévalu alors qu'on combattait en commun et qui sont applicables à la situation actuelle. Cette situation n'est pas un résultat accidentel d'un conflit isolé, mais bien la continuation du conflit mondial que la grande guerre a définitivement jugé partout ailleurs en laissant pendantes seulement dans le Proche-Orient les sanctions spécifiées et déterminées par un traité signé par toutes les Puissances alliées d'un côté et les Turcs de l'autre.

En défendant les aspirations séculaires de l'hellénisme et les droits que lui a reconnus le Traité de Sèvres, en compensation de ses sacrifices pendant la guerre, la Grèce a la conviction qu'elle défend à la fois les intérêts du monde civilisé dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée et les détroits. Et pénétrée de l'importance de sa double mission, elle est arrivée par une extrême tension de ses forces morales et matérielles à être sur le point d'imposer les décisions communes des Alliés, qui ont motivé préventivement son occupation en Asie Mineure et qui ne sont, en ce qui concerne les charges imposées à la Grèce, que l'émanation de la solidarité née de l'alliance, solidarité dont le traité a été une solennelle expression.

Cette conception de ses devoirs a amené la Grèce à souscrire à tous les sacrifices qu'on lui a demandés, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, et à accepter d'entreprendre

par ses propres moyens, après la conclusion, une guerre nouvelle contre les Turcs qui essaient par des procédés diamétralement opposés à la bonne foi et aux obligations internationales de se soustraire à l'application du traité.

En s'adonnant tout entière et avec foi aux préparatifs et à l'action que les nécessités militaires lui imposaient, la Grèce se voit en face d'une situation dans laquelle seuls les intérêts militaires sont les guides de sa conduite et de ses décisions.

Pour ces raisons impératives, malgré son ardent désir de se conformer aux conseils de ses grands Alliés, le Gouvernement royal hellénique est dans l'impossibilité d'y accéder; car tout ajournement des opérations au delà de la limite indiquée par les chefs de l'armée, compromettra, au préjudice de la Grèce, la situation militaire et encouragera l'adversaire à opposer à l'injonction des Puissances une nouvelle résistance. Il est donc évident que le mode de procédure proposé par les Alliés, qui entraînerait forcément la suspension des hostilités, est incompatible avec le but à atteindre.

Les sentiments d'amitié, dont les Puissances alliées sont animées à l'égard de la Grèce, sont une garantie pour le Gouvernement royal qu'elles voudront bien apprécier à leur juste valeur les considérations énoncées plus haut, et tenir compte d'autre part que la Grèce en continuant la lutte met entre leurs mains l'outil le plus efficace pour la réalisation de leur dessein de pacification du Proche-Orient. Car le seul espoir de voir la Turquie se soumettre aux suggestions des Puissances et respecter les droits sanctionnés par leur signature et les intérêts qu'elles considéreront dignes de leur appui pour la sauvegarde de la paix en Orient, ne peut être fondé que sur l'influence exercée et à exercer par une action militaire.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement royal sera toujours prêt à écouter ses grands Alliés à n'importe quelle phase des opérations, et espère qu'ils voudront bien obtenir de la Turquie des propositions concrètes en vue de la réalisation des droits découlant des traités, et de la satisfaction des sacrifices subis par la Grèce et des intérêts que l'évolution des événements militaires et politiques rendra réalisables.

Le Gouvernement royal ne doute pas que les Alliés, dans ce rôle de médiateurs, voudront bien tenir compte de la mission des armées helléniques, qui, en se substituant aux forces alliées pour l'exécution d'une partie du programme commun, seront remplacées par toute la force morale de l'hellénisme quand elles déposeront les armes et lorsque le nouveau régime du Proche-Orient aura besoin d'appui et de sauvegarde. Et la Grèce saura tenir ce rôle avec honneur.

Car l'apparence de résistance que présentent les Turcs n'est due qu'aux cadres encore subsistant de l'ancien Empire ottoman et à l'inapplication des clauses de l'armistice relatives au désarmement. Mais le jour où les garanties stipulées seront rigoureusement appliquées et où l'expérience acquise imposera la prise de toutes les mesures que l'attitude des Turcs jusqu'ici a suffisamment indiquées, la Grèce montera aisément la garde pour le maintien du nouveau *statu quo* en Orient.

*Athènes, le 12/25 juin 1921.*

[E 7932/143/44]

No. 3.

*Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 633.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 30, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry appointed to investigate atrocities committed on the Marmara Islands.

2. I am taking an early opportunity of discussing with the Allied High Commissioners the recommendations made by the commission.

3. I am much indebted to Major-General G. McK. Franks, whose services were kindly placed at my disposal by General Harington, for the thorough and impartial manner in which he conducted this enquiry.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

*Acting High Commissioner.*



Enclosure in No. 3.

Major-General Franks to Mr. Rattigan.

Sir,

June 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the report of the commission appointed to enquire into the atrocities committed in the islands of Marmara.

I have, &c.

G. M. FRANKS, Major-General.

#### Report.

In accordance with the terms of reference received, the commission sailed at 12 noon in H.M.S. "Stuart" from Constantinople and arrived at Karabiga at 4:30 P.M. on the 22nd June.

The Greek harbour-master of Marmara, who had been arrested by order of the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, was also taken on board H.M.S. "Stuart."

2. On the morning of the 23rd June at Karabiga, the commission interviewed the refugees from Arablar, the two women who had been abducted from that village by brigands and who had since been sent back via Artaki, and inhabitants of Marmara who had been reported as having suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the Greek authorities.

The commission also interviewed the Mudir of Karabiga and certain inhabitants of the area who had various complaints to make against the Greek administration.

3. From the evidence received, the story of the events in question at Arablar and Marmara is briefly as follows:—

At about 6 A.M. on the 10th June the village of Arablar was attacked by a combined force of brigands from Kapudagh and other places and by inhabitants from the Greek village of Afisia on the same island.

The villagers of Afisia appeared to have surrounded the village of Arablar, while a small party of seven brigands entered the village.

They collected the men into the mosque, robbed them and murdered two of them in the mosque. The blood marks are still existent on the floor. Three more men and two women were murdered in the village, and a considerable part of the village was burnt and pillaged.

4. Two women named Emmeni Mehmed Oghlou and her daughter-in-law Tayibi, with the latter's baby, were carried off by the brigands together with seven men from the village in the direction of Afisia.

These women were informed that they would have to pay a ransom of £ T. 2,000 for their release.

On the way to Afisia the seven men were murdered.

The women were then taken to Afisia and were here put on a caique and taken to a farm on the northern part of the island, and from thence to Karazak on the island of Marmara, where they were kept for two nights, and then taken to Aftoni. From there the old woman was sent back by boat to Afisia, while the young woman with her child was taken on the 13th June across to the mainland at Vathi. She was eventually released, escorted to Artaki by land by a Greek man and woman, and sent back to Karabigha by the Greek authorities at Artaki.

She states that she was violated by the brigands.

5. The names of the brigand band were ascertained and are as follows:—

Yokos Takor Oghlou.

Nickit Oglou Istrati of Afisia.

Sevdali Oglou Istramos of Artaki.

Mali, or Heraki, a deserted soldier.

Yorgi of Pasha Liman.

Nickit Oglou Istrati of Afisia was reported to have conducted the brigands and supplied them with necessary information for their purpose. This man until about a fortnight ago had been *garde champêtre* at Arablar, and had been dismissed by the villagers owing to incompetence and bad behaviour.

6. Events at Marmara appear to have been as follows:—

Upon learning of the fate of Arablar, the small Turkish population of Marmara became considerably perturbed. They had, in fact, been threatened with a similar

fate, and anticipated trouble, as a Greek brigand had been killed in that village about a year previously.

The Turkish harbour-master accordingly embarked in a caique at Marmara to report to the British authorities at Karabiga. He was fired on by order of the Mudir of Marmara, but escaped and reported himself to Lieutenant Cousens at Karabiga.

7. Eight Turkish residents at Marmara complained that they had been subjected to severe ill-treatment, amounting to torture, by the Greek harbour-master of Marmara, in order to extract information from them as to the reason for the harbour-master's flight.

The commission took the evidence of four of these men, on the arms of one of whom were still to be seen scars due to the cords with which he had been tied. They were sent to Afisia by the harbour-master for examination by a Greek officer who had now arrived on the scene, and were sent back by him to Marmara and released.

These men were confronted with the Greek harbour-master (John Pipis). They reiterated their accusations of ill-treatment, which he vigorously denied.

The commission have no doubt as to the truth of the statements made by the Turks.

8. The Greek harbour-master stated that he had been sent from Panderma to take up the duties of harbour-master at Marmara on the 10th June last. His duties were principally to see that no Turkish inhabitants left that island without passports. His appointment in writing was made by the Greek authorities at Panderma.

9. The evidence of Lieutenant Cousens was taken as to his experience of the events in the neighbourhood and the difficulties which had been placed in his way by the Greek authorities in the matter of the evacuation of the refugees.

A précis of his evidence is attached in the form of a letter.

10. Two boatmen who were examined confirmed the statement that they had been fired on at Pasha Liman and Vori when they were sent to evacuate refugees.

11. On the afternoon of the 23rd June the commission arrived at Panderma. Colonel Grivas, commanding the Greek troops in the area, was invited to come on board H.M.S. "Stuart," which he did.

Colonel Grivas stated that he had taken over command of the district in March last, that he had been given no written instructions defining the area under his administration, but that the verbal instructions taken over from his predecessor showed the area to include the islands of Marmara, Afisia and Pasha Liman.

The colonel expressed regret at the incidents which had occurred, but pointed out that brigandage had always been prevalent in the area, and stated that with the available troops at his disposal he was doing his best to cope with the situation and to arrest and punish the brigands implicated in the recent atrocities.

The commission see no reason to doubt that he is in fact making dispositions for the arrest of the brigands.

12. On the morning of the 24th June the commission proceeded to Marmara, where they interrogated the mudir of that island. He admitted having fired on the Turkish harbour-master, and stated that he did so as he understood that he was starting for Karabiga to seek assistance from Turkish brigands in that area.

His statements as to the movements of the Greek brigands in their itinerary from Afisia were contradictory and unreliable.

He stated that a detachment of an officer and ten men of the Greek army arrived at Marmara on the 12th June, and that they had encountered the brigands of Aftoni on the 13th June. When asked why they had not arrested the brigands he denied his former statement, and said that the only information he has as to the presence of the brigands on the island was from the inhabitants of Aftoni, and was given to him after the brigands had left.

He denied all implication in the ill-treatment of the eight Turkish residents mentioned above, and put all the blame upon the Greek harbour-master.

He admitted that he had been appointed mudir by the Ottoman authorities two years ago, but that the administration of the islands had been in the hands of the Greek authorities for about eleven months.

No notification in writing was given by the Greek authorities when they took over the administration. He merely received verbal instructions from the Kaimakam of Artaki.

He stated that he dealt only with the civil administration, and that all military questions were dealt with by the harbour-master.

He appeared to the commission to be thoroughly unreliable and inefficient.



He was warned that he would be held personally responsible for the safety of the few remaining Turks on the island.

13. The commission then visited the village of Arablar, where a few of the Turkish inhabitants, who had temporarily returned from Karabiga, were found getting in their harvest.

The village was found to be largely burnt. One house had been wrecked by a bomb, by which one woman had been killed and one woman and child wounded.

The commission found bloodstains in the mosque, and were shown the spot where the seven men had been murdered and their bodies afterwards partially burnt. There were sufficient indications existent to confirm this statement. The bodies had been taken to the village and buried.

14. In the village of Afisia the mukhtar was ordered to produce the rifles available in the village. These proved to be of a Russian pattern, and the ammunition corresponded exactly with the empty cartridge-cases picked up in the village of Arablar. Some of the rifles had been used recently and not cleaned.

The mukhtar denied all knowledge of the details of the events at Arablar, and stated that he was ill in bed at the time, and that the atrocities were perpetrated by a band of brigands from Kapudagh.

15. The commission were quite convinced of the truth of the statements made by the inhabitants of the village of Arablar that the villagers of Afisia had taken a large part in the outrage.

The mukhtar was warned that he would be held personally responsible for any molestation of the villagers of Arablar, who were at present harvesting their crops.

16. As regards the question asked in No. 2 of the terms of reference, the commission have not discovered any earlier occurrences in the same or adjoining districts likely to produce feeling sufficient to account for the treatment of the Turkish villagers by their Christian neighbours.

17. As regards No. 3 of the terms of reference, the commission have found no indication that Greek troops were in any way implicated in these outrages.

At the same time the commission have remarked that in all cases the Turkish villagers have been disarmed while the Greek villagers are armed, this leaving them entirely at the mercy of their Greek neighbours, whereas no steps appear to have been taken to safeguard their lives or property by the military authorities.

The commission consider the conduct of the Greek harbour-master of Marmara merits exemplary punishment for his abuse of authority and entirely illegal treatment of Turkish inhabitants.

They further consider that the suppression of personal liberty in the case of the Turkish inhabitants of the occupied area is carried to excess. An order issued by the Officer Commanding, Bigba, is attached.

18. As regards No. 4 of the terms of reference, the commission desire to make the following recommendations:—

*Firstly.*—That it should be strongly impressed on the Hellenic authorities that it is an important part of their duty to maintain internal order in the territory under their administration, and that the Turkish inhabitants are equally entitled to protection with the Greek inhabitants.

*Secondly.*—That it is essential that an effective civil administration should be introduced with a sufficient force of gendarmerie under Allied officers who are capable of maintaining the balance between the Greeks and Turks.

*Thirdly.*—That all villagers, Christian and Turkish alike, should be immediately disarmed.

*Fourthly.*—That, independently of the arrest and punishment of the individuals named, both as a measure of justice and as a preventive against similar cases in the future, a suitable fine should be levied upon the village of Afisia as indemnification to the inhabitants of Arablar for the part taken by the inhabitants of Afisia in the outrage and murder which took place at Arablar.

The commission, having considered to the best of their ability the extent of the damage and the ability of the villagers of Afisia to pay, recommend that the amount of the fine should be £ T. 10,000, and that immediate steps should be taken to enforce the payment of the same.

G. M. FRANKS, Major-General (British member).  
GERBAUD (French member).  
DE MALSO (Italian member).

June 25, 1921.

# Annex 1.

*Lieutenant Cousens to Major-General Franks.*

Sir,

*Karabigha, June 22, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on proceedings at the Marmara Islands on and since the 10th June:—

2. At Karabigha at 5 P.M. on the 10th June I received a report that the village of Arablar had that morning been attacked by a brigand (Savdali) and burnt, and that fifteen of the inhabitants had been killed.

At 10 P.M. on the same day the Turkish harbour-master of Marmara arrived and stated that the brigands had threatened to do the same to the Turks at Marmara. He also stated that whilst leaving to bring me this information he had been fired at by the Greeks of Marmara.

At 11 P.M. 190 refugees arrived and confirmed previous reports, also stating that two women had been abducted.

I immediately reported this to my officer commanding at Chanak.

3. At 8 A.M. on the 12th June H.M.S. "Stuart" arrived. Owing to constant petitions by the Turkish refugees it was decided to commence the immediate evacuation of the Turkish population of the Marmara Islands to Karabigha.

At 12.45 P.M. H.M.S. "Stuart," towing caiques, and the "Inebouli" arrived at Arablar.

I went ashore with Lieutenant-Commander FitzGerald. Five Greek soldiers offered resistance, but we landed without incident; we found more than half the village burnt, and that thirteen men and two women had been killed. The inhabitants demanded to be evacuated by us, which evacuation was immediately commenced.

The Greek lieutenant, Vassilakis, arrived and was taken on board. He promised to assist in the evacuation of the Turks. However, later the same day he offered every obstruction to the evacuation.

The complete evacuation was completed by 8 P.M.

4. H.M.S. "Stuart" arrived Marmara at 8.40 P.M. It was found that all the Turks wished to be evacuated. The Greek mudir admitted having fired at the Turkish harbour-master on the 10th instant; also that by order of the Greek harbour-master eight Turks had been arrested and sent to Afisia.

5. June 13.—Evacuation commenced and completed 4 P.M.

Greek mudir, on being interrogated by the captain of "Stuart," related he was under the thumb of the Greek harbour-master.

At 2 P.M. eight Turks arrested and sent to Afisia returned.

6. June 14.—Evacuation of Afisia commenced. At 11.30 A.M. H.M.S. "Iron Duke" and H.M.S. "Pegasus" arrived off Afisia.

The Commander-in-chief in an interview with Lieutenant Vassilakis gave him forty-eight hours to capture the brigands.

At Afisia the mother of the abducted girl was discovered trying to collect £ T. 2,000 for her ransom.

H.M.S. "Stuart" left with H.M.S. "Iron Duke," and H.M.S. "Pegasus" remained to carry out the evacuation.

Evacuation was completed by 2 P.M. I then left in "Pegasus" for Ismalia, arriving at 3.30 P.M.

The mudir was arrested for assisting the brigands, who had left at noon the previous day for Ataki Peninsula.

7. June 15.—"Pegasus" arrived Ataki at 10 A.M.

The Greek officer commanding, Panderma, was at Ataki organising the capture of the brigands; he assured us of his assistance in the evacuation of the Turkish population. I have reason to suppose that the brigands were directed by the Greek officer commanding troops.

At 2 P.M. "Pegasus" arrived at Marble Quarries at Marmara Islands and found three families of Turks terrorised, probably by the Greek population of Palatia. Proceeded to Palatia and warned Greeks.

Arrived Marmara at 5 P.M. and found Greek officer commanding troops, Panderma, in the town.

Proceeded Pasha Liman at 6 P.M. to superintend the evacuation previously ordered, but found Greek military had given orders to the contrary, and that caiques had been fired on at Pasha Liman and Vari.

At 7 P.M. evacuation completed.



8. *June 16.*—Proceeded to Marmara and interviewed Greek officer commanding troops of Panderma, who placed blame for everything on to his major, left at Ataki; he also stated that he would punish Lieutenant Vassilakis.

Left Marmara noon for Ataki with Greek officer commanding, Panderma, and Lieutenant Vassilakis.

At 1.30 p.m. I was transferred to H.M.S. "Speedy" at Vari, who was evacuating Turks.

Owing to insufficient caïques being available, only three-quarters of the population were evacuated.

9. *June 17.*—Proceeded to Ismalia and released Greek Mukda; proceeded to Karabigha for night.

10. *June 18.*—Completed evacuation of Vari. Visited Pasha Liman and found that Lieutenant Vassilakis, who was now officer commanding Ataki, had given orders that nobody was to enter or leave Pasha Liman—ostensibly in order to arrest Savlali.

Arrived Karabigha at 2.30 p.m., where I was ordered to remain owing to trouble in my own district.

I have, &c.

R. P. COUSENS, *Lieutenant.*

#### Annex 2.

*Officer Commanding Greek Troops, Biglia, to the Governor, Karabigha.*

(Telegraphic.)

All the people that have by any reason gone to the British area from the Greek area should return to their houses within ten days from date. Any man that does not return by the end of said time his family is to be banished, his properties are to be confiscated, his estates are to be burnt. Those who return will not be ill-treated.

[E 7942/1/44]

No. 4

*Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 651.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, July 6, 1921.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 493 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the secret memorandum sent to me on the 4th July by Izzet Pasha.

2. The eagerness which Izzet Pasha has recently shown to promote contact between the British authorities and the Angora Government, and the similarity between his memorandum and the verbal statement made to me the same day by Hamid Bey, give this document considerable importance.

3. As I have stated in my telegram under reference, Hamid Bey made no reference of any kind to the military clauses of the treaty, which are dealt with at length in Izzet Pasha's memorandum. The principal other discrepancy between the two presentations of the desiderata of the Kemalists has to do with the Capitulations. Izzet Pasha's memorandum stipulates for the suppression of the economic Capitulations. Hamid Bey spoke of the suppression of the Capitulations as a whole, and in his conversation he laid great stress on the abuses to which the judicial Capitulations gave rise in pre-war days. He admitted that we British had not abused them, but he said that other Powers had used them in such a way as to make it impossible for Turks to obtain any sort of justice in cases against the nationals of those Powers.

4. Izzet Pasha's memorandum, though in many respects unacceptable, would be more reassuring if there were any reason to suppose that it was intended to serve as a basis for modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, and indicated readiness on the part of the Kemalists to accept the stipulations of that treaty, except in so far as it might be necessary to modify it in order to satisfy the desiderata formulated in the memorandum. Unfortunately, I fear it is certain that the Kemalists take as their starting-point their own National Pact, and that the memorandum merely indicates the extent to which in their view the terms of the National Pact might be abated for the sake of a settlement with the Allies. If the questions of the territorial extension of Turkey and the Straits be put on one side, everything turns on the word "independence." Even the most moderate Kemalists undoubtedly aim at a degree of independence which would do

away with the Capitulations or any adequate substitute for them, would make any guarantees for the safety of the minorities illusory, and would permit of the development of Turkey as a military Power. On the other hand, they would perhaps reconcile themselves to an attenuated financial control, and there are probably many Kemalists who regard political pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism as things to be eschewed, at any rate for the time being. They would probably welcome an understanding with the Allies, and especially Great Britain, if only they could secure their desiderata as formulated by men like Izzet Pasha and Bekir Samy Bey. In internal affairs they would probably set their faces against revolutionary ideas, and aim at developing Turkey as a constitutional monarchy, the sovereign of which would have little real power, but would retain the dignity of his two offices of Sultan and Caliph and the moral influence attaching to the latter.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

*Acting High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Izzet Pasha to Mr. Rattigan.*

L'EUROPE avait promis une Turquie indépendante capable de vivre dans ses limites ethnographiques, avec Constantinople comme capitale.

La réalisation pratique de cette promesse est subordonnée aux conditions énumérées, ci-bas, dans leurs généralités.

L'application de ces conditions fera disparaître la dualité qui existe en Turquie ou, tout au moins, aura pour effet immédiat de rallier, dans ce but, tous les éléments honnêtes et patriotes du pays. Elle pourra seule assurer en Orient une paix durable.

Voici les conditions :

Attribution à la Turquie de l'Asie Mineure dans son intégralité, prenant en considération ses limites naturelles et sa majorité turque et kurde.

Constantinople a besoin pour garantir sa sécurité à l'ouest d'un hinterland et d'une ligne de défense naturelle pouvant lui permettre d'empêcher non seulement une invasion ennemie, mais aussi l'incursion des bandes dont l'action a troublé et dévasté depuis un siècle la péninsule balkanique.

Cette ligne naturelle est la ligne de la Maritza inférieure comprenant Andrinople, ville qui a, d'ailleurs, pour les Ottomans la plus grande importance au double point de vue historique et religieux.

La liberté des détroits est tout naturellement admise, à condition que la sécurité de Constantinople, capitale de l'Empire et siège du Khalifat, soit à l'abri de toute atteinte.

Les experts des deux parties pourraient arrêter les conditions nécessaires pour assurer cette sécurité.

Les dispositions du Traité de Sèvres concernant la protection des minorités sont de nature à porter atteinte à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de l'Empire. Dans leur esprit et dans leur lettre, ces dispositions placent la majorité sous la domination de la minorité.

Il faudrait donc adopter, pour les minorités en Turquie, les stipulations insérées dans les Traités de Saint-Germain, de Neuilly ou de Trianon.

Suppression des Capitulations économiques. La Turquie doit avoir la faculté d'établir son budget. La Commission financière aura le droit de contrôler si les prévisions budgétaires vont à l'encontre des stipulations du traité en ce qui concerne le paiement de nos dettes.

Si toutes ces questions financières, dans leur ensemble, étaient étudiées par une commission composée d'éminents spécialistes de l'Europe qui ne seraient pas imbus de l'idée du régime capitulaire, il serait plus facile de les régler d'une manière juste et équitable.

Le budget de l'État ne permettant pas le recrutement par voie de volontariat, l'armée et la moitié au moins de la gendarmerie doivent être, comme par le passé, soumises à la conscription. Augmentation judicieuse de l'effectif de l'armée en prenant en considération l'étendue des frontières ainsi que la conformation géographique et ethnographique du pays.

À l'ouest, la menace des Grecs, à l'est la propagande et les agissements des bolchevistes rendent la situation de la Turquie particulièrement délicate en ce qui concerne la limitation de ses forces armées.

[7360]

C



Il serait de l'intérêt général de surseoir à cette limitation jusqu'au règlement de la question du désarmement général.

En échange, nous sommes disposés à prendre les engagements les plus formels vis-à-vis des Puissances mandataires de l'Arabie que nous ne poursuivrons aucun but contraire à leurs intérêts dans les pays limitrophes et que nous pouvons même leur assurer notre assistance morale et matérielle dans l'accomplissement de leurs missions, à condition pourtant que cette assistance n'aille pas à l'encontre des intérêts primordiaux de l'Islam et ne froisse pas l'amour-propre des musulmans.

[E 7992/60/44]

No. 5.

*Lord D'Abernon to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 902.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 5, 1921.*

I LEARN from a reliable source that the departure of Enver Pasha from Berlin, which was reported in my despatch No. 765 of the 26th May last, was partly, if not entirely, due to a request conveyed to him by the German Government that he should leave German territory. My informant states that on the German Government becoming acquainted of the presence of Enver Pasha in Berlin an emissary was sent by Dr. Simons, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to request him to leave this country. Enver was very indignant and appealed to the right of asylum, but was informed that the German Government were determined to tolerate nothing which could be made to appear as if intrigues were being conducted on German territory against British interests; that they knew perfectly well that he, Enver Pasha, was in fact intriguing with German officers, and that he must therefore leave Germany of his own free will unless he wished to be expelled. Enver Pasha thereupon left, and is reported at present to be in Moscow.

Similar action has been taken in respect of other prominent Turks, who have all left Germany, including Nuri Bey, the envoy from Mustapha Kemal. Some of these Turks have, however, left of their own accord, as the result of the acquittal of the murderer of Talaat has been to make them fear for their own safety. Indeed the wife of Enver will shortly leave Berlin, if she has not already left, owing to the fact that she has discovered that an Armenian is living in the house adjacent to her own residence.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs also despatched an emissary to Rome for the express purpose of warning the Turkish expert at the German Embassy there that he must keep clear of all intrigues with the Turks. This expert is apparently Dr. Diehl, who was formerly dragoman at the German Embassy in Constantinople. I am informed that Dr. Diehl has taken this advice to heart, and that there is no likelihood of any anti-British intrigue from this quarter.

My informant stated that, in his opinion and in the opinion of the German Government, the only policy for Germany was to keep clear of all complications of this nature, which could bring no useful result to this country, and to convince, by the absolute loyalty of their conduct, the British Government of their good intentions, and thus prepare the way for that which was coming to be considered as being the ultimate aim of Germany, namely, complete reconciliation and co-operation with Great Britain. My informant added that, in his opinion, mischief was undoubtedly brewing which had its headquarters in Kabul, where at the present time there was a mission of several Turkish officers headed by Djemal Pasha.

I have, &amp;c.

D'ABERNON.

[E 8187/143/44]

No. 6.

*Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 297.)

My Lord,

*Athens, July 6, 1921.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 379 of to-day's date respecting the deplorable condition of refugees from Ismid, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo respecting the refugees, mostly Greeks, who were landed there on the 29th ultimo.

As reported in my telegram under reference, I read extracts from the enclosed despatch, as well as from Mr. Rattigan's telegrams Nos. 472 and 488 of the 1st and 5th July, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who promised to telegraph at once very strongly to the Minister of War at Smyrna on the subject.

I understand from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo that a storm of indignation has been raised in that town at the scandalous way in which the authorities have neglected to make any provision for the refugees. At least one case of small-pox was discovered, but only four days after arrival, and this the authorities omitted to notify to the consular officers until reminded of the necessity to do so.

I have, &amp;c.

GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 6.

*Vice-Consul Knight to Earl Granville.*

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

*Volo, June 30, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Canadian steamship "Belchers" arrived at Volo yesterday morning from Ismid (Nicomedia) with 2,770 refugees, mostly Greeks, the remainder Armenians and Turks. More than a quarter of the total number were infants and young children, and nearly all appeared to be in a state of great misery and almost complete destitution, a few bales of clothing and coverings being the most that any one family had been able to save or find room for on board. These unfortunate people were exposed for the whole day to the scorching rays of the sun, as well as the importunities of affluent householders in search of domestic slaves, this being the only active form of local charity known. The authorities, on their part, seem to have completely ignored the whole affair until the evening, when a representative of the prefect arrived by train from Larissa to make arrangements. To-day the pier, already becoming a menace to the public health, is slowly being cleared, and cart-loads of wretched human beings, the more active following on foot, are now to be seen moving out of the town in various directions. A large additional number of refugees from the same locality have since arrived by a Greek boat.

According to the account given me by the master of the "Belchers," on the 27th instant the Greek troops in Ismid—the Kemalists being then only two hours distant from the town—warned the inhabitants, numbering about 45,000, that they had two and a half hours in which to evacuate their homes, as the town was going to be burned. For some time previously the soldiers had been driving into Ismid all the live-stock in the surrounding country, and for four days the shore was crowded with thousands of cattle, &c., which, exposed to the blazing sun and without food, were reduced to drinking sea-water, and dying, many of them, before the Greeks could ship them to Constantinople on boats brought for that purpose. Meanwhile, ten vessels, including the "Belchers" which had been chartered by some Constantinople Greeks with the permission of the British authorities there, had arrived to take off the population, and in the confusion which followed many families were separated and put into different boats, none knowing whither they were bound. All are believed to have been conveyed to various parts of Greece, with the exception of those on board the one Turkish steamer, which is supposed to have returned to Constantinople. The Turks from the "Belchers," numbering over a hundred, assured me that they were given to understand they would be taken there, but, although the ship returned to Constantinople this morning, the master refused, no doubt rightly, to take them with him, on the ground that it was most unlikely they would be allowed to land.

Before the "Belchers" left Ismid, the place had already been fired by the Greek troops, and as she sailed down the gulf one end of the town was observed to be blazing vigorously. The master had no doubt that, according to plan, its destruction would be complete a few hours later.

I have, &amp;c.

W. L. C. KNIGHT.



[E 8217/1/44]

No. 7.

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 653.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 542 of the 1st June and previous correspondence relative to the attitude of the Angora press towards Great Britain, I have the honour to transmit herewith a full translation of a motion submitted to the Grand National Assembly as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of the 14th June, and a summary of an article which appeared in the "Yeni-Gyun" the same day.

2. These publications show to what lengths the Angora press was allowed to go in abuse of Great Britain, even at a time of apparent *détente* in the official attitude of the Angora Government towards His Majesty's Government. It is true that the document as published by the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" is merely a motion signed by two persons recently released from Malta, but it was printed prominently on the front page of the paper, and the date of publication coincides with that of the principal telegram addressed to me by the present Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, Yussuf Kemal Bey, regarding the release of the British prisoners (see my telegram No. 461 of the 25th June, 1921).

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

*Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of June 14, 1921.*

**A MOTION:—OUR COMPATRIOTS AT MALTA MUST BE LIBERATED.**

The British doctors who have purposely blinded 15,000 Turkish boys as well as the garrison commanders and officers must be condemned.

THE following is a copy which we have obtained of a motion ("takrir") concerning those detained at Malta, submitted to the Great National Assembly by Faik and Sheref Beys, Deputies of Adrianople, and referred after consideration to the Council of Commissars ("Heyet-i-Vekile"):

"To the honourable Presidency of the Grand National Assembly,

"Following on the armistice which the Turkish nation, fully armed but desirous of obtaining peace in the name of suffering humanity, concluded with England on board the cruiser 'Agamemnon'—the England who, having set the world on fire, has thought of nothing but to gratify her insatiable appetite for the burning of homes and the shedding of blood—the British have spread themselves to the four corners of the country and, following a mean and insulting policy worthy of their history, ever-cursed and ever-destructive, have once again disgracefully deceived the manly Turk, who is incapable of villainy. Their first business in Turkey was to engage in a devilish pursuit, with burning thongs in their hands, of the conscientious and honest children of our land, defenders of the altar ('mihrab') of Islam, after having previously disarmed them. Their conduct has always been that of the harlot and their works, like their history, always nothing but guile. At this time the Government at Constantinople consisted of five or ten miserable creatures in the service of the British, but never belonging to our race, who sought to satiate the appetite of the stomach and not of the conscience, and who wanted to have money in their pockets rather than honour—that Government handed over our Turkish boys to the English and transferred them to Malta.

"In all the history of the Turkish race, who have always been gentlemen, there is no such record of shame.

"We would remind your honourable Assembly how Yildirim Bayazid preferred to fall among the ruins of the mighty Ottoman Empire rather than hand over Ahmed Djelair and Kara Yousouf to Tamarlane; how Abdul Mejid preferred war rather than hand over the Hungarian refugees to the terrible Romanof Czars; how even Abdul Hamid, the faults of whose administration we are still striving to rectify, did not, in spite of the threat of war, hand over Mazhar Pasha and Shevket Bey to the British.

But let us add that these compatriots have been handed over to the British by the feeble personality of Constantinople, who is unworthy of the dynasty which has produced heroic Padishahs, and prefers that Turk should kill Turk, and Greek slavery and British chains to the independence of the Turkish nation.

"Some of these suffering ones who are groaning under British force in despotism in an island of nothing but jagged black rock in the middle of the Mediterranean, a thousand miles distant from the fatherland, have by some means or other arrived to-day. But, if there is one accusation against the poor unfortunates who remain there, it is that they love the Turkish fatherland and refuse to submit to British insults. What will happen to them? Just as the families of these miserable ones are to-day groaning in Anatolia and Constantinople under conditions of extreme want through inability to find bread, so they also there are in the same plight.

"These men at one time administered the provinces and the armies of this Empire. If they are guilty, the Turkish nation has not transferred to England the power to try and to judge them or to let them live miserably under privations. This is a matter directly incumbent on the right of jurisdiction of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This magnanimous nation thinks of their families and of the present unimaginable sufferings of these men who are in the hands of that tyrannical nation, whose like for the invention of instruments of oppression God has never created. We therefore submit to your honourable High Assembly, which is the personification of virtue and patriotism, that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey should take urgent and definite steps for their immediate liberation, and we propose that the British prisoners in Anatolia, like Ralton and others, should not be handed over until our oppressed Turkish sons have been returned. We likewise propose the punishment of the British doctors, commandants and officers of the garrisons in Egypt who, by premeditated action, blinded 15,000 sons of Turkey by plunging them, under the pretext of disinfection, into baths of over-strong creosol."

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Extract from the "Yeni Gyun" of June 14, 1921.*

**SUMMARY.**

*In the British Prison Houses in Constantinople. Under British oppression in the British Prison Houses at Moda and Bostanji.*

THE "Yeni Gyun," after referring to the innumerable atrocities committed by the British against Moslems and Turks since the armistice, and particularly since the occupation of Constantinople, and to the many acts of oppression from which Turks and Moslems have suffered at the hands of the British in their prison houses in Constantinople, goes on to publish the first instalment of statements made by an unnamed Turkish officer, with the rank of captain in the Turkish army, who, after encountering many difficulties, succeeded in escaping from the British to Anatolia where at the time of writing he was on active service with the Nationalist army.

This officer stated that he had been arrested by the British in September 1920 on a charge of having relations with the Nationalists and of being involved in arms traffic. He was confined in the detention house at Moda, where he had to live in filth and where he was subjected to all manner of insults and sufferings at the hands of the British troops who had charge of him. In the end he was brought before the British 28th Divisional Court Martial, held at the Army Medical School at Haidar Pasha, and sentenced to six months' hard labour.

After his trial he was again confined in the Moda prison house. He then goes on to describe in detail the systematic persecution from which he suffered, even in his uniform, at the hands of the British n.c.o.s. and men, with the full approval of the director of the prison, Captain Baker, because of his refusal to empty buckets of refuse into the sea. At last he was unable to stand the beatings and kickings any longer and fell ill about the end of October 1920, when he was transferred to the hospital at Haidar Pasha. There, in spite of the utmost attention by the doctors, his health did not improve, the bruises on his skin remained, but after six weeks, even although he was still very weak, he was discharged and again returned to Moda, where Captain Baker told him that he was being transferred to Bostanji. He was handcuffed and removed to Bostanji under guard of an n.c.o. and two men.



After describing the Bostanji prison in detail, the officer states that on arrival he was registered under the number 568. He was obliged to change his clothes, which were replaced by filthy ones, and he was forced to wear round his neck a chain bearing his identification number. He then goes on to describe the terrible condition of his fellow-prisoners, and continues on the same lines regarding the severe oppression from which he suffered in his second prison.

[E 8222/1/44]

No. 8.

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 661.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 11, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 24th April, 1921, and previous correspondence relative to Turco-Afghan relations, I have the honour to state that the Angora paper "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of the 12th June, 1921, published an account of the ceremonial hoisting of the Afghan flag over the new Afghan Embassy or Legation there. The flag was hoisted by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. I enclose free translations of the speeches exchanged on the occasion as reported in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié."

2. Your Lordship will observe that, while strongly Islamic in tone, each speech refers to Soviet Russia as a member in a definite triple alliance, and that on the other hand there is no specific reference to any other Asiatic State. The whole performance is of interest in its bearing on the negotiations between Afghanistan and Great Britain on the one hand and Russia and Afghanistan on the other, which, I gather from printed correspondence, had reached a critical stage at the time when the ceremony in Angora took place. Communications between Kabul and Angora are presumably so slow as to deprive the synchronising of the Angora ceremony with any particular stage of the Kabul negotiations of special importance, but it would nevertheless appear that His Majesty's Government should be somewhat slow to believe in any real willingness on the part of the Amir and his Government to break with either Moscow or Angora.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Viceroy of India.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 8.

*Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millié."*

(Free Translation, slightly condensed, of Speeches exchanged at the Ceremony of Hoisting the Afghan Flag at the New Afghan Embassy in Angora on June 10, 1921.)

(1.)

*Afghan Ambassador's Speech.*

I THANK all who attend this ceremony. The Afghan nation, which has at last achieved its wish and sent an official mission to the Turkish nation, always its guide and leader, has shown unending regard for the Turkish nation. This mission is happy to find itself among you as representative of 10,000,000 Afghans. Our religious ties are confirmed by the establishment of official relations, and the treaty between the two nations gives a great hope for the salvation of the Islamic world. The Imperialists of the West have stopped at no oppression of the Eastern or the Moslem world, and they have striven with all their might for the destruction of Moslems. Please God they will not attain their object of overrunning the Eastern world. The alliance of Turk, Afghan and Russian will break the hands of those who wish to overrun the East. We Moslems, ever exposed to the tyranny of the Imperialists, do not despair of the Koranic promise. The world of Islam has resolved to defend its rights against those who seek to destroy it. We are hopeful of the future. We may not possess means equal to those of the Westerns who seek to tyrannise over us, but we shall achieve

independence by our religious purpose and faith. I am certain that hereafter united Islam will one day achieve its rights and exalt the glory of the crescent and star. Our mission is proud of its reception by the Grand National Assembly on its arrival and its president. The hoisting of the Embassy flag was postponed until to-day because of Ramazan. We consider it a happy augury that this ceremony should fall on Bairam and a Friday. I express my happiness that the president should have accepted my request to hoist the flag in person. I pray God for the progress and exaltation of the East and Islam.

(2.)

*Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Speech.*

I thank your Excellency for your invitation to assist at the hoisting of your flag, the symbol of your independence. I thank your Excellency in the name of the Grand National Assembly for this glorious day. Between Turkey and Afghanistan, as with the whole world of Islam, strong bonds existed in principle. As in Afghanistan, so in Turkey, the whole heart of the nation beats fraternally. Certain causes prevented the conversion of these bonds into concrete form. Until lately official relations could not be established. It is a matter of thanksgiving that we have achieved this in the course of Anatolia's struggle for independence. The arrival of your mission is a source of pride to all of us. The joint efforts of Turkey and Afghanistan, working hand in hand, are important enough to secure an important equilibrium in the political world. The result of these efforts will be seen in the future and will redound to the happiness of Islam. For centuries Turkey struggled single-handed for Islam. Henceforward it will have Afghanistan for a comrade. What the world of Islam desires is independence. It does not seek to destroy others. We shall be proud to see every Islamic Government free and independent like Afghanistan. For those who labour under the oppression in the Eastern world, the alliance of Turkey, Afghanistan and the Russian Soviet Republic is, as you finely say, a source of gladness. Please God this alliance will produce more abundant results. We see with gladness that every effort of your Excellency here is devoted to this object. The flag hoisted to-day, the symbol of the independence of Afghanistan, will wave here for the friendship of Afghanistan and Turkey. That the first flag should be hoisted in your time is the cause of congratulation not only for Afghanistan, but for Turkey. I thank you for my own account for the honour of hoisting the flag. An Embassy will shortly proceed to Afghanistan to strengthen still further the bonds between the two countries and this mission will give proof there of the same purpose and sincerity.

[E 8223/143/44]

No. 9.

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 662.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 11, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 483 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the questionnaire drawn up by General Harington in regard to the ultimate policy of the Allied Governments should the Kemalists advance upon Constantinople.

2. Copies have been sent to the French and Italian High Commissioners for transmission to their respective Governments.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 9.

*General Harington to Mr. Rattigan.*

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

General Headquarters,

British Army in Constantinople, July 9, 1921.

IN continuance of the views which I expressed to the High Commissioners on the 4th instant, I am putting forward to you, for consultation with your colleagues, a request that I may, as commander-in-chief of the Allied military forces, be given an indication of the policy which the Allied Governments intend to pursue in the event



of a serious threat to Constantinople. I am concerned with and responsible for the security of the troops entrusted to my command, and in justice to them and to me I would respectfully submit that I should be given some guidance.

Although the military situation is at the moment more steady, and the Nationalists at Ismid show no sign of advancing to break the line of neutrality, yet one must always reckon with the fact that a situation might arise whereby the Greeks were defeated or withdrew, and the Nationalists might develop the policy, so often reiterated from Angora, of driving all Allied soldiers off Turkish soil, urged on, as they would be, by the Bolsheviks.

I have, in conjunction with my military colleagues of France and Italy, considered the situation closely, and I have made such dispositions as I think necessary to meet an attack on the Ismid peninsula, and for dealing with such outbreaks as might be expected to occur at the same time in and around Constantinople. Broadly speaking, assuming the Greeks were defeated or withdrawn, the course open to the Nationalists would be—

- (a.) To advance on Constantinople from Ismid;
- (b.) To advance on the Dardanelles via Brusa; or
- (c.) Both the above together.

Either course would be simultaneous with a certain amount of internal trouble in Constantinople.

I understand that it is the policy of the Allied Governments that in the event of the Nationalists entering the neutral zone I am to resist their advance with all means at my disposal.

I wish to make it quite clear—

1. That I have not sufficient troops to deal with both (a) and (b) at the same time.
2. That I would only be able to oppose (a) for a limited period of time.
3. Once engaged in opposing (a) it will be impossible for me to oppose (b).
4. That I have only sufficient troops to oppose (b) in a minor degree.

Before, therefore, committing the Allied troops to combating the situation depicted at (a), it seems essential that I should know whether—

1. The Allied Governments intend me to deal with (a) or (b) above.
2. The Allied Governments will reinforce me, and, if so, to what extent and at what stage?

It must always be remembered that, once engaged, the withdrawal of the Allied forces under my command, or a change of policy from (a) to (b), would be a very difficult operation, and would certainly have very serious consequences for the lives and properties of Christian inhabitants in Constantinople.

The extent to which either Constantinople or the Dardanelles position could be held must depend on the situation. If the Greeks were out of the field, and the whole weight of Turkey was thrown against the Allies, it would only be possible to hold the above positions as rearguard actions, unless reinforcements of considerable strength were available.

I am well aware that under present circumstances, owing to the uncertainty of the Greek offensive and other matters, it may be difficult for the Allied Governments to give me any guidance, but I ask that the matter may be seriously considered, and that arrangements be made to give me definite instructions without delay should the situation develop quickly.

C. H. HARRINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*  
*Allied Commander-in-chief.*

[E 8224/1/44]

No. 10.

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 664. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, July 12, 1921.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the policy of the Angora Government, I have the honour to forward herewith two documents of the greatest interest, the first of which has reached me from a very secret source, whilst the second is the uncensored version of an article in the Constantinople "Journal d'Orient" of the 3rd July, taken, I understand, from the semi-official Angora Telegraph Agency.

2. Your Lordship will not fail to be struck by the insistence of both Fevzi Pasha and Yussuf Kemal Bey in the determination of Angora to secure the whole of the programme embodied in the national pact, and by Fevzi Pasha's reaffirmation of the policy of collaborating with the Bolsheviks and building up an alliance of Islamic States.

3. It is possible to argue that such utterances are intended for home rather than for foreign consumption, and that Mustapha Kemal and his Minister, while anxious to show themselves not less zealous than the extremist group which looks to Enver Pasha, are in reality anxious to cut adrift from the Bolsheviks and to compromise with the Allies. This theory is so attractive that the Western observers are a little apt to be beguiled by its inherent charm. Personally, I am not prepared to accept it without more definite evidence than I at present have that Mustapha Kemal and his party are prepared to weaken on the essentials of the national pact, i.e., armistice frontiers, and complete independence within the territory so defined.

4. I think the position at present might be roughly summed up as follows:—

- (a.) The Bolsheviks might prefer Enver to Mustapha Kemal, but they do value the alliance of Angora too highly to break with Mustapha Kemal so long as he does not rule the roast there.
- (b.) The Kemalists do not want Enver back, and they do not want either Bolshevism or Bolshevik ascendancy in Asia Minor, but they value an alliance with the Bolsheviks too highly to risk any rupture.
- (c.) Mustapha Kemal and his adherents have uphill work to maintain their ascendancy in the national movement, but they are still strong enough and idealistic enough not to contemplate any weakening on the essentials of the national pact for the sake of an easy settlement with the Allies.

5. I do not deny the possibility that the course of events may make it necessary to revise these three propositions later on. It is, for instance, possible that the Bolsheviks may endeavour, through Enver or otherwise, to establish a grip on Anatolia similar to their grip on the Caucasus republics. It is also possible, though, in my opinion, less probable, that Mustapha Kemal may be weakened to the point of seeking a compromise with the Allies rather than lose his power. I believe, however, that the above propositions accurately represent the situation to-day.

6. I have observed in the two Angora papers during June a rather marked absence of direct diatribes against Great Britain, except for the two onslaughts reproduced in my despatch No. 653 of the 8th instant and a leading article by Yunus Nadi in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 22nd June, which is entitled "The 'Times' and the 'Yeni Gyun,'" and which, though not intemperate in expression, is generally hostile. This restraint is not without significance, but I see in it rather a desire to avoid new provocation of Great Britain than any indication of a real change of heart. Angora as a whole is "out for" the whole of the national pact, and, while, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 651 of the 6th July, there are doubtless many Nationalists who would like a settlement with Europe, if only the national pact (even with a modicum of financial control, perhaps) could be secured, the prevailing feeling is one of hostility to all foreign influence and of hope that sooner or later Turkey may find herself at the head of a combine of Islamic States.

7. The fundamental xenophobia to which I have just alluded is rather well illustrated by two articles in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 24th June and the "Hakimiet-i Milliye" of the same date. The first reproduces in a mourning border, under the heading of "Two more Victims," an extract from the French paper "Stamboul," of Constantinople, relative to the execution of two Turks in Constantinople sentenced to death by a French court-martial for the murder of two French soldiers. The "Yeni Gyun" raises no question as to the truth or otherwise of the charge, but represents it as an intolerable situation that Turks should be "martyred" on Turkish soil under foreign law. The other article deals with the American missionaries, whom it attacks roundly on the ground that their charitable and educational activities cloak a desire to contaminate Islam by the spread of Christianity, and that they constitute both a religious and a political menace.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,  
*Acting High Commissioner*



*Nationalist Policy.*

(Secret.)

ACCORDING to information obtained from a prominent member of the Nationalist Committee in Constantinople, secret sittings of the great Nationalist Assembly were held on the 24th and 27th June. On the first occasion, Mustapha Fevzi Pasha, in the course of his speech regarding the foreign policy of the Angora Government, stated that the Government still held to the national pact in its entirety. He referred to certain telegrams received from the national representatives in Europe concerning the Allied mediation proposals, and stated that, although the Government had taken no definite decision in the matter, its policy was well defined by the national pact. So long as the Powers gave no guarantees for the fulfilment of the claims defined in the national pact, the Government could not commence negotiations. No official communications concerning the Allied offer had been received, but that was no reason why the Government should not inform its representatives in Europe of the Government's point of view regarding the matter. Mustapha Fevzi then stated that the Government possessed positive information to the effect that the Greeks would agree to no intervention before resorting to force once again, but the Turkish army was quite prepared to undergo the test, and he added that if the Greeks believed the Angora Government would still confine itself, after having been obliged to make further heavy sacrifices in blood and material, to the demands formulated hitherto, they were making a profound mistake.

On the 27th June, Fevzi Pasha replied, in the name of the Government, to a motion submitted by Veli Bey, Deputy for Burdur, to the following effect:—

"The widespread rumours which have reached even this Assembly, and according to which the Soviet Government on the one hand had failed to fulfil its obligations, and the Angora Government, on the other, has decided, in contravention of its Oriental policy as pursued since its creation, to cease to afford any further assistance to the Moslems of Syria and Mesopotamia, are nothing more nor less than the calumnious inventions of our interior and exterior enemies. The Government of Angora, following the necessity in the interests of the nation of shaping its general policy in accordance with the currents of European policy, has not hitherto regarded, and does not at present regard, it as advisable to publish an official denial of these rumours. As, however, the principle which we have practised requires this Assembly's being regularly informed of its true policy, certain explanations are necessary.

"The Soviet Government has fully honoured its engagements, and during the last two months has advanced to our Government £T. 1,200,000 gold. We have also received munitions for the heavy and light artillery transferred to the western front from Armenia and Georgia, more than 6,000,000 cartridges for rifles and machine guns, 3,700 chains for cavalry and artillery, material for torpedoes and mines, together with large quantities of clothing and other equipment obtained and sent to us in various ways. All these articles are either in our depots or in the hands of our troops at the present moment. Furthermore, a mixed military commission has received the support of the Soviet Government for the organisation of an army consisting of two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, several battalions of storm troops, together with aircraft and automobiles. Our General Staff has not, however, considered it to be necessary for the moment that this army should be summoned to our frontiers. Moreover, in Azerbaijan, Daghestan and in Transcaspia Turco-Russian military missions are actively organising recruiting centres. The new political and military mission which we recently sent to Moscow will make an effort to the end that this assistance may be still further increased. It will be seen from the figures I have given that the rumour upon which the motion is based is absolutely groundless.

"With reference to the alleged abandonment of the Government of its Oriental policy, I may say that in this regard also the Government will under no circumstances depart from the policy adopted with the consent of the Great National Assembly. It is true that, within the limits of the powers accorded by the Government to the Assembly on previous occasions, we have attempted to harmonise our policy with the present necessities of the general political situation, but this does not by any means signify a departure from our true policy. As with Afghanistan, our Government is about to contract an alliance with the Persian nation, and thus to take another step in the direction of the ideal of an

Islamic United States of the Orient. With greater attention than ever we are following the course of events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and we are proving our deep sympathy for our brethren in religion, who are striving to attain true independence. Evidence of this sympathy may be found in the circumstance of our having maintained upon the Mesopotamian front, in view of important events which may occur there, the troops which it had been proposed should be sent to the Western front.

"For various reasons connected with the higher interests of the nation we beg the Assembly to believe that at the present moment we cannot openly exercise a more efficacious activity; in due time we will give the Assembly further details on the subject.

"Our High Command is also very disappointed that, after the sacrifices made during the last three months, we cannot take the offensive immediately, although the combative spirit of the army has increased enormously. We know how much the Turkish nation has need of putting an end as soon as possible to this state of war in order that it may heal its wounds with the balm of peace, and we understand the impatience shown by certain deputies. We are not prevented from undertaking an offensive for military reasons, or out of fear that the offensive may fail, but for certain political reasons we are practically sure that the military success which we shall obtain when the Greeks commence their offensive will serve our national cause still better; for if we undertake an offensive ourselves the slightest check that we may suffer, under no matter what circumstances, will be greatly to the advantage of our adversaries. This has been clearly pointed out to us by certain friendly political circles, and under these circumstances we prefer to maintain a defensive attitude for a short time longer, and to await the Hellenic defensive, which will probably not be long delayed."

Fevzi Pasha's speech was much longer than the summary given above, but all the essential points have been included.

At the close of the sitting the Assembly unanimously recorded a vote of confidence in the Government.

*Note.*—With regard to the passage in the above report referring to the recruiting of Moslems in Eastern Caucasia and the Transcaspian areas, there is evidence from a very sure source that Mustapha Kemal is in communication with Jemal Pasha, and his attitude towards the latter is described as most friendly. It is also certain that Bedri Bey is in communication with the Nationalist leaders as well as with Ali Fuad Pasha, and that the latter is also in communication with Jemal Pasha. Under these circumstances it would appear that the recent attacks upon Enver in the Angora press were not all that they seemed on the surface. Further, with regard to the alleged attitude of the Nationalists towards the Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, evidence has been obtained that preparations for the carrying out of a definite pan-Islamic campaign have been perfected by the Angora Administration, and that the Oriental policy to which reference is made in the above report is indeed an integral part of the Kemalist programme.

Constantinople, July 6, 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

*Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of July 3, 1921.*

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ANGORA.

YOUSSEF KÉMAL BEY, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement d'Angora, a fait à la séance du 27 juin de l'Assemblée nationale les déclarations suivantes :

"Je considère de mon devoir de fournir à votre haute Assemblée quelques renseignements généraux et succincts sur la politique extérieure de notre Gouvernement.

"Nous sommes sur le point de donner à nos relations politiques avec les Républiques du Caucase méridionale une forme plus précise et plus régulière. Nous espérons établir sous peu des relations régulières avec notre voisin l'État persan.



"Vous savez que les conventions qui ont été signées en Europe par mon honorable prédécesseur Bekir Sami Bey, chargé selon les pleins pouvoirs à lui remis, lors de son départ pour Londres, de défendre les droits du peuple turc et—comme cela a été clairement précisé dans lesdits pleins pouvoirs—autorisé à ce titre de signer la convention et traités qu'il jugerait nécessaire, ont été repoussées par votre haute Assemblée, les conventions ayant dépassé la compétence et les instructions qui lui avaient été remises.

"Notre Gouvernement, considérant cependant le fait en lui-même que le Gouvernement de la République française avait accepté de conclure une convention en vue de mettre fin à l'état de guerre existant, à un devoir de faire certaines propositions dans les bruits du serment national.

"Jusqu'à maintenant aucune réponse officielle ne nous est parvenue au sujet de l'acceptation ou du refus de ces propositions. Nous avons appris entre-temps que la plus grande partie des troupes françaises se trouvant à Zoungouldak ont été retirées. Au cours d'entretiens privés avec deux honorables personnalités françaises venues à Angora, nous avons cherché les moyens de supprimer l'état de guerre existant entre les deux peuples.

"Nous attendons aussi l'exécution des promesses qui nous ont été faites par l'Italie concernant le retrait de ses troupes se trouvant encore en territoire turc. Dans certains milieux on nous reproche de ne pas tenir notre parole.

"Le Turc musulman est essentiellement un homme de parole. Cette qualité est reconnue par le monde entier; amis ou ennemis s'accordent à lui rendre cet hommage. Mais pour qu'il soit valable il doit être pris dans les conditions requises. Nous ne pouvons être aucunement tenus par des paroles ou des faits qui ne sauraient nullement être attribués à notre Gouvernement et à notre Assemblée. Au cours de la séance du 30 mai, notre Président du Conseil avait exposé les lignes principales de notre politique étrangère. A mon tour je ne ferai que répéter ses paroles.

"La politique que nous suivons et que nous sommes fermement décidés à suivre à l'avenir ne peut pas s'écarter des principes posés par la Grande Assemblée nationale et en général par tout le peuple. Notre politique étrangère ne peut pas viser d'autre but que la reconnaissance de nos droits nationaux et de notre indépendance complète dans les limites de nos frontières, à notre souveraineté entière, et notre libre développement à l'abri de toute intervention étrangère. Pour cette raison, nous nous ferons les amis de ceux qui reconnaissent officiellement et effectivement la légitimité de notre cause. Nous nous efforçons de défendre notre droit contre ceux qui veulent nous l'arracher par force.

"Nous sommes convaincus que les peuples qui connaissent la valeur de la liberté et de l'indépendance reconnaîtront ainsi, tôt ou tard, notre bon droit.

"Nous aussi nous voulons progresser dans le domaine de la civilisation.

"Mais le peuple turc désire être le maître sur le sol natal."

A l'issue de ces déclarations, Youssouf Kémal Bey a demandé à l'Assemblée un vote de confiance sans réserve ni conditions en faveur du Cabinet.

La motion a été acceptée à la majorité des voix.

Angora, le 28 juin 1921.

[E 8228/1/44]

No. 11.

Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 670.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 13, 1921.

CONSIDERABLE prominence was given in the Constantinople press a few days ago to an account of the reception of the new Russian Ambassador in Angora by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials on the 27th June.

2. I have now procured a copy of the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of Angora of the 28th June, which gives the speeches exchanged on the occasion. They are not of sufficient importance to have translated *in extenso*, but a summary may interest your Lordship.

3. The Ambassador, Comrade Nachekanof, began by saluting the people of "Revolutionary Turkey" engaged in a triumphant struggle against the black and yellow internationalists of capitalism. He emphasised the greater scale of the effort now

imposed on nations desirous of freedom, as compared with the past, and the need for common action. The Moscow Treaty of the 16th March was a guarantee that neither Russia nor Turkey would endure bondage. They were the first to have raised the standard of revolution, and would be an example to other nations in the revolutionary struggle for the salvation of the world. Russia, having broken the chains of capitalism, had relinquished the blood-stained legacies of Tsarism, and put aside all treaties concluded by it. It had adopted the principle of freedom and self-determination for small peoples, and substituted for the old treaties pacts freely concluded between equals. It had become the natural ally of all nations fighting for freedom, first and foremost the eastern nations, and consequently of Turkey. It was not the Russian people but their despotic rulers and aristocracy desirous of world conquest who had sought to raise the cross on the domes of St. Sophia. The new treaty must be, and would be, the guiding star of the two peoples who were at last enabled to know each other. Difficult stages on the road had still to be traversed.

4. The Ambassador, after some references of the usual kind to the struggle of the Russian people against their enemies at home and abroad, went on to call upon the Turkish nation to play its part and to defend its country against Western Europe. The Treaty of Sévres sought to reduce Turkey to the level of a small Power. Its capital was to be taken from it. The Marmora basin was to be usurped. Two-thirds of Asia Minor was to pass into French and Italian spheres of influence. In the shred of territory to be left to it, it was to be condemned to perpetual slavery and indebtedness to the bankers of Western Europe. Turkey had already, by an admirable effort, broken a part of its chains. It needed but a little blow to shatter them completely, and the time was not far distant when, undefeated and proud, it would direct its new life as it pleased. That this should be so, the Ambassador concluded, was Russia's fervent wish, and he begged Mustafa Kemal Pasha to accept his expression thereof.

5. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, after welcoming the Ambassador, echoed his language as to the importance of the joint struggle for life and independence, and the naturalness of the alliance between nations engaged therein. He commented with satisfaction on the renunciation by Russia of the old treaties, the blood-stained legacy of Tsarism, the establishment of a new basis for Turkey's international existence, and the treaty concluded at Moscow in March. He spoke of the difficulties of the past and the future, and expressed confidence that the latter would be surmounted like the former. An attempt had been made to reproduce the restrictions imposed on the old Turkish Empire in a death sentence, namely, the Treaty of Sévres. The nation, realising the calamities which it had suffered before from not being master of its own destinies, and, perceiving that the Treaty of Sévres aimed at re-creating the same state of affairs, had asserted its own sole sovereignty. It had set up a Government on this basis. It had assured and would retain control of its own destinies. The new form of administration was entirely suited to the needs and social conditions of the people. He concluded by thanking the Ambassador for what he had said, and expressed the hope that his efforts would strengthen the friendship between the two peoples.

6. The letters of credence contain nothing of particular interest.

7. It is significant that while echoing to the full the Ambassador's language as to co-operation between Russia and Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha made no use of the words "revolution" and "capitalism" which occurred so frequently in the Ambassador's speech, much less did he refer to anything in the nature of world revolution. He made it perfectly plain that, so far as Turkey was concerned, the basis for the future must be a national basis. He several times mentioned the Ottoman Empire as a thing of the past, but rather as a victim of restrictions imposed by Europe than as a counter-part to the blood-stained Empire of the Tsars. His language throughout his speech was that of a conscious equal, not that of a grateful client. His reference to the suitability of the new Anatolian system to the needs and social conditions of the people was too pointed not to have been intended as a warning that Turkey was an ally, not a new pasture for communism. It is noteworthy that no mention was made on either side of Islam or of other Asiatic States, except for a very sketchy reference to the latter in the Ambassador's speech.

8. I venture to think that, so far as anything can be inferred from these public utterances, they bear out the theory of the present position as between Turkey and Russia which I have set out in my despatch No. 664 of the 12th instant.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,  
Acting High Commissioner.



[E 8153/382/93]

No. 12.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Signor de Martino.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1921.

CAREFUL consideration has been given to the note No. 629, which you were so good as to address to me on the 16th March, regarding the Franco-British Oil Agreement signed at San Remo in April 1920, and I now have the honour to offer the following observations, with which the French Government are, I understand, in complete agreement.

2. It is noted that the Italian Government do not desire at this stage to discuss further the application of this agreement in territories under a mandate. His Majesty's Government accept such a limitation of the discussion, and I would therefore request that nothing in my present note should be regarded as in any way relating to those territories, except where they are expressly mentioned.

3. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance to the economy of Italy of an increased supply of fuel, and they sympathise with the anxiety of the Italian Government to secure this object. Indeed, as the Italian Government will doubtless remember, His Majesty's Government gave practical evidence of their sympathy last year, not only by supporting, during the course of the negotiations at San Remo, the inclusion in the tripartite agreement of a provision giving Italy a practical monopoly in the future development of the rich Heraclea coal basin, but also by extending special facilities to Italy in the supply of coal from this country.

4. As I have already explained in previous correspondence with your Excellency and your predecessor, the intention of the San Remo agreement was not in any way either to establish a Franco-British monopoly in certain oil-fields or to prejudice the liberty of companies or individuals of other nationality to secure concessions or purchase oil. The objects of the agreement were simply to offer official support to the spontaneous co-operation, in place of the competition, of certain existing British and French oil interests in the countries falling within the scope of the agreement, and at the same time to afford facilities for the development, in certain circumstances, of the oil resources of Mesopotamia on the basis of reciprocal concessions.

5. In view of the misapprehension on these points which appears from certain passages in your note under reply still to exist, in spite of the explanation already offered by His Majesty's Government, I cannot sufficiently emphasise the fact that nothing in the San Remo oil agreement gives the right to any consumer in Great Britain or France, whether through the British or French Governments or through private interests, to purchase oil except on a strictly commercial and competitive basis. The Italian Government and the Italian nationals will have precisely the same facilities and will possess that "safety-valve," to which you allude, in a source of supply which will become more effective as oil production in the east is developed. Further, the economic advantage which Italy possesses in her comparative proximity to the Eastern fields will remain entirely unprejudiced, if not enhanced, by any such increase in the world's production of oil as may result from Franco-British co-operation under the above-mentioned agreement.

6. In the last paragraph of my note of the 18th January, an invitation was implicitly extended to the Italian Government to formulate some concrete proposals tending to co-operation in the development of existing oil interests in whatsoever country situated. I regret that no trace of any such proposals can be found in your note. Indeed, apparently dissatisfied with the full and frank explanation which His Majesty's Government have already offered, the Italian Government, far from offering any suggestion which might form the basis of a subsequent Italo-British or Franco-Italo-British agreement, merely propose that His Majesty's Government should make a public communication to the Italian Government, amounting in practice to an admission of Italy to the full benefits of the San Remo oil agreement, while no advantage is to be conceded by Italy either to France or Great Britain in return.

7. The Italian Government suggest that this public communication should comprise four distinct points, concerning which I have the honour to offer the following observations:—

As regards—

(a.) I would observe that His Majesty's Government are quite unable, even if they were willing, to prevent individual British groups and firms from competing for concessions in any country, and the San Remo agreement does not in any way interfere

with the liberty of British or French nationals who endeavour to acquire oil rights without enlisting official assistance. His Majesty's Government regret that they could not, therefore, give any such assurance as that proposed.

(b.) I would recall to you that His Majesty's Government have already informed the Italian Government that the San Remo agreement gives no privileges to French interests in British colonies which are not in practice equally available to Italian nationals, and in the circumstances they do not feel that any repetition of their assurance can be required.

(c.) His Majesty's Government possess no interest in ex-enemy concessions or shares in any ex-enemy oil interests so far as the territories covered by the present note are concerned. Such interests, if any, are held by British groups and firms in whose commercial arrangements His Majesty's Government cannot properly interfere. In any case, His Majesty's Government understand that, even if they were in a position to make and carry out a declaration in the sense of paragraph 5 (c) of your note, as is not the case, the latter would be in practice valueless, since no ex-enemy oil properties are believed to be now in the least likely to become available for acquisition.

(d.) I have already expressed surprise that the British and French Governments should be asked to admit the Italian Government to all the benefits of the Franco-British agreement without being offered any corresponding advantages in exchange.

8. For the above reasons His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to make the formal communication to the Italian Government suggested in your note. At the same time they do not wish that Italian public opinion should interpret this refusal as evidence of any lack of sympathy or goodwill on the part of His Majesty's Government towards the economic welfare of Italy, and they are anxious to do what they can to give further tangible proof of their sympathy. I would therefore draw your attention to the fact that, while the San Remo agreement provides for the joint support of British and French nationals in any common negotiations entered into by them, the opening of such negotiations is left entirely to private initiative. There is nothing whatever in the agreement to preclude British and Italian commercial groups of good standing making similar joint arrangements and receiving the joint support of their respective Governments in cases where the support of either Government has not already been accorded to other interests. It is essential, however, that the groups should take the first step and agree to act in concert. On that understanding and provided no pledge of official support has been already given elsewhere, if an Italian group and a British group, both of good standing, either alone or preferably in association with French interests, can arrange to enter into common negotiations for the acquisition of oil properties, His Majesty's Government would be ready to extend their support to the joint undertaking.

9. I should be glad if you would bring the foregoing to the attention of your Government and express to them the willingness of His Majesty's Government to make public a communication to the Italian Government by an exchange of notes or by some other means on the lines of the preceding paragraph.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 8613/1/44]

No. 13.

*Mr. Rattigan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 535.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 26, 1921.

ITALIAN High Commissioner informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has approached him with proposal to negotiate settlement between himself and Allied High Commissioners. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he can guarantee support of 65 per cent. of army in Anatolia and 65 per cent. of National Assembly.

Italian High Commissioner asked for my views on proposal.

He himself, at first sight, was in favour of it, as there was nothing to lose by it, and he thought it might be a means of effecting a settlement.

I replied that it seemed to me that best course was for Central Government to come to a preliminary agreement with Angora.

Italian High Commissioner agreed, but said that Minister for Foreign Affairs had, on this being pointed out, replied that there was nothing to be done with Angora.



Government. If, however, he could arrive at fair basis of settlement with Allied High Commissioners, he believed he could carry with him the whole of Anatolian population and majority of army and National Assembly.

Italian High Commissioner said that he was going on to consult French High Commissioner, and if latter approved, he would propose that we should submit matter to our Governments.

I observed that it was not quite true to say that we had nothing to lose by adopting proposal, as we should thereby be disclosing our hand without any real guarantee that basis arrived at would be accepted by Anatolia.

Italian High Commissioner agreed, but said that he considered Minister for Foreign Affairs a man of weight and calm judgment. He was therefore inclined to believe his assertion. Anyhow, proposal seemed only possible chance of settlement.

He did not think there was any real danger of settlement being prevented by Bolshevik armed intervention on the side of extremists, as there was no means of transport for Russian troops and supplies.

If I could feel sure that Minister for Foreign Affairs is justified in claiming support of majority of army and National Assembly, I would be strongly in favour of proposal, but I fear he is somewhat optimistic. There is, of course, risk that proposal may have been inspired by Mustafa Kemal with a view to ascertaining limit to which Allied Governments are prepared to go. But I do not believe this.

I would add that an official of Sublime Porte informed Mr. Matthews yesterday that Kiazim Karabekir had telegraphed to Sultan message of devotion and loyalty. This is significant in view of repeated rumours as to Karabekir's antagonism to extremists.

[E 8652/1/44]

No. 14.

*Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 949.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 20, 1921.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 372 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Addison has received the following information from a reliable source:—

1. Nazim Bey and Behaeddin Schakir (the former of whom had been Ministre des Cultes) have both gone to Moscow, and Bedri has gone to Kabul via Moscow.
2. Practically all the other prominent Turks have now established themselves in Munich. This they have done because the German Government cannot get at them in Munich or order them to leave Bavaria, and also because they feel that, if one of their number were murdered, he would not be acquitted by a Bavarian jury—hence a greater feeling of security.

The centre of the Turkish conspiracy in Germany is therefore Munich, and among the members of the Munich Committee there are the following prominent Turks:—

Nedjmeddin Mollah, a former Minister of Justice.

Kemal Bey.

Fethy Bey, formerly Turkish Minister in Sofia.

Mahmud Mukthar Pasha, formerly Turkish Ambassador in Berlin.

Ahmed Ihsan Bey, a big publisher and printer in Constantinople.

Colonel Remsi Bey, formerly aide-de-camp to the Sultan.

3. During the last few days General Ismael Hakki Pasha has been living at the Eden Hotel in Berlin. With him is a Spanish Jew from Constantinople, called Cambri. The object of Hakki Pasha's visit is to obtain deliveries of material ordered under Turkish contracts made with the Germans. This material was paid for, but was not delivered owing to the conclusion of the armistice. Hakki Pasha has come from Switzerland and is charged by the Angora Government with the duty of getting this material out of Germany to the Nationalist Government. It is not known precisely to what these contracts refer, as Hakki's negotiations are with the industrial firms concerned. It is supposed that he will attempt to get deliveries sent to Angora via Italy.

4. The informant had a piece of information which is by far the most important and which he assured me he knew from personal knowledge to be quite accurate. He said that for some time past an aide-de-camp of Mustapha Kemal, called Djemal Bey, has been residing secretly in Sofia and is negotiating with the Bulgarians for the supply of arms and ammunition from Bulgaria to the Turkish Nationalist Government. The informant asserted that most of the arms and ammunition which the Government of Mustapha Kemal had received, and were receiving, came from Bulgaria and proceeded from the stocks which the Bulgarian Government should have delivered, but which had been hidden. They are exported regularly from the Black Sea ports, from which it is easy to send small shipments at a time.

Djemal's chief job is to supervise and co-ordinate this traffic.

Further, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a report on the relations existing between the Russians, Turks and Afghans, which I have received from Major Breen.

I have, &c.

D'ABERNON.

Enclosure in No. 14.

*Report by Major Breen on Russian-Turkish-Afghan Relations.*

THE Emir Chekkib Arslan, president of the Oriental Club and leader of the Turkish Nationalists in Berlin since the death of Talaat, visited Moscow towards the end of June. After Enver's recent visit to Berlin the Emir informed me that Enver had invited him to visit Moscow, to make the acquaintance of the members of the Government and to discuss the Eastern situation generally with the envoys from Afghanistan and Angora. The Emir was not anxious to go to Moscow, as he shares the prejudice of the late Talaat Pasha in the matter of Russian-Turkish co-operation and he did not wish to arouse the impression among his Turkish friends that he had adopted Enver's policy unreservedly. In view of the value of first-hand reliable information from Moscow I urged him to go, on the ground that he could not afford to remain aloof in Berlin if important negotiations were taking place in Moscow. I met him yesterday in Berlin and learned that he had gone to Russia on the 18th June and returned here on the 4th July, having spent four days in Moscow. His reception in Russia was most flattering. A special railway car and good quarters in the Savoy Hotel, Moscow, were provided for him. Food was fairly good, his ration cards being those of a diplomatic representative of the first-class.

His visit coincided with the Congress of the Third International. Owing to the coming into force of the new Soviet regulation, permitting retail trade on certain conditions, shops were opening in Moscow and a slight revival of life was evident. The tram and train system still remains Socialist; no fares are paid.

He interviewed Trotsky and Chicherin, but Lenin was busy with the Third International and did not see him. Enver explained that Lenin was primarily an exponent of Communism and that, in view of the Emir's known dislike of the Soviet system, an interview might be embarrassing. Chicherin impressed him as a very able diplomat without any socialistic convictions. The Turkish and Afghan questions were treated from a purely Nationalist point of view and he was struck by the fact that there was little difference between the attitude of the Soviet Foreign Minister and his Tsarist predecessors when Turkish or Afghan relations were discussed.

The Emir had three interviews with Chicherin during his visit. He emphasised the need for further financial help for Angora, as hitherto only small sums had been advanced in gold. Chicherin replied that his Bolshevik colleagues were loath to advance more money owing to the effect on Russian public opinion of the recent murders at Trebizond. (A clause in the Turkish-Russian Agreement forbade Bolshevik propaganda. Nevertheless, a certain Turk, Mustapha Sub Hei [?], who had adopted Russian nationality and Soviet principles, arrived at Trebizond from Moscow with twelve supporters and commenced propaganda. The local inhabitants murdered the whole party.) Chicherin disclaimed official responsibility for this propaganda and stated that subordinate officials and political fanatics were violating the London and Angora Agreements and that the Government lacked the necessary information and authority to interfere. The Emir replied that Mustapha Kemal had been forced to obtain the recall of the Moscow representative at Angora as he also was engaged in propaganda.



Chicherin admitted this, but stated that it was difficult to draw the line between propaganda and justifiable diplomatic activity.

Chicherin was not unfavourable to an agreement between the Allies and the Angora Government. The question of Thrace was most difficult. He understood that Mr. Lloyd George had personally guaranteed this territory to the Greeks, or rather, to Veniselos personally. The English could afford to ignore their promise to Veniselos. The Emir replied that any Turkish influence in Constantinople was a fiction as long as the Greeks remained at Chatalja. The question of Thrace could be solved by a referendum. The representative of Angora in Moscow, Fuad Ali Bey, stated that the Bulgarians had pledged their support to the Turks in this matter, provided part of Western Thrace was assigned to them. They would organise bands for whom the Bulgarian Government would deny responsibility.

In the course of conversation with Kemal's representative Fuad Ali Bey, who is a very able man possessing the entire confidence of the Angora Government, the Emir ascertained that the French had gained in popularity owing to the extraordinary disappointment which the acquittal of Talaat's assassin had aroused. Fuad and the Emir agreed that any friendly feeling which existed between Turkey and her former ally was gone for ever. Members of the German Extreme Right and German Foreign Office officials deplored the verdict, but this could not alter the political effect of the acquittal in Mahommedan countries.

Reports from Beirut and Damascus indicated that the French were continuing their policy of conciliation and amnesty and that Gouraud's troops will probably be withdrawn gradually. The difficulty was Alexandretta. The French Government had had difficulty in obtaining the 250,000,000 fr. necessary for the Syrian undertaking this year and the Senate only voted the money on condition that no money would be required next year.

I asked the Emir if it were true that the Afghan delegation which visited Berlin had recruited German officers or technical personnel. He answered that arrangements were made for recruiting some engineers and technical advisers, as Djemal had a staff of twenty Turkish officers only, who lacked the necessary technical qualifications. The Emir had discussed the question with the Afghan representative in Moscow, Mahommat Eli, who ridiculed the idea that an attack on India, either alone or with Russia, was ever contemplated. Afghanistan wished to organise her army and construct roads as a defence, whether against Great Britain or Russia. The only cause of quarrel with the British Government was the unjust occupation of Waziristan. It was incorrect to say that the British had withdrawn their mission from Kabul. The Emir pointed out in this connection that, at the time of the visit of the Afghan delegation to Berlin, Pillai and the other Indian leaders were at no pains to conceal their hostility to the Afghans.

The Emir drew Chicherin's attention during his last interview before leaving Moscow to the futility of Bolshevik propaganda in Mahommedan countries. Chicherin agreed, but complained that even the English would not desist from propaganda and intrigue, alleging that he had definite proof that the British had imported 70,000 rifles into Kashgar which could only be for use against Russia.

When leaving Moscow Enver gave the Emir the explanation of the coolness which had existed between himself and Talaat since the war. After Talaat fled to Germany he regarded the situation as hopeless for Turkey and wrote a memoir in which he set out the causes of the Turkish defeat, stating *inter alia* that Enver and Djemal had violated the principles of the Committee of Union and Progress by amassing wealth. Although all copies of the memoir have been subsequently destroyed, Enver retained one and never quite forgave Talaat.

The Emir's general impression of Russia was not interesting, as his visit was too short. He considered that public opinion was in a state of evolution. Chicherin frankly expressed the view that the only bond between Turkey and Russia was that of mutual advantage by co-operation. Angora had obtained many advantages and Russia had obtained the Trade Agreement with Great Britain.

I asked the Emir if he foresaw difficulties with Russia in the event of the re-establishment of Turkish influence in Constantinople. He replied that Turkey would certainly be forced as before 1914 to act in concert with England or France to counteract Russian pressure.

July 14, 1921.

[E 9009/143/44]

No. 15.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 325.)

My Lord,

Athens, July 26, 1921.

IT is a curious fact that the Greeks are universally convinced—not, I suppose, the Government, but the man in the street—that they enjoy the full sympathy and moral support at least of Great Britain, and I think most of them believe that His Majesty's Government are actually helping them—I do not know how. Individual acquaintances frequently express to me their gratitude for England's attitude, which I find somewhat embarrassing, and my deprecating murmurs that we are doing nothing are simply brushed aside.

In the very early hours of the morning after the receipt of the news, first of the fall of Kutahia and then of that of Eskishehr, large crowds came to His Majesty's Legation (I was, perhaps fortunately, sleeping out of Athens) and cheered vociferously for England, the King and the Prime Minister, and sang "God save the King." His Majesty's consular officers at Salonica and Volo report similar demonstrations at the consulate-general and vice-consulate.

Ever since the first good news came in the streets are full of flags, among which the Union Jack is almost as prominent as the Greek flag; there are a considerable number of Roumanian flags, and, at the most, three or four French ones.

The papers make constant statements regarding the extremely friendly and helpful attitude of the British High Commission and military and naval authorities at Constantinople.

It seems hardly conceivable, but I think that the possibility should be reckoned with of an attempted *coup de main* to seize Constantinople. The Greeks are very impulsive, and very prone to believe what they wish to believe. They are already suffering from "swollen head" owing to their successes against Kemal, and they are really almost capable of believing that Great Britain would be glad—or at least not averse—to see them in possession of Constantinople. Hardly a paper appears without some reference to Constantinople as the next and final objective, and the offer which the Greek Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to make to your Lordship (see my telegram No. 397 of the 11th instant) of a Greek division in Thrace, to be placed under the orders of General Harington, may possibly be an indication that the Government themselves are not strangers to such an idea. The "Constantinople division" is common talk in Athens.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

[E 9010/143/44]

No. 16.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 326.)

My Lord,

Athens, July 26, 1921.

IT is impossible to obtain here any really reliable news regarding events in Asia Minor. The General Staff—or, rather, its representatives at Athens—speak apparently quite freely and frankly to the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, but, if they do, they receive singularly little detailed information from the front; the French Military Mission, from which we could in M. Veniselos's time often obtain details and corrections of the information given by the Greeks, are now worse than useless for that purpose, as the present Greek authorities thoroughly distrust them owing to France's pro-Kemalist policy and tell them nothing, and the natural result is that General Gramat always takes the blackest possible view of Greek operations and prospects; members of the Government, such as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, tell one that the Greek victories are complete and overwhelming, but that they have received no details whatever.

It appears to be certain that the Greek advance has been uniformly successful and has been carried out with quite extraordinary rapidity, but, putting two and two



together, it looks as if the Turks had always intended to retire before the Greeks and that only rear-guard actions have been fought to protect the retirement. There must have been time by now to have made a pretty accurate estimate at least of the numbers of prisoners, guns, &c., captured, and the fact that no such estimate has been officially published—except a reference to forty guns, which may refer to total captures or only to those captured during the Turkish counter-attack north of Eski-Shehr—seems to indicate plainly that the captures have not been great. I gather, in fine, that the captures of Afium-Karahissar, Kutahia and Eski-Shehr were great moral successes, as they must have had a great effect, in opposite senses, on the *moral* of the Greeks and Turks, but that they were not important military victories. On the other hand, if the Greek official account of the Turkish counter-offensive on Eski-Shehr on the 21st July and its conversion into a rout is true—and I do not think we have the right to doubt it—that would seem to be a great military victory.

The Greek press and Greek public opinion, here in Athens at all events, have accepted these successes without hesitation as forming an absolutely complete victory, which may be regarded as one of the decisive victories of the world and as having already put an end to the Nationalist movement and secured the Greek position in Asia Minor. It is in the Greek nature to exaggerate and always to speak in superlatives, but I think they really are convinced that all this is at least very nearly true. This leads of course to very extravagant articles in the papers. One paper declares, "The Near East is ours; we are there alone, and in future our will alone will count in Eastern affairs. The districts which we have watered with our blood, and which are bound to us by the traditions of centuries, are ours and will remain ours." Another says, "All the nations have bent under the burden of the great war; only the Greek people has kept its moral force intact." Almost all the papers suggest, with varying directness, that the road for the Greek army from Eski-Shehr leads to Constantinople rather than to Angora, and one at least loudly declares the necessity for Greece, in these new circumstances, to include the rich valley of the Meander in her Asiatic annexations. Even the Veniselist papers admit that their great leader was hampered by international complications and was not able to secure for Greece those full rights which she must now, after her glorious victories, claim and vindicate; but they insist with truth on the fact that it was Veniselos who opened the door of Asia Minor for them and to whom the greatest credit is due for all they may achieve.

I enclose a French summary of an article in the "Politeia" of the 21st instant, which is a very good example of the prevailing train of thought.

The Royalist papers are especially concerned to prove that the victories are chiefly, if not entirely, due to King Constantine. They refer to him as the true soldier, sharing the dangers and discomforts of his men at the front (he remained in his villa at Smyrna till after the capture of Kutahia, and then went only as far as Ushak; the papers say that he is now at Kutahia). They argue that the Greek soldier has a superstitious devotion to King Constantine, which leads them to imagine that they see him among them dressed as a subordinate officer or a corporal or even a common soldier, and that it is this which gives them the strength and valour before which no Turk can stand. They maintain that the plan of campaign was prepared no doubt by the General Staff, but received the final touches which made it perfect from the King himself. Finally, they declare that it is only thanks to his insistence on maintaining neutrality during the first three years of the war that Greece is able to play her part to-day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Extract from the "Politeia" of July 21, 1921.

REVUE DE LA PRESSE ATHÉNIENNE.—LES REVENDICATIONS HELLÉNIQUES.

EN même temps que les premières nouvelles des victoires helléniques, la presse européenne a commencé à exprimer des craintes sur nos exigences. Ces craintes ne sont pas tout à fait injustifiées. Certainement, nous ne combattons pas pour le Roi de Prusse. Nous avons été laissés, sans aucun appui, à mener à bout une dure lutte, qui est et devait être considérée une continuation de la guerre européenne. La Turquie avait signé un armistice et un traité. Cependant, elle n'a pas déposé les

armes, mais elle a continué la guerre. Ce mouvement fut qualifié au début comme une rébellion contre les décisions des Puissances, contre la volonté des vainqueurs. Mais, petit à petit, la politique européenne l'appela un mouvement nationaliste et a fini par le considérer comme une question concernant les Turcs et les Grecs.

Après de longues luttes, nous pourrions invoquer nos droits sur la solidarité alliée; nous ne l'avons pas fait. D'ailleurs, des malentendus ayant trait à nos questions intérieures, qui n'ont aucune influence sur notre politique extérieure, ont été considérés comme de justes causes pour des points de vue opposés à ceux que dictait la lutte commune. Nous combattons donc seuls aujourd'hui et cette guerre qui se poursuit, sans la participation mais avec la tolérance des Puissances, est une affaire purement gréco-turque. Par conséquent, le traité aussi sera une affaire purement gréco-turque. Ce qui doit être seulement particulièrement relevé, c'est que nous prenons en considération les grands intérêts mondiaux; non, certes, les intérêts de chaque Puissance, ce qui est impossible, étant donné qu'ils s'opposent les uns aux autres sur de nombreux points, mais les intérêts de tous les peuples, les intérêts de la paix et surtout de la paix en Orient.

Si la guerre en Asie Mineure n'est pas considérée par les Puissances comme une continuation de la guerre européenne, nous la considérons avec raison comme la dernière phase de la lutte d'indépendance commencée il y a 100 ans. Nous ne comprenons pas ce que la presse européenne entend par exigences exagérées. Nos exigences sont depuis un siècle les mêmes. Les pères des Européens d'aujourd'hui les considéraient alors très justes et s'enthousiasmaient de nos idéaux. Si leurs descendants, aujourd'hui transformés en matérialistes, ne s'enthousiasment plus, ce n'est pas de notre faute. Pour prouver combien ces idéaux sont grands et élevés, il suffit de considérer qu'ils ébranlent un peuple de 10,000,000 et qu'ils concentrent une armée de 300,000 hommes accomplissant des miracles de vaillance, d'endurance et d'impétuosité. Ces idéaux ne seront réalisés que quand le dernier Grec et le moindre pouce de territoire hellénique seront libérés, quand la Grèce comme État s'étendra jusqu'à ses frontières nationales.

[E 9282/143/44]

No. 17.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 734.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a note, dated the 16th July, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government, and addressed to the foreign representatives at Constantinople.

2. A verbal protest has been made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Porte against the entirely false statements made in the concluding sentence of the penultimate paragraph.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Foreign Representatives at Constantinople.

À SON Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de France, M. le Haut-Commissaire d'Angleterre, M. le Haut-Commissaire d'Italie, M. le Haut-Commissaire du Japon, M. le Haut-Commissaire des États-Unis, M. le Ministre d'Espagne, M. le Ministre des Pays-Bas; à son Éminence Mgr. Dolei (délégué apostolique), M. le Ministre de Suède, M. le Ministre de Danemark; à Constantinople:

Le complot ourdi par les ennemis du peuple turc en vue de l'anéantir se développe avec une rigueur implacable: d'un côté, l'armée grecque fait le désert dans toutes les régions qu'elle occupe et massacre la population sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe; d'autre part, les sociétés secrètes grecques et, entre autres, la fameuse société dénommée "Pontus," dans le but de constituer sur les rives de la mer Noire un État hellénique, où une petite minorité grecque dominerait comme à Smyrne la majorité musulmane turque, sont en pleine activité.

Ces sociétés ont provoqué, il y a quelques semaines, des soulèvements armés dans la province de Samsoun afin d'attirer loin du théâtre principal de la guerre le plus de



forces turques possible et de faciliter ainsi l'offensive du Roi Constantin. Les bandes, de leur côté, ont copieusement ravitaillé en armes et en munitions les villages grecs, où de nombreux dépôts clandestins avaient été constitués au lendemain de l'armistice de 1918, ravageant le pays et massacrant tous les villageois musulmans qui leur tombent sous les mains.

Si l'on rapproche de ces événements le fait que le "Journal officiel" du Gouvernement grec a publié, le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet dernier, l'ordre de mobilisation de toutes les personnes de la race grecque, y compris les Grecs qui sont citoyens turcs vivant en Anatolie et appartenant aux classes 1920-21 incluses, on peut se rendre compte que les sociétés grecques secrètes en provoquant les soulèvements précités ne font qu'obéir aux ordres d'Athènes et attaque par derrière notre armée, que l'armée grecque attaque d'autre part par devant. De plus, les autorités britanniques de Constantinople dans la prétendue zone neutre qu'ils ont fait déclarer autour de cette ville, arment des bandes grecques et arméniennes avec l'intention de faire massacrer la paisible population musulmane de la capitale.

Devant ces attentats contre sa vie et contre son indépendance, l'exaspération du peuple turc a atteint son paroxysme. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie constate le degré de sur-excitation extraordinaire où se trouve le pays, déclare que toute la responsabilité de représailles qui pourrait être exercé par le peuple turc retomberait entièrement sur les Grecs, dont les crimes ont comblé toutes les mesures. A tous ces crimes nous pouvons opposer avec fierté la parfaite discipline dont font constamment preuve nos troupes et l'humanité dont témoigne à toutes occasions notre peuple. Nous ne voulons pour preuve que le témoignage et les déclarations des représentants même de l'Entente et, entre autres, celles des membres du comité d'enquête venu dernièrement à Ismid et dont faisait partie le Général anglais Franks, le Colonel italien Vitale et le Capitaine français Lucas.

YOUSSEUF KEMAL,  
Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Angora, le 16 juillet 1921.

[E 9284/143/44]

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 739.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 6, 1921.

I RETURNED to Constantinople on the 31st ultimo and was immediately informed that Marshal Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wished to see me the next day.

2. The Marshal came accordingly, accompanied by Hamid Bey, President of the Ottoman Red Crescent. I have reported in my telegram No. 549 of the 1st instant the substance of what passed at this interview, and I would only propose in the present despatch to amplify that telegram in one or two particulars.

3. In view of the fact that this was the first occasion on which I had received Izzet Pasha in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, I considered it strange that he should have been accompanied by an unofficial person such as Hamid Bey, whom we have every reason to suspect is a French agent. It is alleged, in fact, that in that capacity he is concerned to prevent as far as possible any rapprochement between the British and Turkish authorities, and, all the more, a settlement of the Turkish question partly through the good offices of His Majesty's Government.

4. Both Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey seemed depressed, though not to the point of making any concrete proposal for mediation. It was obvious that they were merely throwing out feelers as to whether intervention at this stage would be considered by His Majesty's Government. They themselves had no concrete policy to propose, so I confined myself to telling them that the first step would be to bring Angora into line with the Constantinople Government, and, above all, to face the facts of the situation and decide what it might be possible to obtain from the Allies and the Greeks. From the fact that Hamid Bey declared that the Nationalist Government still took its stand on the Nationalist pact and that Izzet Pasha said that Constantinople must have more elbow-room, i.e., an extension of territory in Thrace, I inferred that the Turks have not yet put any water in their wine.

5. I took the opportunity at this interview to remind Izzet Pasha and Hamid Bey that the attitude of the Angora Government in connection with the Prisoners Agree-

ment had caused great irritation in England and was bad policy on the part of the Nationalists.

6. I saw the Grand Vizier on the 3rd instant, on which occasion his Highness informed me that he meant to get into touch with the Angora Government and ascertain the terms on which they would be willing, on their part, to put an end to the present war. Tewfik Pasha distinctly stated that if, in the opinion of his Government, these terms had a chance of being accepted by the Allied Powers and the Greeks, he would address the three Allied Powers with a formal demand for intervention. He stated that he did not believe in the Bolshevik bogey with which the Nationalists were trying to frighten the Allied Powers. On the other hand, he maintained that the Greeks had not accomplished what they had set out to do, i.e., the destruction of the Nationalist army.

7. The Grand Vizier further informed me that the Sultan had shown an interest in my movements and wished to see me. I am to be received in private audience by His Majesty this afternoon.

8. On leaving the Grand Vizier I proceeded to return the visit paid me by Izzet Pasha, to whom I reported what had passed between Tewfik Pasha and myself. Izzet Pasha was much more vague in his statements. He said that he had sent Fethi Bey to Angora to sound the Angora Government. He also thought of sending some other person, but I derived the impression that he is really only temporising in the expectation that the Greeks will have shot their bolt in perhaps a month from now, and that the situation will by then have turned to the advantage of the Nationalists.

9. It is evident that the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha are recovering from the dismay caused by the initial Greek successes.

10. I impressed on Izzet Pasha that the Nationalists would be well advised to show moderation, and that after the experience the Allied Governments had had of the Angora Government in connection with the London Conference of March last, they would have to be convinced of the good faith of that Government in any future dealings with it. I said that the Angora Government could give proof of their good intentions by immediately releasing the British prisoners of war still detained by them.

11. Izzet Pasha replied that an all-for-all exchange might be effected, as we were still detaining a certain number of Turks at Malta. I pointed out that several of these Turks were definitely accused of atrocities against the Armenians and ill-treatment of British prisoners of war, and would be tried eventually. Izzet Pasha stated that we were detaining one Mustapha Abdul Khalik Bey, whom he described as a "saint," incapable of doing any wrong. I subsequently looked up the record of this alleged "saint," and find that he was Vali of Bitlis in 1914-15 and Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior. He was a brother-in-law of Talaat and was implicated in massacres.

12. Speaking of the conference in Paris in June, Izzet Pasha maintained that the Greeks had been warned by the Allies that they would not be allowed to benefit by any successes they might obtain. I said that this was an incorrect statement. The Greeks had been warned that if they decided that they were not prepared to accept outside advice the Allied Powers could not persevere in an action which would be useless. The responsibility for the consequences of the resumption of hostilities would in that case rest exclusively on the Greeks themselves. Finally, Izzet Pasha apologised for bringing Hamid Bey to see me on the 1st instant, and I admitted that I was sorry that he had done so.

13. The Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha called on me yesterday afternoon. The fact that Izzet Pasha accompanied the Grand Vizier led me to suppose that the two wished to pursue the conversations which had taken place on the 1st and 3rd instant, but although I tried to lead the conversation in the direction which I believed they wished it to take, they made no reference to the war in Anatolia. This confirmed my belief that, in spite of their statement that they could not sit with folded hands and watch the further progress of the struggle, they are not seriously thinking of an immediate appeal for intervention.

14. It may be that the Sultan has been bringing pressure to bear on his Ministers to take some steps to try and bring the war to an end, and that the Ministers consider that they have done all that is necessary in holding the language which they have held, first to Mr. Rattigan and then to myself.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.



[E 9286/143/44]

No. 19.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 742.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, August 9, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sultan received me in private audience on Saturday, the 6th instant. His Majesty began by enquiring whether I had suffered from the heat during the journey out here. I replied that the heat wave in England had been very prolonged and had apparently extended to France. His Majesty then said that Turkey was so burnt up morally and materially that nobody in this part of the world troubled himself about the temperature.

2. I then delivered to the Sultan a message which the King had authorised me to give him to the effect that His Majesty hoped that the Sultan would soon reign over a united Turkey at peace with her neighbours. The Sultan expressed great gratification at the King's message and enquired after His Majesty's health, saying that Sovereigns took a natural interest in each other. He also said that he knew that the King and his Ministers had a sympathetic understanding of the Near Eastern question.

3. The Sultan went on to say that those who were responsible for the present distress of Turkey amounted to only 10 per cent. of the total population.

4. The Sultan asked why England had not intervened to stop the present hostilities once and for all. I said that I failed to perceive what practical means the Allies had of stopping the war in Asia Minor or of ordering either the Greeks or the Nationalists. The Allies were heartily tired of war and disorder, and desired peace above all things.

5. The Sultan said that he was not a diplomatist, but was convinced that the despatch of a couple of warships to Smyrna and of one or two other ships to the Aegean and Black Sea would be sufficient to bring the parties at present in conflict to reason.

6. His Majesty asked how it was that Germany, a nation of 60,000,000, obeyed the injunctions of the Allies, whilst a small country like Greece appeared able to defy them. I pointed out that Germany was a former enemy and was now disarmed, whereas Greece had fought on our side towards the end of the war and possessed a considerable army.

7. The Sultan then enquired whether he was to infer that the present hostilities were to continue indefinitely. If so, Anatolia would be completely destroyed and the whole country ruined. I said that I did not think that the war would continue indefinitely, but that the moment for intervention did not seem to me to have come. I drew His Majesty's attention to a telegram which had appeared in the press a day or two previously, reporting a statement of Mr. Chamberlain's in the House of Commons to the effect that the Allies were awaiting the proper moment for intervention. The Sultan received this information with considerable satisfaction.

8. He then said that his Government had tried every means of getting into contact with the authorities at Angora and had failed. The Constantinople Government were now as a last resort sending Salih Pasha to France and Italy to get into contact with Kemalist agents in those places. This statement has been confirmed to me from other sources.

9. The Sultan showed me marked friendliness and courtesy throughout the interview. He excused himself for having mentioned the distress of his country to me, and then said that he was a Turk of the old school. I replied that anything connected with His Majesty's Empire and person was naturally of the greatest interest to myself.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

[E 9288/143/44]

No. 20.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 745.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, August 10, 1921.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 554 of the 6th instant respecting the imprisonment in Constantinople of a number of Christians who were accused by the Turks of being implicated in excesses in the Ismid district, and the action taken by me with a view to obtaining their release, I have the honour to transmit to your

Lordship herewith a copy of a memorandum which I caused to be handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the acting first dragoman on the 9th instant. Copies of this memorandum were also handed to the first dragomans of the French and Italian High Commissions as a basis for joint representations.

2. Your Lordship will see from it that the number of Christians at present in prison exceeds 100, the exact figures being 102. These figures are taken from the lists supplied by the authorities of the prisons in which the Christians are imprisoned, and are checked by comparison with the lists furnished by the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates. Mr. Matthews put before Izzet Pasha the usual arguments that the arrests, or at least most of them, were based upon unsupported denunciations, and were vindictive; that the treatment meted out to these Christians was calculated still further to inflame racial animosity; and that, after all, the alleged excesses had taken place in Kemalist territory, over which the Constantinople Government claimed that it exercised no jurisdiction or control. Izzet Pasha stated that he had already heard these arguments, with the exception of the last one, which was new to him. He promised, however, to make enquiries at the Ministry of War and communicate the result to me as soon as possible.

3. With regard to the last paragraph of the memorandum respecting the reported deportation of a number of Greeks from Adalia on the 15th ultimo, and the deportation of 300 Greeks from Trebizond to the interior on the 21st idem (my telegram No. 559 of the 8th instant to your Lordship), the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he could take no action, as he was not in communication with the Anatolian Government. In view of this attitude on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as soon as my colleagues have received the instructions foreshadowed in your Lordship's telegram No. 454 to Paris of the 4th instant, repeated to Rome and Constantinople, it will probably be necessary for us to address the authorities at Angora direct.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

IL résulte des listes reçues des autorités compétentes par le Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique, et comparées avec celles fournies par les Patriarcats grec et arménien, que pendant les deux mois, entre le 3 mai et le 3 juillet, 74 chrétiens ont été arrêtés et emprisonnés à Constantinople. Dix en ont été remis en liberté, de sorte que 64 personnes se trouvent en prison. Ces chrétiens sont pour la plupart originaires de villages situés sur le littoral du golfe d'Ismid, et auraient commis des crimes, tels qu'assassinats et faits de brigandages. Quelques voyageurs, arrivés de Chilé (mer Noire), ont été arrêtés sur des accusations semblables. Depuis le 3 juillet jusqu'à ce jour, de nombreuses arrestations ont été effectuées et le nombre de chrétiens actuellement incarcérés dépasse 100.

D'après des renseignements parvenus à ce Haut-Commissariat de deux sources sûres, les autorités d'Adalia ont, le 15 juillet, déporté à l'intérieur un certain nombre de Grecs de l'endroit, et les autorités de Trébizonde ont, le 21 juillet, déporté 300 Grecs à l'intérieur.

*Haut-Commissariat, Constantinople,  
le 9 août 1921.*

[E 9289/143/44]

No. 21.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 746.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence respecting the deportation of Christians into the interior.

*Constantinople, August 10, 1921.*

[7360]

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Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

*United States High Commissioner to Mustapha Kemal.*

July 18, 1921.

I AM informed that the Greek women, children and old men are to be transported from Samsoun to the interior. There is much evidence that when the Greek men were recently transported many perished on the journey. The transport to the interior of men of military age may be considered as a military measure, but the transport of old men, women and children does not seem justified by military necessity. This proposed transportation of about ten thousand people under the present conditions must subject these people to great suffering and privations; likewise there will be great danger of their personal safety in transit. Therefore I trust, for the sake of humanity, you will prevent this forced transportation from Samsoun of these women and children. The world at large is bound to consider that the killing of those transported for military reasons was a neglect of the humane laws of war. Any transportation of women and children with loss of life would certainly be viewed with consternation and create a most unfavourable impression against you and your people. I hope for the best interests of Turkey you will reconsider this decision, if it has been made. I would be pleased to receive from you an early and favourable answer which I could convey to my Government.

BRISTOL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora Government, to United States High Commissioner.*

[Undated].

I HAVE the honour to advise you of the following consideration in reply to your telegram to Mustapha Pasha: The information which you have received relative to the transport to the interior of women, children and old men of Greek race of Samsoun is completely in error. Absolutely no measure of this kind has been taken. This information may have had its origin from the fact that the Greeks who were able to carry arms were transported to the interior as consequence of activities of secret Greek societies, and especially the society whose name is Pontos. The inhabitants of certain villages which had hidden bandits in the pay of these societies, and which had aided them in carrying out their misdeeds, have been treated in the same way. I can assure you categorically that only the measures which were urgently called for by a military necessity were taken, and that in no case on our side would we go further than justice or the obligation to guarantee the safety of the country demanded.

I take this occasion to ask you to be so kind as to interest yourself equally in the Mussulmans of all ages and of both sex at the mercy of the incredible acts on the part of the Greek army and Greek population in all parts of our country which are occupied by the enemy. What happened at the end of June at Ismidt, both known and seen by the representatives and the troops of the Western Powers, was only a pale reflection of the horrors which the Greeks have committed and are committing daily in the interior of Anatolia where very few outsiders can witness against them. The massacres and the devastation perpetrated by the Greeks, both on the coast and in the interior, have been verified by numerous American citizens, French and others, and the Occidental press, in spite of its prejudice against us, had also spoken of this at length.

Consequently my Government will be grateful to you if you will have the kindness to take effective steps with the Greek Government regarding the misdeeds of their army, which have been substantiated. The Turkish people, who defend their life and independence and who are fighting against all manner of aggression, will be grateful to all those who will endeavour, though without success, to save some of the Turkish children and women whom our enemy is killing daily.

YOUSOUF KEMAL.

[E 9464/143/44]

No. 22.

*Extract from Prime Minister's Speech of August 16, 1921.*

ASIA MINOR.

I COME now to another very difficult problem, that is the problem of Asia Minor. I would like first to give a short summary of the events which led up to the present position. The basis of the Treaty of Sèvres was that the parts of the Turkish Empire that were Turkish should remain Turkish, those that were Arab should be Arab, those that were Armenian should be Armenian, and those that were Greek should be Greek. I will not deal with the Armenian or the Arab question, because they do not arise at the present moment, but I will refer first to the question of the dispute with Greece. Commissioners were appointed by the Allies to investigate questions of frontiers, questions of population, and, to a certain extent, to go into the history of these countries. The Commissioner appointed by Great Britain was Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada. There could not have been an abler, more impartial, or more judicial Commissioner. He represented the British Empire on the Commission to investigate these three questions. By his report, and the reports of the various experts assisting him, Smyrna and Thrace were assigned to Greece. This was accepted by the Supreme Council. The French experts came to exactly the same conclusion. There was danger of anarchy and its consequences in these various areas. So France occupied Cilicia, with a view largely to protect the Armenian population; the Italians occupied Southern Anatolia, from Adalia up to Scala Nuova, for the same purpose; and the Greeks were invited by the Supreme Council to occupy Smyrna and Thrace. If any part of those territories had been assigned to us for protection it would have cost us scores of millions.

Then came the Treaty of Sèvres, followed by the Nationalist insurrection. The Greeks were anxious to deal with it immediately, but were held back by the Allies. What has happened since shows that Veniselos was quite justified in the view which he took that he could have disposed of that insurrection without the slightest difficulty, because since then the Nationalists have gathered their forces, and in spite of that the Greeks have not encountered up to the present any serious difficulty. The Allies attempted mediation, but unfortunately the Sultan and his Government have lost control and authority. And when we made certain proposals with a view to compromise, unfortunately both parties refused to accept them. I want to put to the House the dilemma with which the Allies were faced. The Greeks and Turks refused the compromise suggested by the Allies.

There were two alternatives before us. The first was to compel both, because you could not compel the one without compelling the other. Two questions came before us at once. How? Whom? How are you to compel, and whom are you to compel? You might say you would compel the Greeks by threatening to bombard their towns; but what about the Turks? Is there anyone who would have suggested that we should have sent an army up to the mountainous areas of Asia Minor to quell the Turkish insurrection, and to force the Turks to come to terms, to chase them from Eshkischehr to Angora, from Angora onward, wherever it might be? It was an utterly impossible proposition. Therefore the first alternative, compulsion, was ruled out. There is only one other alternative, and that is to leave both of them to fight it out. Some say we might have referred the matter to the League of Nations. What would have been the use of that? That would have been an unkindness to the League of Nations. How could they have dealt with it? They had only the means which the Allies could have placed at their disposal, and there was no Allied Power which would have sent an army for the purpose of enforcing a decision. Therefore you had to leave both of them to fight it out.

There is not a single gun, rifle or shell which has been supplied to either side, not one. These battles have been fought without any assistance from us either way. I am sorry to say that not only do I think that that was the only course, but I am afraid it is the best course. I will tell the House quite frankly why I think so. One is a reason that applies to the Turks and the other a reason that applies to the Greeks. I will take the Turks first. The Mustapha Kemal Turks undoubtedly had an exaggerated idea of their own prowess. They conquered Asia Minor very easily. They gained some very easy victories in Cilicia, and they had a very exaggerated view of their own prowess and a contemptuous estimate of the Greeks' military

[7360]

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capacity. Their realisation that they were wrong in both those instances will make them none the worse neighbours for Greeks or Italians or Frenchmen or British. The Turk accepts a fact in the end when it is really driven into his mind.

I come now to the Greeks. There are Greek enthusiasts, on the other hand, who, I have no doubt, will realise soon that there are limits to what Greek resource and Greek valour and Greek skill can accomplish in the fastnesses of Asia Minor. War has one merit, in that it does in the end teach a respect for facts. I think both these races will be easier to deal with when their own limitations have been brought thoroughly clearly to their minds. That is what is being done. The time for mediation has not arrived; when it does, I have no doubt that the Treaty of Sèvres will have to be reconsidered. You cannot expect a country which has waged a successful war to be satisfied with the same terms as a country which is prepared to forgo its full claim in order to avert the terrors and risks of war. May I say this, as one who has never in the least concealed the fact that at any rate he was not hostile to the Greeks? I sincerely trust that the Greeks will not make the mistake which Bulgaria made in 1913, when after a series of very brilliant victories, which dazzled her people and blinded the vision of some of her statesmen, she insisted upon exaggerated terms and put forward extravagant claims which raised for her a host of enemies, antagonised old friends, and ended in her downfall.

As a sincere friend of Greece, I trust that Greek statesmanship will not repeat that error. If it does, I am certain it will end in disaster to Greece. Moderation in victory is not less important than victory itself. I go beyond that. I think moderation in victory is more important to a nation even than victory itself, for there are so many tragedies written across the page of history which have arisen from victory turned to a bad use, a victory immoderately used, and it would have been better for those nations had they never won that victory. I therefore almost entreat Greek statesmanship not to put its claims too high, but to show its quality by displaying a temperance in victory which will win a greater respect for them and for their country, greater renown for their native land as well as for them, and greater security for the country itself, than the most dazzling victory which they could win.

[E 9489/143/44]

No. 23.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo).*

(No. 172.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 19, 1921.

MY telegram No. 269 of 1920: Arms Traffic Convention.

Supreme Council decided at Paris on 10th August that attitude of strict neutrality in present hostilities between Greeks and Kemalists should not infringe rights of private firms to freedom of trade with either belligerent. His Majesty's Government regard this decision as overriding provisional application of article 6 (2) of Arms Traffic Convention so far as Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for export to either belligerent of arms and ammunition, &c., except poison-gas shells. Any other attitude would amount to breach of principle of neutrality, since Greeks and not Kemalists would be able to secure arms.

French, Italian and Belgian Governments are being informed of our view.

Please inform Japanese Government.

[E 9489/143/44]

No. 24.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).\**

(No. 2275.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 19, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2665 of the 5th August, 1920, and to other correspondence relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and in particular of article 6 (2) thereof, whereby the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including pre-war Asiatic Turkey, is prohibited, I have to draw

\* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome), No. 699, and Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) No. 609, *mutatis mutandis*.

your Excellency's attention to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade (see your telegram No. 587 of the 10th August).

2. His Majesty's Government have decided that this resolution must be taken to override the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments to apply the terms of the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms, &c., into Asia Minor is concerned, and they therefore intend to issue licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalists of all arms, ammunition and similar goods enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31st March last. His Majesty's Government do not, however, intend to grant any licences for the export of poison gas shells to either belligerent.

3. To avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I shall be glad if you will inform the French Government of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government, which appears to be the only possible one if the principle of neutrality is not to be infringed.

4. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Brussels, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo is being similarly instructed by telegraph.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 9489/143/44]

No. 25.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 20, 1921.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 11th August, 1920, and subsequent correspondence relative to the application of the Arms Traffic Convention, and, in particular, of article 6 (2) thereof, whereby the importation of arms and ammunition into certain territories, including the pre-war Asiatic possessions of Turkey, is prohibited, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to invite the attention of the Board of Trade to the resolution taken by the Allied Governments at Paris on the 10th instant to the effect that the Allied attitude of strict neutrality in the war between Kemalists Turkey and Greece in no way infringes the rights of private firms to freedom of trade.

2. It has been decided that this resolution must be regarded as overriding the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, the Italian Government, the Japanese Government and Belgian Government to apply the Arms Traffic Convention so far as the importation of arms into Asia Minor is concerned. Any other attitude would in principle amount to an infringement of neutrality, as the Greeks, but not the Kemalists, would be enabled to obtain arms, &c., from private traders in the Allied countries. There is, therefore, no objection to the issue of licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalists of all articles enumerated in the prohibition export list which was published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of the 31st March last other than poison-gas shells, for the export of which to either belligerent it has been decided to grant no licences (see the Prime Minister's reply to Commander Kenworthy's question in the House of Commons, No. 19 of the 15th August, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain's reply to Commander Kenworthy's question, No. 53 of the 16th August, on this subject).

3. I am to request that the Board of Trade will cause measures to be taken in order to carry this policy into effect.

4. The French, Belgian, Italian and Japanese Governments are being informed of the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter, and copies of this letter have been sent to the Cabinet Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Treasury, Home Office, Colonial Office and Board of Customs.

I am, &amp;c.

E. G. FORBES-ADAM.



[E 9560/143/44]

No. 26.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 347.)

My Lord,

Athens, August 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the president of the Council of Ministers returned to Athens from Smyrna early on the 7th instant. The same day a Council of Ministers was held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Afterwards the president addressed some representatives of the press in the following sense:—

The operations in Asia Minor would, he said, be continued until the complete annihilation of the remains of the Turkish army. This was the objective of the new operations. If, in order to realise this objective, it should be necessary to go to Angora, the army would advance to that town and even further. "But," he continued, "the occupation of Angora is not the objective of the operations. If the annihilation of the enemy can be accomplished before that, there will perhaps be no need to advance as far as that town."

M. Gounaris is further reported to have expressed his entire confidence in the ultimate success of the Greek operations, but he could not foresee when the struggle would be brought to a conclusion. He advised the press to be careful to check the information which they were about to publish as the publication of uncontrolled news might injure national interests in view of the present "very delicate situation."

In connection with the above statement, I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to my telegram No. 444 of the 8th instant reporting that M. Gounaris used the words "very critical and delicate" in regard to the present position of Greece. These words were, a member of my staff was told by a press representative present, actually used by the president of the Council, but, in view of their pessimistic tone, it was decided to water them down before publication. It appears to me quite possible, and even probable, that in using these words M. Gounaris was referring to the diplomatic and financial, rather than to the military situation.

This is, as I had the honour to point out, the first time that I have heard of the president of the Council having admitted anything but optimism, and these pessimistic words should be contrasted with the language used by the Minister of War to the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, reported in my telegram No. 445 of to-day's date. Both statements, however, agree as to the destruction of Mustapha Kemal's army, wherever it may be, being the Greek objective, and the possibility of an advance to Angora or beyond would seem to have been provided for.

Although the press has been full of reports of an advance on Constantinople as being the ultimate goal of Greek aspirations and great disappointment was shown when it was made clear that Great Britain would object to this (see my telegrams Nos. 435 and 440 of the 3rd and 6th instant), it appears to me quite possible that the Greek Government did not really contemplate such a step, but hoped by encouraging such reports to obtain the twofold end of keeping up Greek spirits and *moral* and at the same time of deceiving Kemal as to their real intentions and the direction in which they would eventually advance.

Now, however, that the true position has been made quite clear to the Greek people by the two Reuter telegrams and the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to in my telegram No. 446 of the 10th instant, the President of the Council is reported to have authorised Mr. Beaumont, correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," to state that Greece never thought of marching against Constantinople against the wishes of the Allies. In the so-called second Reuter communiqué (my telegram No. 446), which I have ascertained was sent in a telegram from the Greek Legation in London, it is stated that the *démarche* must not be considered as containing any hostile intentions towards Greece. "Patris" (Veniselist), commenting on this, demands that Great Britain shall cease to protect the Sultan and his Government, and shall permit the Greek army to capture them. England, it says, is intervening between the belligerents to save Greece's enemy. Greece was England's ally during the war whereas Turkey was the enemy of the Powers. England, the article continues, forgets all this in order to maintain the solidarity with her Allies. She avows that it is impossible for her to obtain anything favourable for Greece without the consent of

France. This shows that it will be necessary for M. Gounaris to conciliate France since otherwise British friendship will not be able to favour Greece.

"Politia" (M. Stratos's organ) refers to the *démarche* by Great Britain as having been necessary in order to show harmony amongst the Allies. It adds that nothing excludes the discussion of the question of Constantinople by Greece provided she exhibits clearly by diplomatic means her national claims and the necessity for her to occupy Constantinople.

"Chronos" (Government) declares that in acting thus independently of her allies England poses as championing the principle of respect for treaties. She has thus gained a moral victory over her allies which will give her a predominant position and entail the realisation of Greek national aspirations.

In this connection I may mention that, in answer to a question on the subject, the Minister for Foreign Affairs denied to the press representatives that any similar *démarche* had been made by the French Chargé d'Affaires. As your Lordship is already aware, I have informed my French and Italian colleagues of the action which I have taken.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &amp;c.

GRANVILLE.

[E 9550/1/44]

No. 27.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 763.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 17, 1921.

SINCE the conversations which I held with the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha, recorded in my despatches No. 739 of the 6th August and No. 742 of the 9th August, there have been no developments of importance in the situation here.

2. Faik Nuzhet Bey has been appointed Minister of Finance in the place of Abdullah Bey, who has resigned. The new Minister was Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance about a year or eighteen months ago, when he became Minister of Finance for a few days. I understand that he has been a Financial Inspector at the Ministry of Finance. No political significance is attached to this change in the Cabinet.

3. The Constantinople Government are awaiting the result of the military operations in Anatolia, which were resumed on the 14th instant by the advance of the Greek troops in the direction of Angora.

4. The Constantinople Government are as obstructive as ever in opposing the measures designed to put their finances on a better footing, and in general may be said to be imbued with chauvinistic feelings and have for the moment forgotten the depression caused by the first Greek successes.

5. An observer cannot fail to be struck by the entire inability of the Turkish Government to appreciate the situation or to take steps to better their own position. They seem content to drag on a miserable existence, living from hand to mouth. This is due mainly to two causes, namely, fear of Angora, and the fact that there is not a single man of prominence in the Cabinet or outside it.

6. The Grand Vizier, whilst capable of resisting proposals, is too old to put through any reforms. The Minister for Foreign Affairs openly proclaims that he is only a soldier and knows nothing of diplomacy. Discussions with these persons are therefore unprofitable and the High Commissioners are reduced to wondering how long the crazy machine can continue to work.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.



[E 9553/22/44]

No. 28.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 767. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, August 17, 1921.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 577, I invited the French and Italian High Commissioners to meet General Harington and myself at this High Commission on the 15th instant. I then communicated to my two colleagues the opinion of His Majesty's Government with regard to General Harington's powers and position *vis-à-vis* the Allied High Commissioners. I made it clear that His Majesty's Government regarded their view as the only possible one if, as they certainly understood, General Harington had been entrusted with the Supreme Allied Command in order to strengthen the Allied front at Constantinople. General Pellé endorsed this latter statement.

Both my colleagues took exception to the view that General Harington is in no way responsible to the High Commissioners. They quite agreed that he was free to act on his own initiative in all purely military questions and they disclaimed any desire to interfere with his discretion in these matters. But if he were to be responsible for all matters affecting the safety of the Allied troops and the maintenance of order, and the administration of martial law in the area under his command, there was no question in which he could not interfere if he wished to do so. Sanitary measures, for instance, affected the health of the troops, and yet these had hitherto been dealt with by the High Commissioners. Then again there was the question of the inter-Allied police. They could not admit that General Harington could exercise executive command over that force. They instanced the recent arrests of Bolsheviks by General Harington without previous consultation with them as a case in which he had clearly exceeded his duties.

In speaking of these arrests, the Italian Commissioner said that if anything in the nature of a revolutionary or subversive movement were discovered at Constantinople, it would obviously be the duty of General Harington to act. I pointed out that what had happened in the case of the Bolsheviks was precisely of the character indicated by the Marquis Garroni, and that General Harington had had every justification for his action, but my Italian colleague either would not or could not see this point.

The Italian High Commissioner developed the thesis that the High Commissioners were the supreme authority at Constantinople and constituted the *de facto* Government of this country. As such, the army of occupation was necessarily subordinate to them. He appeared to consider that the assumption by General Harington of the Supreme Command had modified, to the disadvantage of the Allied Commissioners, the relations which had hitherto existed between the three Allied Generals and the three High Commissioners.

I replied that nothing had been modified. It was questionable whether the three High Commissioners did constitute the *de facto* Government of this country. Turkish Government existed and carried on the government of Constantinople and its neighbourhood, whilst the High Commissioners urged measures on that Government and in certain police and sanitary matters took direct action. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define the exact powers of the High Commissioners, since in the course of time and owing to the prolonged duration of the armistice, they had, perhaps involuntarily, assumed powers which they would never have thought of assuming at the time of the armistice.

I may mention at this point that the Italian High Commissioner invokes the armistice as it suits him. As regards the question of the Supreme Allied Command, he contends that the three Allied Governments are really in a state of peace with Turkey and that the armistice is a mere fiction. On the other hand, he recognises that the powers of the High Commissioners are based on the armistice. He tries to have it both ways. He finally pointed out that in every constitutional country the military was subordinate to the civil power.

After the Italian High Commissioner had gone over familiar ground and repeated, in very indifferent French, arguments which are well known to General Harington and myself, I said that it was necessary to recognise that we were here under armistice conditions, and that there was an army of occupation which constituted an authority side by side with that of the High Commissioners. There was no comparison between the relations existing between civil and military authorities at Constantinople and those prevailing between these authorities, say, in Italy or in England. One thing was

certain, and that was that if there were no army of occupation here, the High Commissioners would never have been able to put through the various measures which they have put into force.

I then asked General Harington to make a statement.

General Harington repudiated all idea of encroaching on the duties of the High Commissioners or of mixing himself up in political questions. He gave instances of the manner in which he proposed to exercise his functions, and it was clear that his statement impressed my Allied colleagues very favourably.

Finally, I said that it would seem desirable to reach some solution on the spot rather than have to refer the whole question to our respective Governments. I then proposed the formula which I telegraphed to your Lordship in my above-mentioned telegram. My French and Italian colleagues and General Harington expressed themselves satisfied with this formula, and I trust that matters will now run smoothly. Should there be friction, however, I do not hesitate to say that it will be due to the desire of my French or Italian colleague, preferably the latter, to seek for causes of complaint.

There is no doubt that the assumption by General Harington of the Supreme Command was a great blow to my French and Italian colleagues. The latter appear to be looking for trouble between the Supreme Command and themselves. They were also unfavourably impressed by a letter addressed by General Harington to the War Office of the 6th ultimo, and communicated to them by Mr. Rattigan, in which he gives a definition of the responsibilities of a general commanding an army of occupation and defines the duties of an High Commissioner. I have pointed out to General Harington that, in practice, the High Commissioners at Constantinople exercise considerably more extended powers than he has stated, but this particular paragraph gave umbrage to my colleagues, who professed to see in it an indication of the spirit in which General Harington meant to interpret his new duties. They were firmly convinced that he intended to clip their wings and to encroach on their sphere of activity. But I am hopeful that we have succeeded in effacing this impression, and that the French and Italian High Commissioners are now satisfied that General Harington has no such intention.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 9509/49/44]

No. 29.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).*

(No. 894.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1921.*

WITH reference to Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 554 of the 3rd June last, I enclose herewith, for your information and for the information of the British community, a memorandum setting forth the present position as regards debts owed to British nationals by Turkish nationals and as regards the claims of British subjects against the Turkish Government.

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent direct to Sir H. Lamb.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 29.

*Memorandum.*

THE present position as regards claims in respect of damage to the property or person of British nationals in Turkish or former Turkish territory and debts due by Turkish nationals to British nationals is as follows:—

1. *Claims in respect of Damage to Property or Person.*

In so far as claims in respect of damage to property or person are claims by British nationals belonging to the United Kingdom and the damage complained of is such as is specified in clauses 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 of annex 1 to the reparation chapter of the Treaty of Versailles, these claims are, in view of Germany's liability under the reparation

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chapter of that treaty for the acts of her Allies, being registered for submission to the commission which is being set up to consider cases in which there is a moral claim to a grant from the 5,000,000*l.* fund which is to be provided out of reparation receipts from Germany allocated to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

The following would, generally speaking, rank under the terms of the annex in question, provided that the damage was caused by the action of the authorities or directly in consequence of hostilities or operations of war:—

- (a.) Claims in respect of physical property carried off, seized, injured or destroyed.
- (b.) Claims by individuals in respect of personal injury or by dependents of persons who lost their lives.

A commissioner has been sent to Constantinople with a view to investigating and assessing claims of these two kinds.

As regards claims against the Turkish Government which do not fall within the foregoing categories, applicants must in such cases rely upon their future remedies under the Treaty of Sèvres, which has not yet been ratified.

## 2. Debts.

Article 302 of the Treaty of Sèvres reads as follows:—

"Debts, other than the Ottoman Public Debt, provided for in article 236 and annex 1, Part VIII (Financial Clauses), of the present treaty, between the Turkish Government or its nationals resident in Turkish territory on the coming into force of the present treaty (with the exception of Turkish companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals), on the one hand, and the Governments of the Allied Powers or their nationals who were not on the 1st August, 1914, Turkish nationals or (except in the case of foreign officials in the Turkish service in regard to their salaries, pensions or official remuneration) resident or carrying on business in Turkish territory, on the other hand, which were payable before the war, or became payable during the war and arose out of transactions or contracts of which the total or partial execution was suspended on account of the war, shall be paid or credited in the currency of such one of the Allied Powers, their colonies or protectorates, or the British dominions or India, as may be concerned. If a debt was payable in some other currency the conversion shall be effected at the pre-war rate of exchange.

"For the purpose of this provision the pre-war rate of exchange shall be defined as the average cable transfer rate prevailing in the Allied country concerned during the month immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the said country and Turkey.

"If a contract provides for a fixed rate of exchange governing the conversion of the currency in which the debt is stated into the currency of the Allied Power concerned, then the above provisions concerning the rate of exchange shall not apply.

"The proceeds of liquidation of enemy property, rights and interests and the cash assets of enemies referred to in this section shall also be accounted for in the currency and at the rate of exchange provided for above.

"The provisions of this article regarding the rate of exchange shall not affect debts due to or from persons resident in territories detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty."

British nationals are at liberty to recover directly by any means open to them debts due to them from Turkish nationals, provided that property, rights or interests in His Majesty's dominions belonging to Turkish nationals are not made use of to discharge such debts.

There is no objection, however, to the use for meeting debts of property which has been acquired by Turkish nationals since the resumption of trading was permitted on the 17th February, 1919, or other property which has been released by the express permission to the owner of the Custodian of Enemy Property, Kingsway, London, W.C. 1.

When the Treaty of Sèvres comes into force it will be possible to take proceedings in the consular courts under article 308 against persons who remain Turkish subjects.

Debts due from Turkish nationals to British nationals, provided they fall within article 302, but not otherwise, may rank, after the coming into force of the treaty, against the charge on Turkish property authorised by article 291. But it is unlikely that any debts would be permitted to rank against any charge which may be created, unless the creditor had made all reasonable efforts to recover the debt directly from the debtor.

[E 9779/1/44]

No. 30.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 785.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 24, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that I paid the Minister for Foreign Affairs a visit on the 20th instant in order to discuss two important questions with him, and to ascertain his frame of mind with regard to the position in Anatolia.

2. I began by alluding to the resignation of three members of the Turkish Cabinet, which had followed on the resignation of the Minister of Finance. Izzet Pasha stated that no political significance attached to these resignations. The out-going Ministers merely resigned owing to a feeling of solidarity with their colleague. The latter had shown that he had not possessed sufficient knowledge for the exercise of his functions, and the new Minister of Finance was much more conversant with financial problems. Izzet Pasha dismissed these changes in the Cabinet somewhat lightly. The public, however, has taken them rather seriously. I do not personally believe that they amount to much, as the leading spirits in the Government remain in office.

3. I then said to Izzet Pasha that the post of Finance Minister was an ungrateful one in every country. It was particularly arduous, for instance, in England at the present moment, where the necessity for the dismissal of superfluous officials, and the cutting down of expenditure generally had been recognised as imperative. I said that the Turkish Minister of Finance was confronted with the same problem, and I enquired whether the Turkish Government meant to carry out the recommendations submitted to them by the Provisional Financial Commission.

4. Izzet Pasha replied that the Turkish Government were certainly contemplating measures for reducing the number of their officials. I reminded his Highness that the commission in question had estimated that the Turkish Government could effect a saving of as much as £T. 300,000 a month by getting rid of superfluous officials, and putting others on the pension list. Izzet Pasha said that he did not think it possible to effect economies under the above heading to the extent anticipated, but economies would be effected. Thus he said that he could reduce the expenditure in his own department by £T. 6,000 a month.

5. I then pointed out that the Turkish Government must avail themselves of every opportunity of increasing their resources. A lot of time had been wasted in wrangling over the return to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. A return to the *ad valorem* tariff was indispensable. Izzet Pasha alluded to a suggestion which he has made to the High Commissioners in an official note, and which had also been pressed upon my colleagues and myself by the American High Commissioner, that the *ad valorem* tariff should be increased to 15 per cent. I pointed out the practical reasons which made it impossible to agree to this suggestion. Izzet Pasha then said that the Turkish Government would be quite willing to re-establish the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff if they could be assured of the maintenance of the consumption taxes. I replied that the Allied Powers were quite ready to maintain the consumption taxes. The difficulty lay with the Americans. Your Lordship will therefore see that it is of importance to overcome the objections of the Americans to the maintenance of the consumption taxes. I shall shortly have the honour of addressing your Lordship by telegraph in reply to your telegram No. 480 of the 10th August on this subject.

6. I said that the Turkish Government had hitherto been able to carry on owing to the receipt of various windfalls. No more windfalls were to be expected and the Turkish Government would be thrown back on their ordinary sources of revenue, which were quite inadequate to meet their expenditure. The position was therefore a gloomy one, but it had to be faced. Izzet Pasha admitted this, and made a general statement as to the desire of the Turkish Government to improve their financial position.

7. I then spoke to Izzet Pasha about the continued detention of Ottoman Christians on the ground of the theft and pillage of Moslem property in the Yalova and Gemlik districts, &c. Izzet Pasha admitted that it was difficult to obtain evidence against the persons who had been imprisoned. I said that in that case they should be released. His Highness observed that certain Turks had been in prison since the armistice on the charge of excesses against Armenians. No evidence had been obtainable against these Turks. They should also, he thought, be released, as the cases were parallel. As Izzet Pasha appeared to be suggesting something in the nature of a bargain, I replied that I must reflect over his statement. I propose to inform his Highness that I cannot



agree to connect the two categories of individuals, and that I must maintain my demand for the release of those Ottoman Christians against whom there is no evidence.

8. Finally, I asked Izzet Pasha whether he had any news from Anatolia. He replied in the negative, and it was evident that he was much pre-occupied by the absence of information about the battle for Angora, which is known to have begun. I said that every patriotic Turk, whether Nationalist or not, must be asking himself what was the best course to pursue in order to extricate Turkey from her difficulties. I asked Izzet Pasha what he thought Mustapha Kemal ought to do in present circumstances. He replied, "Address himself to you," meaning His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 9788/143/44]

No. 31.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 796.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 24, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter addressed by General Harington to the three Allied High Commissioners on the 10th August, 1921, asking them to notify the Greek High Commissioner of the orders General Harington had issued prohibiting armed individuals belonging to the Greek and Nationalist forces from crossing the boundary of the neutral zone, as defined in the proclamation of neutrality published by the Allied High Commissioners on the 13th May last.

2. At a meeting held at the French High Commission on the 12th instant, my colleagues and I decided to comply with General Harington's request, in order to remove any doubt in the mind of the Greek High Commissioner that Greek troops would not be allowed to occupy Constantinople.

3. The Allied High Commissioners have therefore addressed a note to M. Votsis, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

*Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, August 10, 1921.

IN continuation of my letter of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward, for your information, copies of letters which I have addressed to M. le Général commandant le Corps français d'Occupation de Constantinople, and to the Comando del Presidio Italiano, Constantinople, on the subject of the preservation of neutrality in the Allied neutral zone. Similar instructions have been issued to the General Officer Commanding, British Army of Occupation.

Your Excellency will realise, I am sure, the necessity for Allied action to preserve neutrality, and also the possible situation which might arise if belligerent armed forces cross the neutral boundary.

I would request your Excellency to represent this matter most strongly to the Hellenic High Commissioner, pointing out how deplorable it would be if the Allied forces here found themselves obliged to disarm, or even possibly come in conflict with, the Hellenic forces who have fought as allies side by side with them in the great war.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*  
*Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

*Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to the French and Italian Officers Commanding, Constantinople.*

August 5, 1921.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm in writing the decisions I informed you of verbally on the 1st instant.

In view of the neutral attitude taken up by the Allies with regard to the war between the Greeks and the Nationalist Turks, no armed individuals of either of these nationalities will be permitted to cross the boundaries of the neutral zone, as laid down in the proclamation of neutrality issued by the Allied High Commissioners on the 13th May, 1921.

Any armed persons or parties, either Greek or Nationalist Turk, who are found within the neutral zone referred to above should be disarmed and arrested.

Cases of arrest should be immediately reported to these headquarters.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*  
*Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 31.

*Allied High Commissioners to the Greek High Commissioner.*

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce que, vu le fait que les Alliés ont adopté une attitude neutre dans le conflit entre les Grecs et les Nationalistes turcs, le Général Harington a donné des ordres pour qu'il ne soit permis à aucun individu armé ressortissant d'une des deux nationalités de franchir les limites de la zone neutre telle qu'elle a été définie dans la proclamation de neutralité publiée par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés le 13 mai dernier.

M. Votsis se rendra, sans doute, compte de la nécessité qui incombe aux Alliés de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir la neutralité, et aussi de la situation qui pourrait résulter si les armées appartenant aux belligérants franchissaient la zone neutre.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés se permettent d'attirer l'attention de M. Votsis sur l'effet déplorable qui serait produit si les forces alliées de Constantinople se trouvaient dans l'obligation de désarmer ou même d'entrer en conflit avec les forces helléniques qui ont combattu à leurs côtés dans la grande guerre.

PELLE.

HORACE RUMBOLD.  
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 20 août 1921.

[E 10030/143/44]

No. 32.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 370.)

My Lord,

Athens, August 22, 1921.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 239 of the 17th instant, instructing me not to approach the Greek Government directly with regard to their true intentions, only reached me on the 18th, and I had already, on the 17th, taken advantage of my first conversation with M. Gounaris to question him on the subject, as reported in my telegrams Nos. 456 and 457 of that date. I do not regret this, as I was able to assure him truthfully that I had received no instructions to enquire into the matter and was venturing to put possibly indiscreet questions to him entirely on my own initiative. As I have had the honour to say before, no information obtainable here from any source can be regarded as reliable, but the only people whom I can approach and whose remarks may be useful and interesting, even though not reliable, are the President of the Council and the Minister for War.

I was agreeably surprised by the moderation expressed by M. Gounaris, though of course I cannot determine how far it was genuine or only produced for my benefit.



With regard to Asia Minor, he declared quite categorically that the less extension of territory Greece could claim the better he would be pleased, but he insisted that they must be guided by what the military authorities decided to be a frontier which could be defended with the least cost and trouble. With regard to Constantinople, I cannot say that he actually agreed in words with my remark that Greece could not expect to be given possession of it, and that it would do her more harm than good, but he certainly did not combat it, and gave me the impression of tacitly accepting it. On the other hand, his suggestion that Constantinople and the zone of the Straits should be an autonomous State under the joint guarantee of Great Britain and Greece no doubt covers the hope that they will eventually fall to Greece.

In my conversation with M. Baltazzi on the receipt of your telegram No. 240 of the 17th August (see my telegram No. 459 of the 19th August), I found that his Excellency was either less skilful than his chief in concealing his real feelings or he is less moderate in his views. After speaking to him in the sense of your telegram and remarking how glad I was to find that your Lordship confirmed the views which I had ventured to express personally to M. Gounaris, and which the latter had repeated to him, I read to him the text of your telegram and finally made a copy of it, which I gave him unofficially. M. Baltazzi suggested at first that the whole telegram referred to Constantinople, but I pointed out that the first paragraph only referred to Constantinople, and meant that I must tell him quite definitely that there was no possible question of Greece getting it, and that it was therefore the greatest folly to encourage or allow the press to go on talking about it as the final and certain objective, as such talk only excited hopes in the public which could not be realised, and had an irritating and harmful effect on public opinion in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The second paragraph of your telegram, on the other hand, referred to Asia Minor, and gave me official authority to repeat to him what I had already said to M. Gounaris about the desirability for Greece to demand the least possible extension of the frontiers given to the so called Smyrna zone by the Treaty of Sèvres. I said that I had no instructions on this subject beyond the telegram now in his hands, and no indication of the views of His Majesty's Government, but, speaking personally and not officially, I gathered, chiefly from the press reports of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons, that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres in Greece's favour, provided that Greece did not make exaggerated claims.

M. Baltazzi took strong exception to Mr. Asquith's statement, quoted in your telegram, that the continuance of hostilities was for no "world purposes or great ideals," and claimed that a higher ideal could hardly be found than the liberation of their fellow Greeks, and indeed of all Christians, from the hated Turkish yoke.

M. Baltazzi reverted to the subject of Constantinople, and made it pretty clear, in his insistence on the necessity to settle the question once and for all, that he looked on my repeated warnings as only meaning that Greece must not attempt to seize Constantinople at present. I explained very firmly that I read your Lordship's instructions as meaning a great deal more than that, and I declared that what he and the Greek Government and the Greek people had got to understand was that, though there was admittedly a Constantinople question, it was a world question, in which Greece was no doubt interested like many other States, but not a Hellenic question.

I would venture to urge upon your Lordship that MM. Gounaris and Baltazzi are quite right in insisting that the present opportunity should not be missed to make a definite and, so far as possible, durable settlement. One of the great aims of British policy for very many years, an aim which was approved by practically every other country, was to prevent Russia securing possession of Constantinople and the Straits and thus reaching the Mediterranean. During the war the force of circumstances and the necessities of the time obliged us to surrender this principle and to promise Constantinople to Russia, and if the Russian revolution had not intervened we should have had to honour our signature. The promise is now wiped out and Russia need not be considered for the moment, but it is certain that in time Russia will be reconstituted and will be as strong as, or probably stronger than, she ever was, and her old desire for Constantinople will inevitably return. It would then be a thousand pities if Europe were content with a mere makeshift and failed to create an organism in the zone of the Straits which, under international guarantees, could be trusted to maintain itself for at least many years.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

[E 10031/143/44]

No. 33.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 5)*

(No. 371.)

My Lord,

Athens, August 22, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 370 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that several Greek papers to-day quote an article in the "Daily Telegraph" which apparently described M. Gounaris's moderation as expressed "in private conversation," in terms closely resembling my telegram No. 456 of the 17th instant. They express complete concurrence with M. Gounaris's alleged remarks and declare that Greece has no imperialistic desires of aggrandisement, but will be fully satisfied with the narrowest frontiers which will ensure the liberation of all Greeks from the Turkish yoke. Constantinople, for once, is not mentioned. An interview is also published which M. Theotokis is said to have given to a journalist, and in which he also expressed similar moderate views. At the end of the report of the interview it is stated that M. Theotokis refused to answer any questions with regard to Constantinople.

During the last few days the press has been full of references to the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons, and of enthusiastic eulogies of the Philhellenic attitude of the "noble Welshman." One paper observes that Greece is sick of the romantic "Philhellenes," who lose their Philhellenism as soon as Greece is in any difficulty, and that what she wants and delights to see is the type of Philhellens exemplified by Mr. Lloyd George, who recognises her inherited worth and greatness and sees in her a useful and valuable friend and ally. One or two of the Government papers distort the meaning of the Prime Minister's words and use them as the basis for a violent attack on M. Venizelos, who, they say, showed his weakness and incapacity by failing to exploit the wonderful influence which his friends declared he exercised over the Allies in order to insist on Greece being allowed to crush Kemal a year ago when the task would have been so much easier.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

[E 9957/531/44]

No. 34.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Danish Minister.\**

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1921.

HIS Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the identic notes addressed to them by the Danish, Netherlands, Norwegian and Swedish Legations on the 2nd May, 1921, regarding the provisions of Part III, Section II, of the Treaty of Sèvres, relating to the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosphorus, and I now have the honour to offer the following observations in reply:—

2. Without raising the question of the justice of the imposition of dues on shipping using this waterway, the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments point to the alleged trend towards the abolition of dues on shipping in the case of other international waterways during the last half-century, as illustrated by certain conventions, such as those reducing or abolishing the dues on the Sound, Elbe, and Scheldt. Attention is also drawn to the absence of Netherlands and Scandinavian representation on the "Commission of the Straits," and the rights of the four Governments are reserved.

3. His Majesty's Government do not consider that there is sufficient similarity between conditions on the Straits and on the waterways cited by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments to warrant the application of the same principles, particularly in view of the fact that the necessity of devising an international control to keep them open and free to all nations in peace and war did not arise on the Sound, the Scheldt, and the Elbe. In the case of the Straits the events of the last few years have shown that this necessity has arisen in the most acute form. Further, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept the general contention that the trend has been towards the abolition of dues on international waterways. Such contention ignores the essential distinction which is universally recognised between tolls or

\* Also to Netherlands, Norwegian, and Swedish Ministers, *mutatis mutandis*.



"droits de péage" and taxes or navigation dues. The former represent a survival of the recognition of the right of the riparian sovereign to close a passage, should he so desire, or alternatively to derive a revenue from the users, should he engage to keep it open. It is true that such tolls have been practically abolished, and that any tendency to revive the system would be retrograde. Taxes or navigation dues, on the other hand, are universally recognised as being payments for services rendered, and may not in any case provide a revenue for the riparian sovereign. The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was, for instance, specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In virtue of that article and subsequent treaties, the European Commission of the Danube, which is responsible for the control of navigation and the maintenance of the channel of the river at its mouth, levies dues to cover the expenses of the commission and the cost of maintaining and policing the channel. The commission has incidentally been forced since the war to increase the dues charged by them by 200 per cent. on account of the great rise of their expenses. In the case of the navigation on that part of the Danube which has been declared international between Ulm and the point at which the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube begins, article 16 of the draft Act of Navigation for the Danube, as adopted at the first reading, provides for a moderate tariff of dues to be applied exclusively to the works for which they are levied, and not for purposes of revenue, and to be charged without discrimination based on nationality or similar considerations.

4. At the same time His Majesty's Government would refer to the Statute on the régime of the waterways of international concern, which was negotiated at the recent conference on communications and transit, held under the auspices of the League of Nations at Barcelona. Article 4 of this convention provides that in "the exercise of navigation . . . nationals, property and flags of all contracting States shall be treated in all respects on a footing of perfect equality," while article 2 reads as follows:—

"No dues of any kind may be levied anywhere on the course at the mouth of a navigable waterway of international concern, other than dues in the nature of payment for services rendered and intended solely to cover in an equitable manner the expenses of maintaining and improving the navigability of the waterway and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interest of navigation. These dues shall be fixed in accordance with such expenses, and the tariff of dues shall be posted in the ports. These dues shall be levied in such a manner as to render unnecessary a detailed examination of the cargo, except in cases of suspected fraud or infringement of regulations, and so as to facilitate international traffic as much as possible, both as regards their rates and the method of their application."

5. It would appear then that two principles have become established in the treatment of navigable waterways of international concern during the last half-century: the first demanding the abolition or reduction of all dues not specifically levied in respect of services to the shipping on which they were imposed, and applied to those services, and the second laying down that all dues and charges shall be levied on a footing of absolute equality between all vessels, whatever the port of origin, destination or departure, their flag or ownership, or the nationality or ownership of their cargoes. The first of these principles, as will be shown below, is not in any way contravened by the dues to be levied on shipping using the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, and is indeed specifically laid down in the first paragraph of article 53 of the Treaty of Sèvres, while the second principle is embodied in article 54 of the same treaty.

6. His Majesty's Government are glad that the special provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, providing for absolute equality and impartiality in the imposition of the Straits' dues have been noticed by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments. Apart from the administrative expenses of the commission, these dues are primarily to be devoted to necessary works and the provision of material facilities for all shipping and partly for a small force of maritime police, which in view of the menace from local disturbances to the unobstructed passage of vessels through the Straits should generally be welcomed. This consideration, connected as it is with the local political conditions, is again evidence of the difference in treatment which the problem of the Straits calls for as compared with the Scheldt, the Sound and the Elbe.

7. With regard to the composition of the commission, the Principal Allied Powers, in drafting these provisions of the treaty, were unanimous in considering that, in the interests of efficient administration, the size of the commission should be reduced as much as possible. It was inevitable, however, that those countries should be represented or invited to be represented on the commission who either, by their sacrifices in

the recent war, have at last made it possible to open this waterway to the commerce of the world and are now primarily responsible for guaranteeing that it should so continue open, or who, by their geographical position, are vitally interested in the free flow of trade through the Straits.

8. In these circumstances, the mere presence on the commission of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, whose vessels together formed the bulk of the shipping using the Straits before the war, and who are deeply interested in the prosperity of Mediterranean commerce, should afford to those Governments who are not actually represented on the commission sufficient guarantees that the dues on vessels using the Straits will not be so raised as in any way to hamper the free movement of trade and shipping.

9. His Majesty's Government confidently trust that, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments will not desire further to pursue their representations.

10. The French and Italian Governments concur in the terms of this note.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 10261/1/44]

No. 35.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 812.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 2, 1921.*

ON the occasion of the Courban-Bairam festival I followed the usual procedure in sending the first dragoman to the palace and also to the Heir Apparent to convey my respects.

2. The Heir Apparent sent me a message in return to say that he would be pleased if I would take tea with him. I had not previously made the acquaintance of His Imperial Highness, though I had heard that his relations with the Sultan were not cordial, and that he was strongly Nationalist in sympathy. I did not feel that I could disregard the Heir Apparent's message, and I therefore asked him to appoint a day for an audience, at the same time causing the Sultan to be informed of the circumstances leading up to the audience, as I wished His Majesty to be cognisant of the matter.

3. I was received by the Heir Apparent on the 31st ultimo at the Dolma Bagtché Palace, a portion of which is assigned to him as a residence. The Prince appears to be a man getting on for 60 years of age, rather stout, of pleasing appearance and extremely well dressed. He might pass for a well-bred Frenchman if he did not wear a fez.

4. After he had made some preliminary remarks regarding his former intimacy with Sir Gerard Lowther, we passed to the discussion of the political situation. The Heir Apparent implied that the Sultan had been badly advised by Damad Ferid Pasha, and as much as said that His Majesty had been foolish in the confidence he had reposed in that personage. As his reference to the Sultan was somewhat disparaging, I interrupted and led the conversation on to the subject of Mustafa Kemal. The Heir Apparent said that he did not know Mustafa Kemal personally, and that Damad Ferid Pasha had been responsible for sending him to Anatolia. In fact, he attributed the present misfortunes of Turkey largely to the action of Damad Ferid Pasha when he was Grand Vizier.

5. The Heir Apparent said that the British Government and nation did not understand the Turks and their mentality. I replied that it was part of my business to attempt faithfully to report events here and Turkish public opinion to your Lordship. The Heir Apparent then asked why we made no attempt to get into direct touch with the Nationalists. I said that for one thing we had never received any encouragement to do so. The Nationalists had always held us up as their principal enemies; their press was openly hostile to us, and they had behaved very badly in the matter of our prisoners of war. I reminded the Heir Apparent that Bekir Sami Bey had been well received in London, and that modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, advantageous to Turkey, had been agreed to by the Allies at the London Conference in March. These modifications were mainly due to the initiative of the British delegates at the conference. But the Angora Government had apparently summarily rejected them, thereby losing an excellent chance of effecting a satisfactory settlement.

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6. The Heir Apparent pointed out that the French had established contact with the Nationalists through M. Franklin-Bouillon, who, he understood, was negotiating some sort of an agreement with them. Why could we not do the same? I said that the French authorities at Constantinople had always denied that M. Franklin-Bouillon had gone to Angora in any official capacity; and that we took the view that our Allies should not negotiate agreements with the Nationalists behind our back.

7. His Imperial Highness admitted that the Nationalists had been foolish in their political conduct, but said that they were only soldiers fighting with their backs to the wall. They were short of arms and ammunition. The Greeks were committing grave excesses, and were conducting the campaign with great ferocity.

8. As it had been suggested to me that the Nationalist movement was in reality being directed from Constantinople, though I do not believe that this is the case, I asked the Heir Apparent whether, in his view, the centre of gravity was at Angora or at Constantinople. He replied without hesitation that it was at Angora, and that the Constantinople Government had no control over the Angora authorities. He then developed at great length the theme that England and Turkey must eventually work together for their mutual advantage.

9. Finally the Heir Apparent alluded to the Armenian massacres, and said that he had personally intervened during the war to prevent excesses. He held letters from the Armenian Patriarch thanking him for his action. This led him to speak disparagingly of the Committee of Union and Progress, which he compared to a young and inexperienced surgeon too anxious to perform an operation on a person of advanced age who was not a proper subject for such an operation.

10. The conversation took place in a room looking across the Bosphorus to Scutari. As we were talking a tender towing two barges full of Greek sailors passed the Palace proceeding towards the Greek battleship. His Highness had his back to the window and did not see this tender, otherwise the sight of the Greek sailors might have inspired some additional remarks about the Greeks.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 10267/143/44]

No. 36.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 820.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 5, 1921.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 806 of the 28th July last, to transmit herewith copy of the telegram which has been addressed to the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs under the signature of my French, Italian and Japanese colleagues and myself, in regard to anti-Christian outrages in Pontus and Asia Minor.

2. I regret the delay which has occurred in despatching this telegram and which has been caused, firstly, by the difficulty in obtaining unanimity as to its text, and, secondly, by endeavouring, finally without success, to induce the United States High Commissioner to join in the proposed representations.

3. The French and Italian High Commissioners, whose consent I considered it desirable in the first place to obtain, were unwilling to adopt, as being too categorical, the original text of the telegram which I had drafted and which followed more closely on the lines indicated in your Lordship's despatch. After agreement had been reached on this point, Admiral Bristol expressed his unwillingness, on the general grounds of the dislike of his Government to identic communications, to associate himself in our common protest without previous instructions from the State Department. The Japanese High Commissioner likewise felt obliged to take the instructions of his Government on the subject.

4. Though eventually authorised by his Government to use his own discretion in the matter, Admiral Bristol finally declined to participate, and the accompanying telegram has accordingly been despatched to Angora by wireless in the names of the four High Commissioners above mentioned.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 36.

*Allied High Commissioners to Youssouf Kemal.*

(Télégraphique.)

LES Hauts-Commissaires soussignés n'ont pas manqué de transmettre à leurs Gouvernements la protestation des autorités d'Angora contenue dans le télégramme qui leur a été adressé par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, en date du 6 juillet dernier, contre des attentats commis par les troupes helléniques lors de l'évacuation d'Ismid.

Dès le reçu des nouvelles qui leur étaient parvenues antérieurement relatives aux tristes événements d'Ismid, les Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople ont décidé de nommer immédiatement une Commission interalliée, non seulement pour s'enquérir sur lieu, mais aussi pour assurer la protection de la vie et des biens de tous les musulmans qui pourraient s'y trouver en péril. Le rapport de cette commission, arrivée à Ismid le 28 juin, fut communiqué de suite aux Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, qui ont invité leurs représentants à Athènes de protester de la façon la plus énergique auprès du Gouvernement hellénique contre ces attentats et contre l'impuissance des autorités militaires helléniques d'assurer la protection des musulmans dans les districts occupés par elles. Par suite de cette démarche, le Gouvernement grec s'est engagé à ouvrir une enquête de l'espèce et d'imposer les sanctions nécessaires.

Les autorités d'Angora reconnaîtront sans doute que l'action prise à cet égard par les Gouvernements et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés démontre suffisamment leur sollicitude envers des musulmans opprimés et leur intention de veiller à ce qu'aucune injustice à l'égard des musulmans ne soit tolérée.

Les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées et associées regrettent, toutefois, de constater que, d'après les rapports circonstanciés qui leur parviennent, la population chrétienne des villes du Pont est exposée actuellement à des attentats du même ordre.

Ils expriment l'espoir que les autorités d'Angora, pour leur part, se feront un devoir d'instituer une enquête immédiate et rigoureuse pour vérifier les allégations répétées de déportations, de massacres, vols et autres attentats de tout genre qui auraient été commis à l'encontre de la population chrétienne d'Ineboli, Samsoun, Kerasunde, Ordou, Tripoli, Trébizonde, et d'autres villes et villages du Pont ainsi que de l'intérieur d'Anatolie. Ils sauront gré à son Excellence Youssouf Kemal de leur communiquer le plus tôt possible le résultat de cette enquête, qui devrait concerner notamment :

De nombreux crimes commis dans la région de Samsoun et de Kerasunde par les bandes d'Osman Agha.

La déportation vers l'intérieur au cours des mois de juin et juillet derniers de très nombreux sujets ottomans de religion chrétienne appartenant aux populations de la côte anatolienne, sans excepter même les femmes et les enfants. Ces déportations auraient été effectuées dans les conditions les plus brutales et auraient donné lieu aux pires excès. Une partie des déportés auraient été massacrés à Kavak et dans les environs. Plus de soixante-dix villages auraient été détruits dans la région de Samsoun, parmi lesquels les villages d'Ada, Karaberjin, Dere, Avdan, Dzinhari, Tsandir, &c., et plus de 3,500 chrétiens arméniens de Seïtoun et de Merzifoun au cours du mois de juillet dernier.

La dispersion et le massacre de la population arménienne de Seïtoun et de Merzifoun au cours du mois de juillet dernier.

Les faits précités, au cas où ils seraient confirmés, démontreraient l'incapacité de l'Administration ottomane à assurer la liberté et la sécurité des minorités chrétiennes et ne pourraient que provoquer dans l'opinion publique une indignation extrêmement nuisible à la cause de la Turquie.

[E 10271/1/44]

No. 37.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 826. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 7, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report for your Lordship's information that M. Hermitte, "chef du cabinet particulier" of M. Briand, arrived here in the latter part of last month, ostensibly on a holiday.

2. Accompanied by my French colleague, he had an audience of the Sultan, which lasted about half an hour, on the 27th ultimo. According to a person in touch with the

[7260]

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Palace, General Pellé and M. Hermitte laid emphasis, in their conversation with His Majesty, upon the debt which modern Turkish civilisation and literature owed to France, pointing to the knowledge of the French language possessed by Turks of the official and educated classes, and to the fact that the Turkish drama and poetry of to-day derived their inspiration and form from French models. The Sultan, who had a suspicion that an endorsement of these views by him would be exploited by the press of Paris, is reported to have changed the conversation without expressing an opinion.

3. Reports, which are probably based on nothing more than surmise, are current, that M. Hermitte's visit is connected with the Franco-Kemalist Agreement, which M. Franklin-Bouillon has been endeavouring to negotiate. It is stated that M. Hermitte has full power to sign without reference to Paris.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 10272/143/44]

No. 38.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 827.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 7, 1921.*

THERE have been no developments in the political situation at Constantinople since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship. The attention of the Turkish Government and of the European community here has been engrossed by the progress of the struggle in Anatolia. The public have had to rely on the communiqués issued by both sides. These communiqués do not show any particular regard for the truth. On one or two days the Greek commander-in-chief did not issue any communiqué at all, and his silence was significant as indicating that nothing decisive had occurred.

2. The main object of the Greeks seems to have been to outflank the left wing of the Turkish army and cause that wing so to bend back as to endanger the whole of the Nationalist forces. In order to perform this operation the Greek column had to advance through a waterless tract of country, where it suffered greatly from thirst. The Turks were at one time in a critical position, but skilfully extricated themselves from it, and the struggle still continues beyond the Sakaria river. I do not believe that the Greeks can have expected such a determined resistance on the part of the Kemalist army as they have encountered. Fighting has been proceeding for twelve days, and it is known that the losses have been heavy on both sides. Although it is dangerous to prophecy, there is a likelihood of the present operations ending in a stalemate, both sides being too exhausted to be able to press any advantage. Such a state of things might form a favourable moment for intervention. On the one hand, the Greeks cannot view the prospect of a winter campaign with much equanimity, especially after the exhausting nature of the effort they have just made. Their financial embarrassments should come home to them with greater force when they reflect that they have not been able to crush the Kemalist army. The wiping out of that army could alone lead to a termination of the struggle.

3. The Kemalists, on their side, will be no less exhausted. They have to face dissatisfaction at Konia, whilst they will be unable to raise revenue from a large part of Anatolia. It is doubtful whether their Bolsheviki friends can help them very much, and it is known that they are very short of arms and ammunition.

4. Constantinople presents a curious spectacle these days. The Greek fleet is very much *en évidence*, and everybody realises that the passage of Greek warships through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea portends the seizure of some Turkish steamer. The action of the Greek ships in removing from Turkish ships articles such as carpets and jewellery, which cannot be classed as even conditional contraband, and of imprisoning old men and children taken off ships so searched, does not fail to add to the bitterness of the Mahomedan population.

5. The following incidents throw an instructive light on Greek mentality :—

When the hostilities were at their height, I received a request from the Association of Greek Boy Scouts for permission to hold a flag-day in Constantinople in aid of the Greek war-orphans. This request was naturally refused.

An imaginative picture, portraying in most lurid colours the battle of Eski-Shehr and the slaughter of panic-stricken Turks, was put into circulation by a Greek artist.



[F 3398/3105/23]

No. 38A.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 828. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 6, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 908, Secret, of the 26th ultimo, with reference to the activities of the Japanese High Commissioner at Constantinople. I have no information showing that Mr. Uchida is exerting himself to interest the Turks in the question of an alliance with Japan. Mr. Uchida appears to be very busy and hard-working. Having regard to the fact that Japanese interests in Turkey are practically negligible, I have often wondered why Mr. Uchida is so busy. He has explained that everything is new to the Japanese at this post, and that he is occupied in studying the past diplomatic history of Constantinople.

Mr. Uchida recently came to see me to ask whether the Allied High Commissioners would communicate to him the agenda of their meetings. I replied that we could not do this as we could not treat the Japanese High Commissioner in this matter more favourably than the United States High Commissioner. The latter claims, with great insistence, to be consulted on all questions relating to trade, but we do not communicate the agenda of our meetings to him. I am aware that after the ratification of the treaty the Japanese Ambassador will occupy a somewhat different position to that of the United States Ambassador, but it would not be wise from the local point of view to discriminate between the two High Commissioners at the present juncture.

Mr. Uchida has offered General Harington to use all the influence he possesses with the Turks towards securing the release of the British prisoners of war. It is difficult to see what influence Mr. Uchida can possibly have with the Nationalist, and I have told General Harington that I do not think it necessary for him to accept Mr. Uchida's offer.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

By General Harington's orders all copies which could be traced were seized and destroyed.

During the battle of Eski-Shehr a large portrait of King Constantine, surrounded by the words "He is coming," was posted on the wall of the Greek Military Mission in the main street of Pera. General Harington caused this also to be removed.

Finally, I notice in a recent letter from the *locum tenens* of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that his Beatitude now refers to the Ottoman Greeks as "our nation."

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 10414/143/44]

No. 39.

*Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 416.)

My Lord,

*Athens, September 8, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Corfe, President of the Committee of the League of Nations for the repatriation of Greek and Bulgarian populations, consulted me some three weeks ago as to whether there would be any objection to his accepting an invitation from the Greek authorities to visit the front in Asia Minor. I said that I saw no objection whatever, provided that he made it clear that he went, not as a British officer, but as a private individual or an official of the League. Colonel Corfe accordingly went, and returned a few days ago. He is now very indignant at a telegram in the Greek papers stating that the "Daily Telegraph" has published "an important interview granted by King Constantine to Colonel Corfe, the delegate of the League of Nations on the Asia Minor front;" in this interview the King is stated to have declared, amongst other things, that Greece did not aim at getting Constantinople, that the Greek army could have been very useful there, but the Allies did not desire their assistance, so it was useless to discuss the matter "for the present." Colonel Corfe begs me to assure your Lordship that this report is a pure invention, although he cannot judge whether it was invented by Mr. Beaumont, the correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," or by some Greek authority at Eski-Shehr. It is true that he received a hint to write his name, and was immediately received by the King, who naturally talked a certain amount about the military situation, but never mentioned Constantinople or any political subject. The only thing which may be worth reporting is that the King told Colonel Corfe that he had personally requested the Commander-in-chief not to destroy more in Angora, when they got there, than was absolutely necessary from a military point of view.

Colonel Corfe was not able to go right up to the front, but he saw a good deal at the bases and on the lines of communication, visited all the hospitals he could, had many long conversations with various officers, including, in particular, General Dousmanis, and motored about in the country visiting Turkish villages. His impressions were very decidedly favourable with regard to the *moral* of the army, their equipment in stores, munitions, &c., and, what interested me most, their behaviour. He assured me that, so far as he had been able to judge (and he was accompanied by an Englishman who spoke Turkish), there was practically no looting or ill-treatment of the inhabitants, and that nothing was taken without an official receipt being given. He had asked one Turk in a village about this, and he had replied that though they naturally did not like the Greeks, or want them there, they nevertheless preferred them to the Kemalists; that he did not know whether the official receipts would ever really mean payment, but, at least, the Greeks gave them these papers, which ought to mean something, whereas the Kemalists gave nothing at all. Colonel Corfe declared that the individual Greek soldier bought and paid for what he wanted.

Colonel Corfe's view of the immediate future is that the Turks probably cannot stand much longer, and that when the real retirement begins it will be rapid and complete, and that the Greeks will take Angora without much more resistance; as an alternative, he sees the possibility of the Turks standing too long, with the result that the Greeks may be able to surround them and capture the bulk of the army; and finally, as a third alternative, he admits the very remote possibility of a stalemate. He understands that the Greek intention is, after taking Angora and destroying all military works, railways, &c., to come back to the Sangaria and make that their



provisional frontier, but he fears that with the advent of winter they will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain such a long line of communications, open to attacks by guerilla bands. Colonel Nairne agrees in general with these views, though he regards the alternative of the capture of Kemal's army as just as remote as the stalemate. As regards the danger from guerilla bands, the Greeks are confident that they can deal with them, thanks to past experience, and it is probable that they will employ the method, which they say has proved successful in Epirus for instance, of removing (not ill-treating) the women and children until the men make their submission and give undertakings to keep quiet.

I am sorry to hear indications, from at least two sources, that the Greeks are themselves forming bands. If that is true and they try to rule the country by that method, I fear that we shall hear of atrocities, reprisals, &c.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

P.S.—September 9.—I took an opportunity to mention to M. Baltazzi this morning the rumours referred to in the last paragraph. He assured me most positively that he had no information whatever confirming the stories, and that he personally agreed most fully that it would be a fatal policy for the Greeks to adopt. At my suggestion, he promised to draw the attention of the President of the Council and the Minister of War to the subject, in case anything of the kind might have been done by subordinate commanders.

G.

[E 10539/1/44]

No. 40.

*Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Moscow, September 6, 1921.

IN the course of my first visit to M. Chicherin, for the purpose of presenting to him my credentials, he took occasion to inform me that Ali Fuad Pasha, the Angora Ambassador in Moscow, was anxiously awaiting my arrival in order to put before me his point of view on the subject of Anglo-Turkish relations. I informed M. Chicherin that I had no authority to discuss such matters, but would refer to your Lordship and ascertain whether it was desired that I should meet Ali Fuad informally and listen to such statements as he might wish to make.

My first interview with Ali Fuad took place in the presence of M. Chicherin. It was difficult to arrange otherwise without appearing desirous of giving gratuitous offence. The interview was interesting as indicating the closeness of the relations between the two. During more than an hour's conversation Ali Fuad hardly took his eyes off M. Chicherin, from whom he was evidently taking his cue. When once or twice his schooling was at fault, M. Chicherin intervened and gave a new turn to the conversation.

My second interview with Ali Fuad took place in his house, and he then handed to me the memorandum of which I am transmitting herewith a copy.\* He was evidently much more at his ease, and spoke more frankly and with less restraint. He informed me that these conversations had been none of his seeking, but were the result of M. Chicherin's initiative. He had been told by M. Chicherin that it was I who was anxious to meet him and discuss the Angora situation. Of the two accounts I incline to believe that of the Angora Ambassador.

The trend of Ali Fuad's arguments will be clear from his memorandum. The points that he principally emphasised in the course of our interview were the following:—

He complained eloquently of what he regarded as the unjust treatment to which Turkey was subjected upon the conclusion of the armistice. The terms which Turkey had put forward, based upon the principles propounded by President Wilson, had, he

\* Not printed.

said, been favourably received by the British naval commander-in-chief. They had, however, led to nothing, and Turkey, having laid down her arms on the understanding that they were agreed, felt that she had been tricked into a position of impotence.

Popular demonstrations held to protest against this unfair treatment had, Ali Fuad said, been throughout of a perfectly peaceful nature, no armed outbreak of any kind occurring. The Allies had, however, used these exhibitions of popular feeling as a pretext for taking punitive measures in the shape of the capture of Constantinople, the occupation of strategic points on the mainland, the suppression of the Constantinople Parliament and the expulsion of its members. In this, and in fact throughout all dealings with Turkey since the armistice, Great Britain had been the initiator of repressive measures and has played largely an executory rôle.

Since the creation of the Angora Government Great Britain had pursued it with relentless hostility. Yet Angora was the expression of Turkish national feeling, and the only object it sought was the independence of Turkey within her ethnographical boundaries. The sincerity of its motives was demonstrated by its refusal to accept either Talaat or Enver, on the ground that they were associated with plans tending to put Turkey under foreign political domination. Surely it was not to the interest of Great Britain, with her great interests in the Mussulman world, to follow a policy of oppression towards a Nationalist Turkey, which only sought to live in harmony with her and to shape its existence in accord with the spirit of friendship which had animated relations between Great Britain and Turkey in the past.

To count any longer with Constantinople was useless. The Government, by its vacillation and weakness, had lost all hold over the Turkish nation. Angora alone is the embodiment of national sentiment.

Ali Fuad spoke at some length upon the attitude of Angora towards the races which had formed part of the former Turkish Empire. Over these, he said, Turkey had no desire whatever to impose her domination, the lesson of respecting the rights of others having been taught her by the war. The line of Alexandretta-Aleppo-Bagdad constituted, in his opinion, the ethnographical boundary of Turkey, and the tribes to the south of this line were free, as far as Turkey was concerned, to govern themselves as they willed and to place themselves under the mandate of whatever Power they chose. Angora was not connected with the anti-British risings in Mesopotamia, which were the result of spontaneous movements among the tribes.

In the matter of the present Græco-Turkish war, Ali Fuad appeared to be under the impression that the Greeks are acting as the instruments of the Allied Governments. He was aware that a declaration of neutrality in the conflict had been made by the various Governments concerned, but believed that this declaration merely implied that the Allies were not themselves taking part in the war, but were deputing the Greeks to act for them. He laid stress upon the fact that the Greek army was found to be equipped with British artillery, British rifles and British aeroplanes, and deplored the employment of the Greeks, the historical enemies of Turkey, for executing the coercive policy of the Allies.

Ali Fuad spoke of the relations between Angora and Soviet Russia. These are regulated by the *Traité d'Amitié* which exists between the two countries. He denied the existence of an alliance and refused to admit that Russia had been supplying the Turkish forces with military equipment or armed support. It was certainly the case that large quantities of Russian war material had found their way to Angora, but this material was supplied by the Germans out of the stores and equipment captured by them in the course of the war. Also—an admission which to some extent incriminates the Soviet Government, in whose hands all the foreign trade of this country is supposed to be concentrated—he referred to a fairly large contraband trade in Russian arms and ammunition carried on by private dealers through Black Sea ports.

The Angora Ambassador is a man of from 35 to 40 years of age, short of stature, but noticeably broad and powerful. He is obviously a soldier and disclaims any diplomatic ability. His manners are distinctly attractive and give an impression of straightforwardness. He has an excellent knowledge of German and speaks French fluently and fairly correctly.

I have, &c.  
R. M. HODGSON.



*Foreign Office to Law Officers of the Crown.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, September 21, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour, by the direction of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, to request you to favour him with your early opinion on certain questions raised by the apparent intention of the Russian Soviet Government to deliver warships to the Kemalist Turkish Government of Angora.

2. With a view to explain the somewhat complex issues of international law involved, it seems necessary to call attention to the following facts:—

3. His Majesty's Government concluded on the 16th March last a trade agreement with the Russian Soviet Government, a copy of which is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference,\* together with a copy of the letter addressed by Sir Robert Horne to M. Krassin at the time of its signature explaining the point of view of His Majesty's Government on certain provisions of the agreement.\* It will be seen that by sub-paragraph (a) of article 1 of the agreement the Russian Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government reciprocally oblige themselves "to refrain from any attempt by military or diplomatic action or propaganda to encourage any of the people of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire." This agreement is still in force, but His Majesty's Government have recently instructed the British Trade Commissioner in Moscow, in a despatch a copy of which is enclosed herein,\* to draw the attention of the Russian Soviet Government to certain apparent breaches of the agreement. It should be mentioned that on the day of the signature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement the Russian Soviet Government signed an agreement with the Turkish Kemal Government, the constitution and history of which is briefly explained below. A paper giving the substance of the agreement, as known to His Majesty's Government, is also enclosed herein.

4. The principal Allies concluded an armistice with the Turkish Government at Constantinople in October 1918. Certain parts of Turkey were occupied by the principal Allies, and this occupation was extended in March 1920 to Constantinople. On the 10th August, 1920, a Treaty of Peace was signed at Sèvres with the Turkish Government. This treaty has not yet been ratified either by the Turkish Government or by any of the principal Allies.

5. Meanwhile a separate Government in that part of Asia Minor not occupied by the Allies had been constituted in 1920 by a certain Mustapha Kemal. This Government subsequently styled itself the Grand National Assembly. The seat of the Government is at Angora. This Government, while not formally renouncing allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey regards itself as the sovereign Government of Turkey, in distinction to the Government of Constantinople, with which, however, it does, in fact, for political purposes, remain in close and friendly relations. One of the main objects of the Angora Government was to prevent the entry into force and execution of the Treaty of Sèvres, and, in particular, to drive back the Greek forces who had been sent to occupy the Smyrna area of Asia Minor by the Supreme Council in 1919, an occupation which was subsequently extended in July 1920 in order to drive back the Kemal forces from the area of the Straits, and force the Turkish Government to sign the Treaty of Sèvres.

6. In the autumn of 1920 the Government of Venizelos fell in Greece, and the succeeding Government ordered a plebiscite, resulting in the return of King Constantine. For political reasons His Majesty's Government and the French Government have not officially recognised the King, but have continued in informal relations with his Government. Partly owing to this change of attitude towards Greece, but principally in order to put a stop to the intermittent warfare between the Kemal forces and the Greeks, the Supreme Council invited the Greek Government and the Turkish Government at Constantinople to send representatives to a conference in London in February 1921, with a view to agree upon modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres acceptable to both parties. In the hope that the Turkish Government at Constantinople would eventually merge into a united Turkish Government to include the Kemal Government at Angora, the Supreme Council did not desire to recognise formally the latter, but they invited the Constantinople Government to include in their

\* Printed in the "Russia" series of confidential print.

delegation representatives of the Kemal Government. It was with such a united delegation that the Supreme Council subsequently negotiated. At the London conference certain proposals were put before both the Greek and Turkish Governments, and it was made clear to both Governments that if hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor the Supreme Council rejected all responsibility. Before final answers to the Supreme Council's proposals were returned, hostilities were resumed in Asia Minor between the Greeks and Kemalists Turks, and towards these hostilities the Supreme Council decided to adopt an attitude of neutrality.

7. Since this renewal of hostilities had taken place in quasi-defiance of the Supreme Council, and while the questions at issue were still *sub judice* by the Supreme Council, the principal Allied Governments originally decided to interpret their neutrality in such a way as to prevent any export of arms from the countries of the principal Allies even by private traders to either combatant, and at the same time to deny either side the ordinary rights of a belligerent in the matter of the visit and search of the vessels of the principal Allies at sea. By this decision as to neutrality it was assumed that a certain *de facto* recognition had been given to the Kemal Government at Angora, as a Government separate from the Turkish Government at Constantinople, with whom His Majesty's Government were still technically in a state of war, suspended by the armistice of 1918. His Majesty's Government have had, however, no direct official relations with the Kemal Government. Warfare between the Greeks and the Kemalists has continued since the London conference, the Greek Government rejecting an offer of mediation made to them only in June 1921. At a meeting of the Supreme Council in August 1921, it was decided to supersede the policy described in the earlier part of this paragraph by adopting the customary rules of neutrality towards the belligerents, so far as private trade in arms between either belligerent and the countries of the principal Allies is concerned.

8. The Kemal Government have, since its constitution, adopted a somewhat hostile attitude towards Great Britain, without, however, going to the length of a declaration of war. Although His Majesty's Government had, after the London conference of March 1921, made plain their neutrality towards the Græco-Turkish hostilities, the Kemal Government have preferred to regard His Majesty's Government's attitude of neutrality as hypocritical. Some hostile measures, such as the refusal to allow British vessels to call at Turkish ports in the Kemal areas, have not been permanently applied, but modified according to the changing political situation; but the Kemal Government have seized and still detain more than twenty British subjects as prisoners and have rejected an agreement made by their representative at the London conference in March 1921 for an exchange with Turkish prisoners detained by His Majesty's Government at Malta—an agreement which on their side His Majesty's Government had begun to carry out.

9. Without burdening the Law Officers of the Crown with further details, Lord Curzon is satisfied that upon the facts a good case could be made out in support of the thesis that the Kemal Government has been guilty of some "form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire," but he is doubtful whether action under the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement based upon that case would be consistent with the maintenance of a policy of neutrality towards the Kemalists as belligerents and in harmony with the international practice governing the relations of neutrals towards belligerents.

10. His Lordship would, therefore, be glad to receive your opinion on the following questions:—

1. In the light of the above explanation of the relations of His Majesty's Government with the Turkish Kemal Government, would His Majesty's Government, in view of their declared attitude of neutrality towards the Græco-Kemalist hostilities, be entitled to regard certain acts of the Kemal Government as "hostile action" within the meaning of sub-paragraph (a), article 1, of the Anglo-Russian Agreement?

2. If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, would His Majesty's Government, knowing that certain vessels of war belonging to the Russian Government were being delivered to the Kemal Government, be entitled (a) to protest against such delivery as a breach of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, (b) to enforce such protest forthwith, in order to prevent an imminent breach of the agreement, by sinking or seizing these vessels, or (c) to make a diplomatic protest to the Russian Soviet Government?

3. Generally.



11. It will be appreciated that, if any action is to be taken in the matter of the delivery of these vessels it may have to be taken quickly, and Lord Curzon would, therefore, request that he may be favoured with your opinion at your earliest possible convenience.

I have, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 41.

*Summary of Agreement signed between the Russian Soviet and Turkish Kemalist Governments, March 16, 1921.*

LE Gouvernement de la République socialiste russe et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, étant entièrement animés du désir de voir régner toujours entre eux des rapports cordiaux et des relations de sincère amitié, ont signé, le 16 mars, un Traité d'Amitié et de Fraternité. Les deux parties contractantes, en constatant la contiguïté entre les mouvements nationaux et libérateurs des peuples d'Orient et la lutte des travailleurs de Russie pour un nouvel ordre social, affirment formellement le droit de ces peuples à la liberté et à l'indépendance ainsi qu'à leur droit à se gouverner sous forme selon leur propre désir. Les deux parties acceptent de ne reconnaître aucun acte international imposé à l'une des contractantes par violence; en particulier, la Russie ne reconnaît aucun traité ou acte international concernant la Turquie qui n'est pas reconnu par le Gouvernement national turc. Les territoires turcs dans le sens du présent traité sont compris dans le Pacte national turc du 28 janvier 1920 avec les détails suivants: la Turquie cède à la Géorgie la suzeraineté de la région de Batoum, ville y compris, à condition d'une vaste autonomie locale, culturelle, religieuse et agraire. La Turquie est assurée du libre transit de marchandises, &c., par le port de Batoum sans douane, sans frais spéciaux. La contrée de Nakhitchevan constituera un territoire autonome sous la protection de l'Azerbeïdjan sans droit de cession.

Les deux parties reconnaissent nuls et abrogés tous les traités passés entre les deux pays avant la conclusion du présent traité. La Russie considère la Turquie comme libre de toutes les obligations pécuniaires basées sur des actes passés entre la Turquie et le Gouvernement tsariste. La Russie dénonce le régime des Capitulations comme incompatible avec la souveraineté de tout pays et déclare nul et abrogé en Turquie tout droit ayant quelque rapport avec ce régime.

En vue d'assumer la liberté de passage des détroits aux transactions commerciales de tous les peuples, les deux parties décident de remettre l'élaboration définitive du status international de la mer Noire et des Détroits à une conférence ultérieure composée des délégués des États riverains, sans que les décisions de la susdite puissent atténuer la souveraineté absolue de la Turquie ou la sécurité de ce pays et de Constantinople, sa capitale.

Les ressortissants de chacune des deux parties résidant sur le territoire de l'autre pays seront traités conformément aux lois du pays de leur résidence, exception faite pour le droit de famille, succession, capacité juridique qui seront résolus par un accord spécial.

Les deux parties sont d'accord pour appliquer le régime de la nation la plus favorisée aux nationaux mutuels y résidant.

Tout habitant des territoires ayant fait partie de la Russie avant 1918 (régions Kars et Ardahan) sur lesquels le Gouvernement russe affirme par la présente la souveraineté de la Turquie, pourra librement quitter la Turquie, emportant avec lui ses effets et ses biens ou leur montant. Réserve à tout habitant du territoire Batoum voulant quitter la Géorgie.

La rapatriation mutuelle des prisonniers de guerre et civils sera exécutée dans l'espace de trois mois pour prisonniers de la Russie d'Europe et de six mois pour ceux de l'Asie.

Les deux parties s'engagent de ne point admettre sur leur territoire la formation ou le séjour de groupements prétendant assumer le rôle de Gouvernement de l'autre pays ou d'une partie de son territoire, de n'admettre ni passage ni séjour de forces militaires ou navales et de [?] groupements hostiles à l'autre pays et interdire tout acte préparatif à action hostile contre l'autre pays, de même par (droit) rapport aux Républiques soviétistes du Caucase sous condition de réciprocité.

La Russie s'engage à faire auprès des républiques les démarches nécessaires pour la reconnaissance par lesdites dans les traités à conclure entre la Turquie et ces républiques des clauses respectives du présent traité.

Les deux parties s'engagent à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir et développer toutes les communications entre les deux pays ainsi que pour assurer le libre transit des personnes et des marchandises sans aucune entrave; elles sont d'accord pour conclure dans le plus bref délai possible une convention consulaire ainsi que tous les accords supplémentaires réglant les questions économiques, financières et secondaires pour affermir entre les deux pays les relations d'amitié préconisées dans le préambule du présent traité.

[E 10553/1/44]

No. 42.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 2503.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 22, 1921.*

THE French Ambassador called here on the 17th instant and told Sir William Tyrrell, by whom he was received in my absence from London, that his Government had been somewhat perturbed by the reports which had reached them with regard to the plot discovered by General Harington at Constantinople, and that they had consequently instructed him to protest against the action that General Harington proposed to take, on the ground that, being of a political character, it would not be in accordance with the terms of the *modus vivendi* under which the French Government had agreed to his appointment as Allied Commander-in-chief.

2. Sir William Tyrrell informed Count de Saint-Aulaire that I had received telegrams from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople (see Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams No. 607 of the 13th instant, and No. 614 of the 15th instant) stating that his colleagues were of opinion that, if the information which had led to the discovery of the plot should prove to be erroneous, all the High Commissioners would be put in an absurd position, but that they admitted at the same time that, if General Harington were convinced of the genuineness of the plot, he could afford to take no risks and must act at once. Sir H. Rumbold had reported that they had therefore preferred that the whole affair should be regarded as a purely military question, and that General Harington should act on his own responsibility.

3. The French Ambassador at once agreed that this opinion of the High Commissioners disposed of the matter, and said that he would report in that sense to his Government.

4. The Italian Ambassador called two days later to make a similar communication, although he endeavoured to make it as mild as possible. He was received by Sir Eyre Crowe, and was given a similar reply.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 10694/143/44]

No. 43.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 852.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 15, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communication which has been addressed by Youssouf Kemal, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, to the Allied High Commissioners, the American and Japanese High Commissioners and to the Spanish Minister. As this communication deals with the alleged unneutral proceedings of two British torpedo-boat destroyers, as well as to the British unneutral attitude generally towards the Nationalist Government, I referred Youssouf Kemal's communication to Admiral de Robeck for his observations.

2. A copy of Admiral de Robeck's letter of the 12th instant is enclosed herewith. Your Lordship will observe that he entirely disposes of Youssouf Kemal's allegations regarding the proceedings of the British destroyers. I would suggest that I should be authorised to refute that portion of Youssouf Kemal's communication which deals with the incident in question without reference to any action which the other Allied High Commissioners may wish to take on Youssouf Kemal's communication.

[7360]

I 2



3. The remainder of Youssouf Kemal's letter raises the question of the use by Greek warships of Constantinople as a base for operations in the Black Sea. I am of opinion that if your Lordship authorises me to reply to Youssouf Kemal, as proposed above, it would be preferable to ignore the latter part of his communication.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Youssouf Kemal to Allied High Commissioners.*

LE 27 août dernier, deux torpilleurs anglais pénétrèrent dans le port de Samsoun et arrêtaient, pour visiter, le navire à moteur d'Ali Reiss, originaire de Rizé. Une embarcation britannique montée par dix hommes armés se détacha de l'un des torpilleurs, accosta le moteur, et tous les marins anglais qui se trouvaient dans l'embarcation fouillèrent de fond en comble le navire turc, et interrogèrent l'équipage pour savoir si le navire transportait des armes et des munitions. N'ayant trouvé, au bout de leurs recherches, qu'un seul revolver, les marins anglais quittèrent le moteur et rentrèrent à bord de leurs navires de guerre.

Or, le 10 août, le communiqué officiel du Conseil suprême annonçait que les grandes Puissances avaient décidé de persévérer dans leur politique de stricte neutralité vis-à-vis de chacun des deux belligérants; d'autre part, Mr. Lloyd George, dans son discours du 16 août aux Communes, affirmait que l'Angleterre n'aidait en aucune façon aucun des deux adversaires. La perquisition effectuée par les torpilleurs anglais à bord du moteur turc pour chercher des armes et des munitions vient de montrer encore une fois au peuple turc la façon dont on remplit à son égard les promesses les plus solennellement faites. Nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de rappeler à cette occasion que c'est précisément après la proclamation toute aussi solennellement faite de la stricte neutralité de la zone de Constantinople et du Bosphore que les navires helléniques ont commencé à utiliser ce port comme base de leurs raids dans la mer Noire.

Je crois devoir ajouter que, même strictement appliquée, nous ne saurions considérer comme bien sincère la neutralité de ceux qui, après avoir mis la main sur notre flotte de combat, déclarent que les deux parties belligérantes sont libres de s'approvisionner comme ils l'entendent en matériel de guerre. Il est évident pour tout le monde que la Grèce, ayant conservée sa marine militaire, est seule appelée à profiter de cette liberté.

Au nom de mon Gouvernement, je proteste de la façon la plus énergique contre tous ces faits par lesquels on tâche, d'un côté, de calmer les appréhensions du monde musulman, inquiet de voir atteinte à l'indépendance de la Turquie, et, de l'autre côté, d'aider dans la mesure du possible la Grèce dans sa lutte contre nous.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
YOUSSEUF KEMAL.

Angora, le 4 septembre 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Your Excellency, "Iron Duke" at Constantinople, September 12, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my observations on your letter of the 10th September. The facts are as follows:—

2. On the date named, viz., the 27th August, a caique under sail was met outside the port of Samsoun by two British destroyers. One of these lowered a boat and proceeded alongside for the purpose of obtaining news. No search of the cargo took place—merely some conversation carried on with the aid of an interpreter. The English boat's crew was naturally armed, as it has been reported more than once recently that many caiques are used by armed brigands. The orders given to the British destroyer were, *inter alia*, to acquire news of what was going on on the coast, and, as all information was denied them by the Turkish authorities at the ports visited, recourse had to be had to interrogating passing vessels. The British officer behaved perfectly correctly and courteously, and his visit lasted less than five minutes.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the next Turkish caique visited (in the neighbourhood of Bender Erekli) had a sick man on board, who received medical attention and was given a supply of quinine.

I do not know whether your Excellency intends to answer this communication from Youssouf Kemal, or, in view of its tone, to ignore it, but I welcome the opportunity of restating the naval point of view.

3. Under the terms of the armistice with Turkey, I maintain that His Majesty's ships have a perfect right to detain and search any Turkish vessels, and that right will continue until a peace with Turkey has been ratified. In order not to complicate further an already difficult situation, this right has not been exercised since Great Britain's declaration of neutrality as between Greeks and Kemalists, but the right exists, and it would have to be shown that its exercise operated unfavourably against the Kemalists in their conflict with Greece before a charge of breach of neutrality could be preferred with justice. Special care had been, and will continue to be, taken to ensure that no grounds for such a charge will be furnished through the action of any of His Majesty's ships.

4. To describe the trivial incident cited by the writer as a disregard of "promises most solemnly made" of strict neutrality is merely playing with words. Does Angora not think that a reciprocal neutrality is incumbent on them? Touching matters within my knowledge as naval Commander-in-chief, why are not the usual courtesies and facilities accorded to His Majesty's ships in Nationalist ports? Why is British trade boycotted? Why has no redress been made for the forced entry and brutal murder on board a British ship at Adalia, and in regard to matters of common knowledge, but outside my official sphere, why are British prisoners still held by the Nationalists?

It ill becomes this "Minister" to talk of neutrality when every action of his Government bespeaks hostility.

5. As regards the complaint that Greek ships continue to use Constantinople as a base for their raids in the Black Sea, this is, of course, outside my province to justify or explain.

The ships are there, however, with the consent of all the Allies, not that of the British only. As far as I am aware, no "waters" have been proclaimed neutral, and therefore exception cannot be taken to Greek ships using Constantinople and the Bosphorus on the ground that the neutrality of these zones, "solemnly proclaimed," has been infringed. The writer chooses to forget that, as a result of the great war in which Turkey ranged herself on the side of the enemies of Great Britain and her Allies, Constantinople to-day is in the military occupation of those Allies, and the fleets of those Allies—of which Greece was one—can scarcely be excluded from its waters.

6. Finally, with regard to the penultimate paragraph of the letter under reply, no one knows better than the writer how little the fact of possessing or not possessing a navy has affected the supply of arms and munitions to the Kemalist forces. It is not a fact that Greece, by virtue of her navy, has alone been able to reap the advantage of unrestricted imports of war material.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, Admiral,  
Commander-in-chief.

[E 10702/143/44]

No. 44.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 864.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 20, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 745 of the 10th August last, reporting the action taken by me to obtain the release of certain native Christians imprisoned in Constantinople for alleged participation in excesses in the district of Ismidt, I have the honour to report that since writing that despatch I have made verbal representations several times weekly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the 30th ultimo Izzet Pasha informed me that he hoped to give me a favourable answer in a few days. On the 3rd instant he stated that the Council of Ministers had requested the Minister of Justice to endeavour to find some means of releasing those Christians against whom



no evidence was available. On the 6th instant he stated that a number of the prisoners were to be released on the following day; on the 11th instant that six had been released; on the 17th instant that seventeen had been released; and yesterday that forty-seven had been released. I propose to continue pressing for the release of such of the remainder as to whose guilt there is insufficient evidence.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 10706/143/44]

No. 45.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 868.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 20, 1921.*

SINCE the retreat of the Greek army from beyond the Sakaria River my colleagues and I have exchanged views regarding the psychological moment for any action which the Allied Powers may wish to take in the direction of mediation or intervention in the Greco-Turkish conflict.

2. I find that my colleagues share my impression that the Nationalists would be glad to make peace, as they realise their exhausted state. But I personally do not believe that they would be satisfied with less than the solution contemplated at Paris in June last with regard to Smyrna. On the other hand, my colleagues and I have no information to show that the Greeks would welcome mediation at this stage, and we are of opinion that it will be necessary to await the effect on Greek public opinion of the inevitable disappointment caused by the failure of the Greek army after their great effort to reach Angora and to crush Mustapha Kemal's army. A report in the press states that the Greeks have failed to obtain a loan abroad and that they will have to recourse to an internal loan, which presumably means the printing of more notes.

3. Looking at the situation from here, it would seem that we must await the further development of the military operations and see whether the Greeks will be able to carry out their programme of destroying the railway between Eskişehir and Angora and creating a kind of desert between themselves and the Nationalists without hindrance from the latter. A few weeks should be sufficient to judge of the effect on the internal situation in Greece of the serious check which the Greeks have received. We therefore think that towards the end of October the Allies may find the moment favourable for action.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 10707/1/44]

No. 46.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 869. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 20, 1921.*

M. FRANKLIN-BOUILLON arrived at Constantinople from Paris a few days ago and left for Ineboli on the 15th instant in a French destroyer.

2. I learn confidentially in the above connection that a certain person called on one of the chiefs of the French Military Intelligence Service and asked the latter if he could give him any information about the convention between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Nationalists. The French officer, who thought that his visitor had called on behalf of the American Associated Press, asked him not to press the point, as any statement he might make might have an injurious effect on Anglo-French relations.

3. My informant infers that there is a secret military clause attached to the convention by which the French undertake, on evacuating Cilicia, to leave to the Kemalists military stores, equipment and munitions sufficient for two divisions. It is also believed that the French would consent to allow the Kemalists the use of their

railway line, i.e., the section of the Bagdad Railway in the French sphere running east through Biredjik and Ourfa towards Mosul, in the event of hostilities between the Kemalists and King Feisal.

4. It is difficult to check the accuracy of the foregoing information. There is little doubt in my mind that M. Franklin-Bouillon's negotiations cover a wider ground than the exchange of prisoners. My French colleague, who must be perfectly well aware of what is going on, spontaneously informed me a few days ago with a shrug of his shoulders that M. Franklin-Bouillon had passed through Constantinople on his way to Angora. He knew quite well that I had no doubt already heard about M. Franklin Bouillon's movements, and it is evident to me that he wished to convey the impression that he is in no way associated with that gentleman's activities.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 10708/476/44]

No. 47.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 871.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 21, 1921.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 848 of the 9th August, asking my views on Judge Sir Lindsey Smith's proposal to try in the Supreme Court actions between British and Ottoman subjects, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the judgment given by him containing his reasons for assuming jurisdiction.

2. The decision has had a useful effect upon the Turkish Government, which has been induced thereby to enter into serious negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners for the creation of the Mixed Court proposed in our joint note of the 12th August, of which copy is enclosed herein for purpose of reference.

3. The French Government has also been moved by our judge's action to display great eagerness in carrying through these negotiations, with a view to remove the complaint made by French nationals that they have still to wait, while British cases are already being tried.

4. Three meetings have already taken place at the Sublime Porte between the Juridical Commission of the Allied High Commissions and the Turkish delegates, and an agreement has been reached on all points save one. The Juridical Commission has accepted the Turkish proposals on the following points:—

The court will be called "Temporary Mixed Judicial Commission" instead of "Temporary Mixed Tribunal." This change of title will not affect its powers in any way.

Judgments will be pronounced in the name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

The administrative service of the commission will be directed by one of the Ottoman members as administrative president. There are also several modifications of minor importance.

5. The one point on which the Turks insist and which the Juridical Commission is unwilling to yield is that the court, consisting of two Allied and one Turkish member, should always be presided over by the Turkish member.

6. At yesterday's meeting the Turkish delegates declared that this is a condition *sine qua non* of their Government's acceptance, and that if it is not yielded they will leave the Allies to do what they please. They sought to justify their claim as a matter of international courtesy.

7. The Juridical Commission holds that it is contrary to the dignity of the occupying Powers to place their judges during the armistice under a Turkish president, and that a far more serious objection lies in the unfitness of any living Turkish judge to preside over a European court. Under the French system, on which the Turkish is based, the president exercises a predominant influence in directing the course of the trial. To concede to the Turks the direction would give to the Mixed Court the character of a Turkish, instead of an inter-Allied, institution. Sir Lindsey Smith agrees in this view.

8. It may be possible to find some way out of the deadlock, and so far as British interests are concerned there is no harm in delay, as British subjects can have their



cases tried in the Supreme Court while the negotiations proceed, but the French and Italians are so anxious to bring the negotiations to a conclusion that they may be tempted to yield the point.

9. I will keep your Lordship informed by telegram of the further development, but at present my view is that we should refuse to yield, and that the French and Italians should follow our lead if the negotiations fall through and should give jurisdiction to their own consular courts.

10. It is important that we should have a judge of high standing ready here to sit on the court as soon as it is formed, so that the court may inspire from the start confidence in its procedure and judgments, and so pave the way for the judicial reform contemplated in article 36 of the Treaty of Sevres. Sir Lindsey Smith is eminently qualified for the post, but I understand that the six months' term for which he consented to come out expires on the 1st October. I venture to urge that every effort should be made immediately by telegram to induce him to stay to inaugurate the new court if it is found possible to establish it.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

*Judgment by Sir Lindsey Smith.*

(Ernest Mill v. Asseo & Merkidian.)

IT is not without interest, as it is typical of so many cases that have come within the knowledge of the court, to allude shortly to the steps which the unfortunate plaintiff then took to get back his money.

As there was no Mixed Court, and the British court had not reopened, he went to the Allied police, who suggested he should go to the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner returned his application, and it went to the Allied police court at Stamboul.

Arbitration was then suggested, and each side put up an arbitrator. After a time the arbitrator chosen by the defendant resigned. The plaintiff then applied to the police again, but they were unable to help, as they had instructions not to deal with commercial cases. The plaintiff then went back to the High Commissioner, who could give him no assistance, as by this time Asseo claimed to be an Italian subject. The plaintiff then sent a lawyer to the Italian judge, who referred it to the Carabinieri. This necessitated many visits to Stamboul, lasting over a month. The Italian police then told the defendant he must allow the arbitration to finish. He objected, as the plaintiff had chosen a lawyer and not a merchant as arbitrator. The plaintiff then nominated a merchant. The defendant's next objection was to a certain clause in the submission to arbitration, and finally the Italian police declined to have anything more to do with it.

The plaintiff then went to the Italian judge, and the Italian judge asked the defendants to agree to arbitration. They refused on the ground that they were an Ottoman firm.

The plaintiff finally applied to this court for a summons, and the court, having formally ascertained from the Italian authorities that they did not consider that they had jurisdiction to deal with the matter on the ground that, though Asseo was an Italian-protected subject, the firm was an Ottoman one, allowed the summons to be issued.

When the case was opened by the plaintiff, the defendants' firm, who were represented by a foreign lawyer, submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the case, as defendants were Ottoman subjects, and that even if the British court were technically competent to try the action such powers had never been exercised by this court before, and should therefore not be exercised now. This raises a very important issue, and it is helpful, in order to arrive at the true meaning of the present Order in Council, to consider the various Orders in Council from which this court derives its jurisdiction.

The first Order in Council was in 1860, but unfortunately no copy appears to be in the possession of the court. The amending Order in Council is dated 1863, and article 65 therein provides: "Where a British subject desires to entertain a suit against a foreigner, the Supreme Court shall entertain the same, and shall hear and

determine it," &c. Then comes the important proviso which is all part of the same section: "Provided that the foreigner first obtains and files in the court the consent in writing of the competent local authority on behalf of the Sublime Ottoman Porte or of the consul of his own nation to his submitting, and does submit to the jurisdiction of the court, and, if required, gives security to pay fees and abide by and perform such decision as may be given by the Supreme Court." It is clear that under that article this court had no jurisdiction unless the foreigner formally submitted to it. The next Order in Council, 1873, article 81, contains provisions to the same effect, the only alteration being that Ottoman subjects are mentioned therein as well as foreigners, and it reads: "Where any Ottoman subject or foreigner desires to institute a suit," &c., and the proviso commences: "Provided that the Ottoman subject or foreigner first obtains and files a consent in writing."

But the Order in Council, 1899, article 150, extended the scope of the court's jurisdiction, and for the first time the words "if so required by the court" were inserted before the words "first obtains and files in the court," so that it was left to the court's discretion to say whether it required submission before it would entertain the action. Further, the proviso was no longer part of one continuous paragraph, but was put into a distinct subsection and numbered. This was reproduced as article 139 of the last Order in Council, 1910, which reads as follows:—

"139.—(1.) Where an Ottoman subject or foreigner desires to institute or take in the court an action against a British subject, or a British subject desires to institute or take in the court an action against an Ottoman subject or foreigner, the court shall entertain the same, and shall hear and determine it, either by the court sitting alone or, if all parties desire, or the court, having regard to its jurisdiction, thinks fit to direct a trial with a jury or assessors, then with a jury or assessors, but in all other respects according to the ordinary course of the court.

"(2.) Provided that the Ottoman subject or foreigner, if so required by the court, first obtains and files in the court the consent in writing of the competent authority on behalf of the Sublime Ottoman Porte or of his own nation (as the case may be) to his submitting, and does submit, to the jurisdiction of the court, and, if required by the court, give security to the satisfaction of the court, and to such reasonable amount as the court thinks fit, by deposit or otherwise, to pay fees, damages, costs and expenses, and abide by and perform such decision as shall be given by the court or on appeal."

It appears to me that the plain meaning of this article as it appears in the two last Orders in Council is as follows: Where an Ottoman subject desires to bring an action against a British subject, or *vice versa*, this court is bound to hear and determine it, but the court may, if it thinks fit, require the Ottoman subject to (1) file a consent of his Government to his submission and to actually submit; (2) give security for damages and costs. It has been suggested that the words "if so required by the court" apply only to what I may call the Government consent, and not to the words "and does submit," and that therefore the actual personal submission is still essential before the court can entertain the action. I do not think the subsection can be so construed. I think that the words "Provided that the Ottoman subject" down to the "jurisdiction of the court" must be read and is actually one continuous sentence, all governed by the proviso "if so required by the court." If this part of subsection 2 is divided into two distinct sentences, the first of which is governed by the words "if so required by the court" and the second not so governed, the second sentence would then consist of the words "and does submit to the jurisdiction of the court," whereas the first sentence would have to end with the word "submitting," which leaves it incomplete.

Further, the word "first" implies a second or some further action which the party is to do "if so required by the court." The first thing is "obtain and file the Government consent." What is the second? "To submit," I take it, "to the jurisdiction of the court."

I am therefore of opinion that this court has, by virtue of the Order in Council, jurisdiction to try this case. Next comes the question whether the court should in the circumstances exercise such jurisdiction. I am informed by Mr. H. E. Pears, who, as leader of the bar, has an unrivalled experience in the practice of these courts, and who has very properly acted as *amicus curiae* on this point, that this court has never before exercised jurisdiction in a case where the defendant, an Ottoman subject, has failed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.



I can well understand that before the war this court declined to hear such cases unless the party submitted to the jurisdiction and gave security, (1) because there was an alternative court open to the parties (the Tijaret); and (2) if a decision was given here, there might be great difficulty in enforcing it. There was, in fact, no inducement to the plaintiff to sue in this court an Ottoman who objected to the jurisdiction, for, in the absence of security or sanction of the defendant's Government, his judgment might be useless to him. It was far safer to proceed against the defendant in the Mixed Court, which was then open to him. But like many other excellent things, the Tijaret vanished with the war, and the British merchant has at the present time no tribunal whose assistance he can invoke other than the Ottoman courts, which have been tacitly admitted by the Capitulations to be quite unsuitable to deal with modern commercial actions. It would seem superfluous in the 20th century to point out how important it is that merchants should have courts to recourse to which can deal, and deal promptly, with actions of this nature. If there is no tribunal which can enforce commercial contracts when made it is useless for the merchant to make any, and an end very soon comes not only to commercial security and stability, but even to trade itself. This cannot but be a disadvantage to the country and everyone in it. It is therefore my considered opinion that, until other courts are established, it should be the policy of this court, where it has a discretion, to exercise that discretion in the direction of admitting rather than of refusing to entertain such actions. I am strengthened in that view by article 308 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, where it is laid down that all contracts concluded before the coming into force of the treaty (as this was) between British subjects and Ottoman subjects shall be decided by the British court to the exclusion of the Turkish courts.

That treaty has been signed but not ratified, therefore it is not yet in force, but it shows that it is the desire of the British Government that the jurisdiction of the British court should be extended to cover such cases as these.

I have already held that the submission is a question for the court's discretion, and I think that the present situation and the facts of this particular case are more than sufficient to justify this court in declining to require any such submission. I therefore propose to hear and determine this case forthwith on its merits.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

*Joint Allied Note to Turkish Government.*

A DIVERSES reprises et notamment par ses notes des 5 mai 1919, 9 juin 1919 et 13 juillet 1919, la Sublime Porte a bien voulu appeler l'attention des Hauts-Commissaires alliés sur les graves inconvénients qui résultent, tant pour les intérêts des ressortissants alliés que pour ceux des sujets ottomans, de l'absence en ce moment de tribunaux régulièrement constitués également reconnus par les Puissances alliées et le Gouvernement ottoman.

Tant à la suite de ces notes que de leur propre initiative et pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la justice gravement lésés par cette regrettable situation, dont la responsabilité retombe d'ailleurs entièrement sur le Gouvernement ottoman, les Hauts-Commissaires ont engagé avec la Sublime Porte des pourparlers en vue d'instituer à Constantinople un Tribunal mixte provisoire composé de juges alliés et ottomans qui se serait prononcé sans appel ni autre recours sur les différends en matière civile et commerciale présentant un réel caractère d'urgence entre Alliés et Ottomans ou entre Ottomans et Alliés. Un délégué ottoman avait été désigné pour conférer à ce sujet avec les délégués des Hauts-Commissaires alliés et une base d'entente avait été établie en vue d'un accord définitif. La Sublime Porte n'ignore pas que c'est à elle seule qu'incombe la responsabilité de l'échec de ces pourparlers.

Préoccupés de mettre fin à une situation qui s'aggrave de jour en jour, les Hauts-Commissaires autorisés par leurs Gouvernements ont décidé de s'adresser de nouveau à la Sublime Porte en vue d'instituer à Constantinople un Tribunal mixte provisoire composé de juges anglais, français, italiens et ottomans qui, sans préjuger le régime judiciaire qui sera établi en Turquie après la paix, connaîtrait sans appel ni autre recours, pendant la période actuelle d'armistice et jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du futur traité de paix, de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale ayant un caractère d'urgence qui s'élèveraient entre ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'une part, et ottomans d'autre part, de même qu'entre sujets ottomans d'une part, et ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'autre part.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de communiquer sous ce pli à la Sublime Porte l'exposé des dispositions préparées par eux "dans les limites de l'équité et en tenant compte des droits et intérêts de l'Empire ottoman," conformément au vœu exprimé par le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères dans sa note verbale du 9 juin 1919. Ils espèrent fermement que le Gouvernement ottoman, reconnaissant l'esprit d'équité qui a inspiré ces dispositions et les garanties de justice impartiale qu'elles présentent pour toutes les parties intéressées, s'empressera de leur donner son adhésion et de désigner des juges ottomans appelés à participer au Tribunal mixte provisoire qui sera ainsi constitué.

Les Hauts-Commissaires feront connaître à la Sublime Porte, avant le 31 de ce mois, les noms des juges alliés qui auront été désignés par eux. Ils prient le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères de leur faire la même communication avant la même date en ce qui concerne les juges ottomans.

Dans le cas où la Sublime Porte le jugerait préférable, elle pourrait rétablir dès maintenant les chambres mixtes commerciale et maritime du Tidjaret, qui devront être rétablies dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix et qui connaîtraient, dans les mêmes formes qu'avant la prétendue abolition des Capitulations, de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale entre ressortissants alliés et ottomans ou ottomans et alliés, sous réserve cependant des dispositions de l'article 308 du Traité de Sèvres, soit que les parties alliées se réservent de s'adresser à leurs Tribunaux consulaires conformément à cet article, après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, soit que, n'étant pourvues devant le Tribunal de Tidjaret pendant la durée de l'armistice, ce tribunal n'ait pas rendu un jugement qui aurait été régulièrement revêtu de la signature du drogman allié.

Les Hauts-Commissaires laissent à l'appréciation de la Sublime Porte le choix entre ces deux propositions, mais ils tiennent à l'avertir dès maintenant que, si dans un délai très court, elle n'avait pas, par son adhésion à l'une ou l'autre des deux solutions proposées, mis fin au déni de justice qui se prolonge en Turquie depuis près de trois ans, ils sont autorisés par leurs Gouvernements à prendre les mesures qu'ils jugeront nécessaires pour assurer, sans le concours du Gouvernement ottoman, le règlement des nombreuses affaires civiles et commerciales urgentes entre Alliés et Ottomans et Ottomans et Alliés qui restent actuellement en souffrance par suite de l'absence de tribunaux réguliers compétents, soit que ces affaires soient portées devant le Tribunal mixte provisoire dont il est question ci-dessus, jugeant avec le concours des juges alliés seuls, soit qu'elles soient portées devant les Tribunaux consulaires alliés conformément aux dispositions de l'article 308 du Traité de Sèvres. L'exécution des jugements ainsi rendus serait assurée, selon le cas, par l'autorité consulaire des parties intéressées ou par la police interalliée, ainsi que cela a lieu dès maintenant pour les affaires mixtes entre Anglais et Ottomans.

Les Hauts-Commissaires sont décidés à appliquer l'une ou l'autre de ces dispositions en cas de refus du concours du Gouvernement ottoman, mais ils espèrent que la Sublime Porte, comprenant la nécessité de mettre fin à une situation qui lèse aussi gravement les intérêts des Ottomans que des Alliés, et qui ne profite qu'aux gens de mauvaise foi, ne voudra pas, par une abstention que rien ne justifierait, priver les parties ottomanes des garanties que les Hauts-Commissaires entendent leur assurer.

Les Hauts-Commissaires prient le Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères, en raison de la gravité et de l'urgence de la question, de vouloir bien leur faire connaître sa réponse le plutôt possible et en tous cas avant le 31 du mois courant.

PELLÉ.  
HORACE RUMBOLD.  
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 12 août 1921.

Enclosure 3 in No. 47.

*Memorandum by Allied High Commissioners.*

PENDANT la période actuelle d'armistice et jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, sans préjuger en quoi que ce soit le régime judiciaire qui sera établi en Turquie après la paix, un Tribunal mixte provisoire siégeant à Constantinople connaîtra contradictoirement ou par défaut de tous les différends en matière civile et commerciale ayant un caractère d'urgence entre ressortissants anglais, français ou italiens d'une part, et sujets ottomans d'autre part, de même qu'entre sujets ottomans d'une part, et ressortissants anglais, français et italiens d'autre part.

[7360]

K 2



Chacun des Hauts-Commissaires désignera pour faire partie de ce tribunal un des trois juges alliés et, s'il l'estime à propos, un juge suppléant. Le Gouvernement ottoman désignera de son côté trois juges ottomans et, s'il le juge à propos, un, deux ou trois juges suppléants.

Dès que le tribunal sera régulièrement constitué, il recevra les requêtes des parties alliées ou ottomanes. Ces requêtes seront transmises au tribunal par l'autorité dont relèvera la partie demanderesse.

Les jugements seront rendus à la majorité des voix par trois juges: un de la nationalité du demandeur, un de la nationalité du défendeur et le troisième d'une nationalité différente désignée par le sort. Celui-ci exercera la présidence du tribunal.

Dans le cas où deux Alliés de nationalité différente seraient parties aux débats, le sort désignera celui des juges alliés de l'une ou l'autre nationalité qui serait appelé à siéger. Le président en ce cas serait le juge allié de la nationalité non partie au procès. Dans le cas où des Alliés des trois nationalités seraient appelés en cause, le sort désignera le président et le juge allié, qui seraient appelés à siéger. Les jugements devront être toujours rendus par trois juges dans les conditions ci-dessus indiquées.

Le Tribunal mixte provisoire appliquera la loi ottomane et les usages locaux. Il réglera lui-même sa procédure en prenant pour base la procédure employée autrefois devant les tribunaux du Tidjaret en la simplifiant et en diminuant les délais le plus possible. Ses décisions seront sans appel, requête civile ni recours en cassation. Elles seront seulement susceptibles d'opposition devant lui en cas de défaut de l'une des parties.

Les frais judiciaires seront versés au Trésor ottoman après prélèvement des dépenses occasionnées par la constitution du Tribunal.

La procédure se fera en français. Les débats auront lieu également en français. Des interprètes pourront être donnés aux parties ottomanes qui seront personnellement entendues.

Le tribunal décidera souverainement sur le rapport d'un de ses juges des affaires qu'il jugera nécessaire de retenir comme présentant un réel caractère d'urgence. Pour les autres, il renverra les parties à se pourvoir après la paix comme il appartiendra.

Chacun des Hauts-Commissaires désignera un greffier pris dans le personnel de chancellerie des Hauts-Commissariats respectifs. Le Gouvernement ottoman désignera, de son côté, deux greffiers ottomans. Le tribunal choisira parmi ces différents greffiers celui qui assurera la direction du greffe.

Les significations des actes de la procédure et l'exécution des jugements seront faites, en ce qui concerne les parties alliées, par l'autorité des Hauts-Commissariats dont elles relèveront et, en ce qui concerne les parties ottomanes, par l'autorité ottomane.

Le Tribunal mixte provisoire ainsi constitué continuera, après l'entrée en vigueur du futur Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, à juger les affaires dont il aurait été saisi antérieurement, à moins qu'il n'en soit décidé autrement par le Traité de Paix.

[E 10710/143/44]

No. 48.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 875.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, September 21, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 820 of the 5th instant, to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the text of a telegram addressed by the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French, Italian and Japanese High Commissioners and myself\* in reply to our joint telegraphic protest against anti-Christian outrages in Pontus and Asia Minor.

2. As your Lordship will observe, this telegram has been communicated to us through the Turkish Commandant of Ismid. I have, however, no doubt as to its authenticity.

3. The general tone of the telegram is reasonable and moderate as compared with other communications which have been received from the same source.

\* Not printed.

4. Yousouf Kemal thanks us for our spontaneous action on behalf of the Mussulman population of Ismid, but strenuously denies the inability of the Turks to govern non-Mussulman peoples.

5. He ascribes the measures taken by the Nationalist Government against the Christians of the Black Sea districts to the actions and activities there of the Greek population itself; to the organisation there of Greek secret societies, the existence of which was proved as the result of a raid on the premises of the "Pontus" Club last spring; to the formation of Greek bands which devastated the Mussulman villages of this region; to the revolt which broke out as the result of the steps taken by the Turkish authorities for the disarming of the population; and to the bombardment by the Greek warships of Ineboli. With considerable justification he argues that measures of precaution were necessary to guard against spying and the possibility of a Greek landing, and to put an end to the embarrassment caused to the Turkish operations elsewhere by a perpetual state of disaffection and danger on the Black Sea littoral.

6. Yousouf Kemal denies, however, that these measures of precaution resulted in massacres or atrocities, or were harsher than the circumstances required. They consisted in the deportation of all Greeks who were not natives of Pontus, in the transfer into the interior of all capable of bearing arms and consequently of actively assisting the Hellenic forces in the event of a landing and in a search for arms, large numbers of which were discovered. Where no resistance had been offered no blood had been shed, and only those women who had been proved guilty of participation in secret societies had been sent into the interior. In such circumstances they had naturally been accompanied by their children.

7. After furnishing explanations in regard to certain specific instances quoted in our identic telegram, Yousouf Kemal makes certain general observations.

8. The original cause, he declares, of all the misfortunes which have befallen, not only the Christians but also the Mussulman population of Asia Minor, lies in the occupation of Smyrna two and a half years ago. The Turks saw in this step the political and economic ruin of their race and the negation of the principle of self-determination. Asia Minor, as the result of that occupation, was being turned into a desert. The Greeks themselves were almost equal sufferers with the Turks, and were suffering in vain, since if she wished to retain Smyrna, Greece would have to wage perpetual war.

9. Yousouf Kemal states in conclusion that the Near East can only be pacified if Smyrna be restored to Turkey. No palliatives will, he says, be of any avail. A complete end must be put to the invasion of Asia Minor by the Greeks. And, he adds almost as an afterthought, a similar course must be adopted in respect of the Greek occupation of Thrace.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 10970/22/44]

No. 49.

*Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe.*

THE French Ambassador came to see me to-day in order to take leave, preparatory to a four or six weeks' holiday in France. He asked me to convey to Lord Curzon his sincere regret at not paying his respects to him personally on this occasion, but as he understood his Lordship was not in town, he did not think it right to trouble him.

Count Saint-Aulaire began by handing me a note (which is now being dealt with by the department) recording the official acceptance by the French Government of the decision to bring to an end at once the customs sanction on the Rhine. I expressed the great satisfaction which His Majesty's Government entertained at this solution, and begged him to thank M. Briand for having so promptly accepted our last communication in the spirit in which it was made: I promised that the necessary instructions would be sent without delay to the British High Commissioner at Coblenz, and to the expert who would represent this country on the inter-allied commission.

The second subject approached by Count Saint-Aulaire was General Harington's recent action in dealing with the Turkish plot. He read to me an official telegram from his government in which they renew, in rather strong language, their protest



against the action of the British general as having been taken in defiance of the allied High Commissioners who, although they had not thought it necessary themselves to enter a formal protest, had nevertheless made it quite clear that they entirely disapproved of General Harington's action, which, moreover, they reported, had not the approval of Sir Horace Rumbold. The French Government must insist to have it definitely accepted that General Harington was in all political matters subject to the three High Commissioners: the French Government were unable to admit the contention that the action actually taken was not of a political kind.

I told Count Saint-Aulaire that I sincerely regretted receiving such a communication. From all the reports we had received from Constantinople two things appeared to be clear: (1) that the action taken had been exceedingly salutary, as well as justified on the merits of the information at General Harington's disposal; (2) that the allied High Commissions so far from protesting, had at first approved the action, and later, when on further consideration, they thought it necessary to dissociate themselves from approval of it, they had nevertheless agreed that it was for General Harington to take such action as he thought right on his military responsibility. I found it difficult to resist the conclusion that the objections so persistently raised had their origin not so much at Constantinople as at the Quai d'Orsay, and I thought it was a pity that the reluctance so constantly shown for a long time by the French Government in acting up to their promise to recognise the supreme command of the British general at Constantinople seemed even now not to have subsided, but to give rise to a spirit of mistrust and ill-will, which made the position of our authorities at Constantinople exceedingly difficult without, so far as I knew, serving any useful purpose.

Count Saint-Aulaire pretended to be very surprised at my taking such a view. He thought it was quite obvious that General Harington had exceeded his powers, and he said it was notorious that he had been completely misinformed as to the existence of a plot, and that the steps he had taken were perfectly futile, irritating and unnecessary.

I asked Count Saint-Aulaire to endeavour to place himself for a moment in General Harington's position, and to imagine what he would do if he were a French general invested with the powers of supreme command; if, in that position, he had convinced himself, on careful and honest consideration of important evidence furnished to him that the military position was seriously menaced, that a traitorous plot was on the point of breaking out, and that the persons implicated were known; what would be his sentiments if his British and Italian colleagues told him that, whatever his information was, they forbade him to take any action whatever, and if at the same time this obstructive attitude was loudly proclaimed to the public, so that it came to the ears of the implicated traitorous persons? I said that I could not for a moment believe that in such circumstances the French general would refrain from taking the measures which he considered necessary for the safety of his forces, and I should not wonder if he were to receive from the French Government a complaint about the unwarranted attitude of the British and Italian obstruction. I ended by saying that I thought the incident on the spot was now considered as settled, and even satisfactorily settled, and I therefore hoped that the French Government would refrain from reviving such an unpleasant controversy. The Ambassador ended by putting his paper in his pocket instead of handing it to me, as had apparently been his original intention.

In the course of a general conversation which followed, Count Saint-Aulaire touched upon the Greco-Turkish situation. He was anxious to know whether we had any information to indicate the probability of the Greeks now being ready to accept the mediation of the Powers.

I said we had nothing very decisive on this point; but there seemed to be clearly much uneasiness at Athens at the existing state of affairs. Whether this feeling was so pronounced as to induce either this, or a future, Greek Government to approach the Powers and to express readiness for a compromise, was a question on which I could not express an opinion. Count Saint-Aulaire asked what truth was there in a report that we invited M. Gounaris to come here, and when was he expected? I explained to him that what happened was that a good many weeks ago M. Gounaris had suggested paying a visit to London, and we had intimated to him that the moment was not then a suitable one for such a visit, and M. Gounaris had accepted the hint. So far as I knew, nothing further had been done in this connection; it was most probable that M. Gounaris still cherished the hope of coming to London, and I ventured to think that if the Greek Government were really inclined to come to

the Powers for advice and help in their present dilemma, M. Gounaris's visit might prove useful. I had no doubt that if, and when, such a visit were definitely decided upon, the allied governments would be informed; but, I said, it is not only the attitude of Greece that is important—it is equally essential to know the frame of mind prevailing at Angora: about this we were in equal uncertainty, and I asked Count Saint-Aulaire whether his government could throw any light upon this side of the question. I observed that they had the advantage of having an agent at Angora in the person of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who, according to all our reports was exceedingly active and in the closest touch with Mustapha Kemal. I presumed, therefore, that the French Government were in a position to form a fairly reliable opinion of the intentions of the Kemalist Government, and I said His Majesty's Government would welcome any information which might be available from this source.

Count Saint-Aulaire said he was unfortunately in entire ignorance: he did not know how far Paris was informed, but he himself had been told nothing, and no particulars of M. Franklin-Bouillon's proceedings had been communicated to him. He promised, however, that any information of interest derived from Angora by the French Government would be placed at our disposal.

The Ambassador then touched upon the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway. He reminded me that under the Treaty of Sèvres the mandatory authorities in Palestine had powers to expropriate the French railway company on certain conditions. He understood that the British authorities in Palestine had offered to buy out the company for £11,000,000. The company had rejected this offer as inadequate, and it had been agreed to have the matter settled by arbitration. The arbitrators had been appointed and the proceedings were expected to be opened before long: nevertheless, it was to be feared that those proceedings would, as in all similar cases, be protracted, so that a final settlement was not likely to be reached for a considerable time. Meanwhile, the railway company was in great financial difficulties, and unless they received some payment now, the danger was that they would have to go into liquidation. This was a contingency which the French Government would deeply deplore, chiefly on account of the unfortunate effect which it would have on public opinion in France, as it would in all probability give rise to a further malicious campaign of anti-British feeling. The company now suggested that they should receive an immediate advance of the compensation eventually to be paid to them, amounting to £5,000,000: as the British authorities had themselves offered £11,000,000, it could not be said that this was an unreasonable demand, and the French Government earnestly hoped that this request of the company would be granted at an early date. I promised to refer the matter at once to the Colonial Office.

The next subject touched upon was the Suez Canal. The Ambassador told me that his government warmly supported the proposal of the Suez Canal Company that the opportunity of the present negotiations between the British and Egyptian Governments should be taken to obtain a definite prolongation of the Suez Canal concession. The Ambassador was instructed to ascertain whether in fact this question formed part of our negotiations, or, if not, whether we would not agree to include it.

I said this question had not so far been included, and I was not in a position to give any undertaking that the prolongation of the Suez Canal concession would figure in the agreement which it was hoped to negotiate with the Egyptian delegation. Just how much it would be possible for the British Government to demand from Egypt was a matter which must be carefully weighed by the negotiators, and all I could say was that this question had not been overlooked, and would continue to be carefully borne in mind.

The last subject touched upon by the Ambassador was Albania. He expressed the gratification of his government on learning that we had come to an understanding with Italy about the famous "formula" and that so the whole matter was practically settled.

I said we had done our very best to meet the views of Italy as far as we possibly could. We had first of all made important concessions to Italian views, which we understood were shared by the French, as to the southern frontiers of Albania; we had withdrawn the support which we had previously and consistently given to the Greek claims to southern Albania; we had done so in order to facilitate the unanimous solution of the frontier question by the Ambassadors' Conference, and had explained that, as France and Italy had agreed to the slight rectification of the



northern and eastern frontiers which we had thought it right to indicate in the interests of the peace and tranquillity of those regions, we withdrew our previous suggestion for the cession of southern Albanian districts to Greece, having been assured that thereby the desired unanimity would be established. It was at that stage that the Italian Government came forward with a further demand to the effect that they would not agree to the definite settlement of the frontiers until they had been given satisfaction concerning their "formula." This satisfaction they had now obtained, and it was with intense surprise that I read in a telegram received from Paris to-day that the Italian Government, having obtained the passing by the Ambassadors' Conference of a resolution embodying the "formula," refused to bind themselves to the acceptance of the frontier rectifications in northern and eastern Albania. I said this kind of proceeding made me almost despair of ever coming to a settlement in this matter. The immediate result would be that no communication could be made to the League of Nations, whilst it was the necessity of making such a communication at the earliest possible date that the Italian Government had used as the principal argument for hastening a decision about the "formula."

Count Saint-Aulaire tried to make out that the frontiers of Albania were quite an indifferent matter, as long as the "formula" concerning the future of Italian interests in Albania was acknowledged. I said I could not take this view: we had been ready to pledge ourselves, under the "formula," to take a certain view of Italy's position in Albania, but that view was clearly conditioned on an Albania within certain recognised frontiers: it would be quite a different question to allow this "formula" to apply to an Albania having other frontiers. For instance, we were ready to recognise that an infringement of Albania's frontiers, say by the Yugo-Slavs, raised the question of the strategical interest of Italy, which the Allies were willing to take into consideration: if, however, the frontiers with Yugo-Slavia were not fixed, and particularly if the small concessions to Yugo-Slavia, which we had considered just and which we thought had been accepted, were to be repudiated by Italy, how could Italy expect us to view in the same light Yugo-Slavia's actions on that disputed frontier? I therefore expressed the hope that the French Government would use their influence to get the Italian Government speedily to redeem the undertaking of their delegate in Paris, on which we had relied, that the frontier line as defined by the committee of the Ambassadors' Conference would be accepted.

As the Ambassador rose to leave I asked him whether he had not something to tell me about Tangier. He said no. I then explained that we had been led by a message given by the French Government to our Ambassador in Paris to believe that Count Saint-Aulaire had received instructions to communicate with us on the subject of the internationalisation of Tangier. Expecting such a communication, we had so far deferred considering in detail the recent French note concerning the Tangier harbour concession, because we were disposed to think that these matters were connected and had better be treated *pari passu*.

Count Saint-Aulaire said that he had received no intimation that the question of the internationalisation of Tangier was to be taken up at once. He knew that the question was receiving consideration at the Quai d'Orsay, and perhaps the matter would be brought forward shortly; he himself, however, was under the impression that owing to the recent Spanish reverses in Morocco, the Spanish Government was no longer so eager to attack the Tangier problem, and that therefore there seemed to be no reason for the French Government to do so.

I said I doubted the accuracy of his impression. The information which we received from Madrid showed unmistakably that the Spanish Government's anxiety about the future of Tangier remained unabated, and that they were getting very nervous about the prolonged inaction of the French Government. I therefore regretted that the French Government apparently intended to put off the matter again.

Count Saint-Aulaire went once more over the ground of the French objections to discussing the question with Spain before they had come to an understanding with Great Britain. I begged his Excellency not to reopen this chapter, and I observed that supposing the French Government had any reason to believe that Spain was less anxious than formerly about the settlement of the Tangier question, this should be an inducement to the French Government to put forward their proposals at the moment when, according to their prognostications, Spain might be less unwilling to be accommodating.

I said I gathered from the French note about the harbour works that the French Government above all feared the elimination of the Sultan's authority from Tangier.

This, I thought, was a complete misapprehension of the point of view urged either by Great Britain or by Spain. So far as I knew, no one had ever proposed to eliminate the Sultan's authority: on the contrary, the draft tripartite agreement negotiated in 1913 definitely provided for the appointment of a Kalipha, who was to wield the Sultan's authority in the administration of Tangier. I could quite understand that the degree of the actual influence of the Sultan in Tangier might be dependent on the conditions to be prescribed for the appointment of this Kalipha, but the draft treaty had made no provision for it, and therefore the matter seemed to me eminently one respecting which the French might well put forward their views to the British and Spanish Governments simultaneously as one of the bases of the proposed agreement for conferring the special régime on the Tangier zone.

Count Saint-Aulaire reiterated his conviction that none of these matters would present difficulties if only they could be first discussed between France and England. I criticised this as an unreasonable view, which had the appearance of mere obstruction: the Ambassador must be quite well aware that there would always be ample opportunity for discussing particular points between the delegates of two Powers represented at a conference so soon as the conference itself had been properly started. Let the French Government put forward their general scheme and communicate it to Great Britain and Spain: if this proved acceptable as a basis of discussion the conference could speedily meet, and nothing could then prevent an interchange of views on any points between any of the delegates.

Count Saint-Aulaire finally promised to urge our view once more upon his Government.

(Initialled) E. A. C.

Foreign Office, September 29, 1921.

[E 10707/1/44]

No. 50.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 2567. Urgent.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 30, 1921.

WITH reference to Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 2047 of the 16th July and my despatch No. 1987 of the 20th July, I transmit to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople\* regarding M. Franklin-Bouillon's present visit to Angora.

2. I should be glad if you would take an early opportunity of obtaining from M. Briand some information regarding the purpose of M. Franklin-Bouillon's visit. You might remind him that at my meeting with him and the Italian Ambassador at Paris on the 19th June last M. Briand stated, in reply to an enquiry of mine, that M. Bouillon had no mission from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report upon the situation. In view of information which has appeared in the press and has reached His Majesty's Government from other sources, I should be glad to know whether M. Bouillon is still without any mandate from the French Government, and, if not, to learn generally the nature of his mission and the scope of the negotiations, if any, which he is conducting. You should remind M. Briand at the same time of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on the 10th August (see your telegram No. 587 of that date) "to use such informal means as may be available to them to ascertain the real intention of the belligerents and to interchange information on the subject."

3. In so speaking to M. Briand you should bear in mind the assurance given to me in the last paragraph of M. Briand's note of the 14th July (see Sir M. Cheetham's above-mentioned despatch) in connection with Bekir Sami's negotiations in Paris, that no general engagement would be entered into by the French Government with the Kemalists without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

\* See No. 46.



## CHAPTER II.—SYRIA AND ARABIA.

[E 7776/104/93]

No. 51.

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, July 7, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 371 of 5th July: Syrian amnesty.

I find on enquiry at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that arrangements referred to in enclosure to Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 1658 were in fact never carried out. No proclamation has been issued and no amnesty can be announced before submission to Parliament.

[E 7635/4/91]

No. 52.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 7, 1921.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a special full power under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, authorising and empowering you to negotiate and conclude, with such Minister or Ministers as may be vested with similar power and authority on the part of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, a treaty between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Hejaz, for the settlement of matters now under discussion between the two countries.

2. A draft of the treaty which it is desired to conclude with King Hussein is enclosed herein, and I have to request you to use your best endeavours to induce His Majesty to agree to it. You should refer to me for instructions, should King Hussein insist, in the course of negotiations, upon introducing in this draft any modifications of substance. You should also report from time to time the state of your negotiations.

3. The wording of articles 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 of the enclosed draft differs somewhat from the wording of these articles in the draft of the treaty as despatched to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo for translation into Arabic, to which draft articles 17, 18 and 19 of the present draft have also since been added. The observations of the Government of India on some of these articles have been invited by the Secretary of State for India. Further instructions will be sent to you by telegraph should these observations, when received, necessitate any modification of the draft treaty.

4. I also transmit to you, for your information, copies of the English versions of the treaties with Idrisi Seyyid and Ibn Saud.\* The Government of India have been asked by telegraph to send to you direct, c/o High Commission, Cairo, copies of the Arabic version.

5. Copies of this letter and of the draft treaty in its present form are being sent to the Colonial Office, India Office, Admiralty, Board of Trade and Ministry of Health, and to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Constantinople and Jeddah.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Draft of a Declaration to be signed by His Majesty King Hussein simultaneously with the Conclusion of a Treaty between him and His Majesty's Government.*

HIS Majesty King Hussein of the Hejaz, recognising that the progress and prosperity of the mandated countries of the Middle East can best be secured with the support and assistance of Great Britain and France, through whose help in the late war the Arabs were enabled to shake off the Turkish yoke, and mindful of the

\* Not printed.

sacrifices made by those Powers in the cause of Arab freedom, hereby declares that he will at no time take any action calculated to embarrass Great Britain or France in the task entrusted to them under the Covenant of the League of Nations of advising and assisting the populations of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria until such time as they are able to stand alone.

*Draft of Proposed Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Hejaz.*

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty King Hussein of the Hejaz on behalf of Themselves, Their heirs and successors, inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their respective interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples,

And His Britannic Majesty having named and appointed as His Plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Majesty King Hussein,

The said and His Majesty King Hussein have agreed upon and concluded the articles following:—

## ARTICLE 1.

The High British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the sovereignty of His Majesty King Hussein, His heirs and successors, over the territories of the Hejaz, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 3 following.

## ARTICLE 2.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees and promises to use all the means which His laws provide to prevent His territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

## ARTICLE 3.

The frontiers and boundaries of the Hejaz being at present indeterminate, and their definite settlement a matter requiring much time, the two High Contracting Parties agree that such frontiers and boundaries are to be discussed and determined hereafter.

## ARTICLE 4.

The High British Government undertake that they will use their good offices in promoting and assisting the settlement of any dispute upon frontiers and boundaries which may arise between His Majesty King Hussein and any of His neighbours who now are or who in the future may be in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty King Hussein shall be free at all times to invoke the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty in the event of such dispute arising.

## ARTICLE 5.

The High British Government undertake to restrain by all peaceful means in their power any aggression upon the Hejaz by neighbouring States who now are or who in the future may be in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

## ARTICLE 6.

The treaties now in force between the High British Government and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali El-Idrisi, and between the High British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Feisal as-Saud are herewith communicated to His Majesty King Hussein. The High British Government likewise undertake to communicate in due course any other treaties that they may conclude with neighbours of His Majesty King Hussein.

[7360]

L 2



His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the aforesaid treaties now existing between the High British Government and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali El-Idrisi and between the High British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Feisal-as-Saud, and undertakes to refrain from any act that would or might impede the due execution of those treaties by the High Contracting Parties.

#### ARTICLE 7.

His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to cultivate, to the best of His opportunity and power, the maintenance of peace and friendly relations with those of His neighbours who have executed treaties with the High British Government and with those who may in the future do so; to refrain from unprovoked aggression in act or form against such neighbouring States; and to discountenance, and as far as possible prevent, within the territories of the Hejaz, any conspiracy or intrigue directed against these States or the interests of their Rulers.

In issues of importance between the Hejaz and neighbouring States His Majesty King Hussein may invoke the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty as provided in Article 4.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Each High Contracting Party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the Agent of the other. His Majesty King Hussein may appoint a Hashimite Agent in London, and His Britannic Majesty may appoint a British Agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of the Hejaz.

His Majesty King Hussein shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint a Consular Agent in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a Consular Agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of the Hejaz as the High British Government may from time to time deem expedient.

These Agents and Consular Agents shall enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

#### ARTICLE 9.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by the High British Government in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon the said Government.

On their part the High British Government agree to recognise such complimentary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the Hejaz in accordance with regulations to be published by His Majesty King Hussein.

#### ARTICLE 10.

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the High British Government undertake not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Majesty King Hussein within the territories of the Hejaz for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On His part His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to place no obstacle in the way of any efforts made by Moslem British subjects or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty to contribute towards the welfare, health and food-supply of pilgrims in the Hejaz.

#### ARTICLE 11.

The High Contracting Parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues, and to publish the amount thereof by the first day of the 1st Jamada in each year for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims, and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

#### ARTICLE 12.

The High British Government agree to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Majesty King Hussein who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Majesty King Hussein showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On His part His Majesty King Hussein agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons—whether Moslem or otherwise—enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who may at any time be within the territory of the Hejaz, provided such British subjects or British protected persons are registered at a British Consulate in the Hejaz. The provisions of this Article are not, however, to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's Government who are habitually resident outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint Consular Agents.

#### ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that the property of British subjects or persons—whether Moslem or otherwise—enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may die in the Hejaz shall be handed over to the British representative in the Hejaz, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British Representative in the Hejaz will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under the laws of the Hejaz are duly paid.

#### ARTICLE 14.

As a mark of confidence in the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and in order to relieve the Hashimite Courts of unnecessary and inconvenient labour, His Majesty King Hussein hereby agrees that all cases arising in the Hejaz in which a British subject or person—whether Moslem or otherwise—enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, is accused of a crime or offence, or is the defendant in a civil matter, and all cases involving the personal status of such persons who are not Moslems, shall be tried by the British Representative in the Hejaz or by such authority as may be nominated by him for the purpose. The provisions of this Article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's Government who are habitually resident outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint Consular Agents.

#### ARTICLE 15.

At the desire and friendly request of His Britannic Majesty, and in the belief that his action will be for the good of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Palestine and also for the general advantage of his own kingdom, His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the Mandate over Mesopotamia and the Mandate over Palestine conferred on Great Britain as Mandatory Power in execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. His Majesty King Hussein undertakes further that in such matters as come within his influence he will use his good offices and facilitate as much as possible the execution of the terms of both Mandates by His Britannic Majesty.

His Britannic Majesty for his part undertakes that nothing shall be done in these countries which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of their populations. His Britannic Majesty further undertakes that he will use his good offices towards the maintenance of good relations between Mesopotamia and Palestine and the territories of His Majesty King Hussein.

#### ARTICLE 16.

The High British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the flag of the Hejaz. Provided that when such flag is flown by vessels other than public ships of the Hejaz the vessel flying it shall be registered at Jeddah or Yenbo, or at one or other clearly specified seaport lying within the boundaries of the Hejaz as determined in accordance with Article 3 of the present treaty, and shall be possessed of papers, issued by His Majesty King Hussein, in general conformity with the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein hereby confirms His recognition of the flags as flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of His Britannic Majesty's dominions, or to British-protected territory or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flags shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

#### ARTICLE 17.

No customs duties shall be levied at seaports in Palestine on goods imported on behalf of the Hashimite Government for immediate transport to the Hejaz by the



Hejaz Railway, provided that a certificate, signed by such Hashimite authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments, shall be presented at the time of importation to the chief customs officer at the port of import, setting forth that the goods in question are the property of the Hashimite Government and are being sent under its orders to the Hejaz, and showing the description, number and value of the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed. Provided, secondly, that the goods are required for the public service of the Hejaz, and not for the purpose of any State monopoly or State trade; and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a clearly distinguishable nature, transported through Palestine in sealed packages which shall not be opened or subdivided before their export from Palestine.

#### ARTICLE 18.

Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby declares that it will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a third party directed against the interests of the other High Contracting Party.

#### ARTICLE 19.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two Parties.

[E 7925/455/91]

No. 53.

*Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 57. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, June 20, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 11th–20th June, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Jerusalem and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
*British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 53.

*Jeddah Report, June 11–20, 1921.*

#### *Departure of Emir Feisal.*

EMIR FEISAL arrived in Jeddah from Mecca on the evening of the 10th June, accompanied by King Hussein and Emir Zeid.

R.I.M.S. "Northbrook" arrived at Jeddah on the afternoon of the 11th, and at 4 o'clock the Royal party embarked. King Hussein was received by the captain of the boat, and the crew and Indian troops were lined up on deck. The King made a speech to the captain emphasising his friendship for Great Britain. Thereafter he talked with the Mesopotamian notables on board, and left the boat at sunset with a salute of twenty-one guns. The "Northbrook" sailed on the morning of the 12th.

Emir Feisal was accompanied by the following:—

#### *Personal Staff:—*

Mohammed Rustom Haidar (*private secretary*).  
Tahseen Kadri (A.D.C.).  
Subeih-el-Ezzi (A.D.C.).  
Abdullah-el-Khammas (A.D.C.).

#### *Mesopotamian Notables:—*

Seyed Nur-el-Yaser.  
Seyed Elwan Yaser.  
Seyed Hadi-ibn-Seyed Hassan Makotor.  
Seyed Mahdi-ibn-Seyed Hadi Makotor.  
Sheikh Shaalan-el-Jabr.  
Seyed Mirza-el-Yaser.  
Haji Mahdi-ibn-Haji Fadel.  
Haji Sallal-ibn-Haji Fadel.

There were in addition 16 servants, 7 with the Emir and his staff and 9 with the Mesopotamian notables.

I had a long interview with the Emir Feisal on the evening of his arrival at Jeddah, and he handed me a report which I am forwarding under cover of a separate despatch. The points emphasised in this report are:—

1. The complete lack of public security and the consequent danger of a Wahhabi invasion.
2. The absence of any organised public health system and the lack of hospital accommodation.
3. The great need for money to put 1 and 2 on a proper basis.

He emphasised these points in his conversation, said he was very much afraid of a Wahhabi invasion of the Holy Places and that financial assistance was a dire necessity.

Just before Feisal's departure, King Hussein sent a telegram to Emir Abdullah saying that he considered Feisal as himself without distinction, and that he was in complete accord with him (Feisal) in all that had come to pass.

The King remained in Jeddah after the Emir Feisal's departure, and left for Mecca on the afternoon of the 18th.

On receiving, from the High Commissioner, Cairo, a copy of Bagdad telegram No. 200 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, I called on the King, who sent the following telegram to the Naqib of Bagdad:—

"To the Eminent, Illustrious Seyed Naqib,

"Of course you have been informed of my son Feisal's departure to you in accordance with the various requests of the inhabitants. Owing to the connections of our families, I need not point out how necessary it is for all of you to work for the prosperity of the country and its welfare and good future. I earnestly hope this from your nobility and feelings, religious and national. May God grant us all success.—HUSSEIN."

The King was delighted with his visit to the "Northbrook," and with the arrangements made for Emir Feisal's departure. He repeatedly asserted his friendship for, and loyalty to, Great Britain, and said that our interests were the same. In local matters, however, he remains both obstinate and unreasonable.

#### *Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.*

I called on the King on the morning of the 14th, and, in the course of conversation, he said he had just heard that a patient had arrived by car from Mecca and had been admitted to the Indian hospital, which was contrary to his wishes. I replied that I knew nothing of the matter, that I would make enquiries, and that the only case that I had personally sent to the hospital was the case of enteric fever referred to in my previous report. The King then said he did not wish the hospital to work at all unless it was found necessary that they should assist the Arab hospital. I pointed out that it was illogical for His Majesty to allow the hospital to land and then to keep it idle for three months, and that I could not agree to this. His Majesty said that he would not leave Jeddah until the matter was arranged, but I refused to agree and took my departure. Thereafter numerous letters were exchanged between us. I agreed to limit the number of beds, so long as there was no epidemic disease, and to confine it entirely to British and British-protected subjects, but would make no further concessions, other than sending it back to India, which I would do on receipt of a written order from His Majesty to that effect. In the meantime, I found out that the case referred to was an Indian pilgrim, who was seriously ill and had come to Jeddah to see a British medical officer. He had not gone to the hospital, but to the house of a friend.



I again called on the King on the 17th and 18th, but no further reference was made to the subject. The hospital is an excellent one, splendidly run by Captain Samatullah, M.C., I.M.S., and many patients are clamouring for admission. In the meantime, I have instructed the officer commanding to accept British pilgrims, and I hope to make some arrangement with the local authorities as to the admission of Arab patients and patients of other nationalities.

#### Ottoman Bank.

Just after midday on the 18th, M. Emile Hanna, the local manager of the Ottoman Bank, came to see me in a great state of excitement, and said he had received orders from the Kaimakam of Jeddah that he must leave Jeddah by the first available boat, *i.e.*, on the 22nd, and that if he did not comply he would be removed by force. M. Hanna asked for my protection. I wrote a strong letter to the kaimakam, warning him of the illegality of his action and asking the reasons, which, if personal, should have been submitted to me, and, if connected with the bank, to both the British and French consulates. I also sent a long telegram to the King to the same effect. At the same time I called upon the French consul-general and explained the position to him, and received assurances of his cordial support.

In his reply, the King said he did not know of any bank existing in the country, and that, further, M. Emile Hanna had been talking to people in Jeddah and saying that the Wahhabies are coming during this pilgrimage to occupy Mecca, and for this reason he must be deported at once. In reply, I asked His Majesty to allow me to arrange for his departure, to give the bank time to send another man in his place should they wish to do so and to allow M. Hanna to depart without force or compulsion. King Hussein replied that the man should be sent away from the country at once, so as to safeguard the country against his actions. I wired back that I would arrange it as soon as possible, but that he could not leave by this boat and that I relied upon His Majesty to allow the matter to be settled like this.

So far as I can find out, the King has absolutely no grounds for the charge brought against this man. The French and Italian consuls report that they have never known him to dabble in political matters, and our experience in the agency is the same. It is another example of the King's tyrannical despotism which is such a danger to the peace of the country and which gives him and his Government such a bad reputation, both in the Hedjaz and in other parts of the world.

#### General.

(a.) A large pilgrim caravan of 9,500 camels, with many additional pilgrims on foot, left Mecca on the 17th June for Medina. The hire of a camel to Medina and back is 26l.

(b.) Emir Ali has telegraphed from Medina to his father that Ibn Saud, who is now in Boreidah, the capital of Kasim, has begun to send his troops to attack the outskirts of Medina. They had attacked several Arabs near Ghoraba and El Khanak. He (Ibn Saud) further sent threatening notices to the villages of Khaibar and El Hayat and to the Huteim tribe, with the object of stopping all communications between Medina and Hail.

(c.) Dr. Khalil Hussein arrived from Egypt on the 15th and has gone to Mecca. He came to see me, and said that, through intermediaries, he would keep me informed of the health conditions of Mecca and of the Hajj.

(d.) An Indian hakim in Mecca, Hakim Khalil Bedauni, has, with the King's permission, established a hospital for outdoor patients, and an appeal for donations is being made to Indian pilgrims. This hakim is not a qualified doctor, but is a druggist.

(e.) The King, during his visit to Jeddah, sent the superintendent of the Jeddah police to jail. No reason is given for this, and they say that no one but the King knows the reason. Local opinion is that it is done to show his autocratic power, and as a warning to the other officers in Jeddah.

#### Current Rumours.

1. That Aziz-el-Rahman of Amritsar and Saiyid Ahmed Mujilid, Indians resident in Mecca, are inducing Indian notables to visit the King and to give him presents. The former further obtains money by proclaiming himself a Royal spy, and the son of Saiyid Ahmed Mujilid gets a monthly allowance of 8 mejidiehs for intelligence work.

2. That the Wahhabies have again appeared near Taif, and that the Hashimite Government has forbidden people to travel on the Mecca-Taif road because it is not considered safe.

3. Mecca reports that, during the Id, when notables and others called on the King, he held up the Koran before them and adjured them to abide by its tenets, saying that the British alone were striving to tear the Koran to pieces, and that he himself was their bitterest enemy. He read verses from the Koran aloud to them. His Majesty held similar language during the Id last year to some Indian notables, and in the presence among others of Mulla Abbas, Jeddah agent of the Faiz Hussein. This year the King emphasised that he was pro-Asia, not pro-Britain.

Also that Feisal addressed a gathering of the Ashraf before leaving for Iraq, explaining that he was going to be King of Iraq, that he shared his father's feelings against the British and that he hoped to deceive them by using their money and aid but refusing them real co-operation. He asked for the prayers of the Assembly that he might ere long become the independent King of Iraq.

Also that news has been received by agent from one Mahmoud Effendi, formerly a translator in the office of the French Liaison Officer in Damascus, who was sacked by the French for selling information to the Arabs, that he himself has been ordered by the Hashimite Government to go to Morocco or Tunis, from where he writes, to work for the Hashimite Government there. He states that another Arab agent, Mohamed Amsouni, also a Moroccan and ex-cavass of the French Liaison Officer in Damascus, has been appointed to work in Egypt.

Also that Ghandi and Mohammed Ali, the Indian Nationalists' leaders, have been invited to visit the Hedjaz.

Also that a deputation has been sent to Afghanistan.

In his address to the Arab leaders, Feisal is said to have lauded the Turks and to have recommended co-operation with them, and to have said that anti-British propaganda must be sedulously spread all through the East.

King Hussein, during his recent visit to Jeddah, sent for the head Government officials, accused them of disloyalty and said he was sending a man from Mecca to be vice-president of the municipality. He has carried out his threat, and has sent Marzouk Garrara, a slave, to occupy that position. It is said that he can neither read nor write, and is a man of bad character, who has been frequently imprisoned.

Sherif Ahmed-bin-Mansour, one of the Ashraf, is going to Yembo to bribe the Hamada tribe to allow the pilgrim caravan free and safe passage through the Hamada mountains. He is well supplied with money.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 53.

#### Shipping Intelligence to June 20, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 10th and 20th June, 1921 :—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				June.	June.		Packets.
Hwah Jah ..	Chinese ..	..	Bombay ..	..	12	..	..
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian ..	Massana ..	Suez ..	10	11	..	2,570
Tantah ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	12	14	..	4,197
Patroclus ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Java ..	12	12	..	1,000
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	15	15	..	410
Nurani ..	British ..	Bombay ..	..	18	..	726	14,398

R.I.M.S. "Northbrook" arrived on the 11th and left on the 12th.



[E 7948/117/89]

No. 54.

*Consul-General Satow to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, June 27, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a speech\* recently made at Damascus by General Gouraud, as reported in one of the local papers, regarding the future development of the autonomous States of Syria.

After referring to the creation last year of these States, the general declared that the problem now was to complete and render more liberal the organisation of the different States, an organisation which, while it need not be exactly similar, must in every case comprise a representative institution, a council.

As regards the State of Damascus, this council is to be the old general council of the vilayet, which will be called the Government Council, and the members of which are to be elected on a wider suffrage than the old council. Until the census has been taken and elections can be held, a nominated council is to be formed. It is to have the same powers as the council which will eventually be elected, and from the outset it is in a consultative capacity to deal with such questions as the State budget and the laws and regulations proposed by the Government. Sanjak and Kaza Councils are also to be formed.

As regards the federation of the different States, the first step in this direction is to be the creation of a federal council, composed of five delegates each from Aleppo and Damascus, and sitting alternately at these places. The president will be chosen for one year, alternately from the Damascus and Aleppo delegates. This council will designate the persons from among whom the directors-general of the common services are to be chosen. Of these common services the following are those most needed now: (1) For the common budget; (2) for public works; (3) for the general control of wakfs. The constituent States will each continue to make use of their own resources, and the revenues of the federal budget will be provided from customs dues and certain other indirect taxes. The actual number of the directors-general is to be fixed when the federal council consists of elected members.

In his speech General Gouraud expressly excluded from the federal States of Syria the Lebanon, declaring that it must develop on separate lines until such time as it desired to enter the federation. Until then it would only have an economic connection with the federation. This clear statement will doubtless give much satisfaction to the Lebanese.

The rest of the general's speech contained some remarks as to the objects of French policy in Syria in the past, and as to the desire of France to resume good relations with the Turks. He also announced an amnesty to the twenty-one persons condemned by court-martial in August 1920, and that the unpaid balance of the war indemnity would be left at the disposal of the State of Damascus.

(Copies to Cairo, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 8048/4/91]

No. 55.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 13.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, July 13, 1921.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to your letter of the 4th June, on the subject of an alleged interview between Mr. M. T. Kaderbhoy and the Emir Feisal on the 11th April, and to India Office letter of the 17th June, on the same subject, of which a copy has been received in this Department; also to India Office letter of the 17th June, addressed to this Department, on the subject of the future relations between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz, of which a copy was transmitted to the Foreign Office. Copy of the reply sent by this Department to the last mentioned letter is enclosed herewith.

\* Not printed.

2. With regard to the question of the Khalifate, Mr. Churchill wishes to make his own view quite clear. He understands that the temporal character of this institution, however strongly it may be supported by Moslems in India or elsewhere, has no foundation in international jurisprudence. He is informed that Moslems all over the world differ widely on the question of who is the real Khalifa, and he is himself in a position to state that a considerable proportion of the British Moslem subjects (many millions in number) with whom he has to deal in his capacity as Secretary of State for the Colonies attach no importance whatever to the Khalifate of the Sultan of Turkey. He is very strongly opposed to any departure from the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government of non-interference in religious matters. He regards the Khalifate as a purely religious office, any reference to which would be quite out of place in a treaty between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein of the Hedjaz.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 55.

*Colonial Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Downing Street, July 13, 1921.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 17th June, regarding the future relations between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz, and to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Montagu, that as the proposed negotiations are being conducted by the Foreign Office, to whom a copy of your letter was transmitted, he presumes that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will reply direct to you on the various points raised.

Mr. Churchill's own view with regard to the Khalifate is expressed in this Department's letter of to-day's date, addressed to the Foreign Office, of which a copy is enclosed for Mr. Montagu's information.

I am also to transmit herewith copy of this Department's letter of the 30th June. (Addressed to the Foreign Office.)

I am, &amp;c.

J. K. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 8339/1977/91]

No. 56.

*Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, June 24, 1921.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 43 of the 26th April last, relative to the capitulatory rights of British subjects in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note on the subject by Mr. Vice-Consul Grafftey-Smith.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 56.

*Minute on Foreign Office Despatch No. 43 of April 26, 1921.*

EVEN if, after pressure, King Hussein signs the Treaty of Sèvres, and even if, after pressure, he gives an undertaking to recognise as British subjects persons whose claims he has hitherto refused to accept, there remains the fact that His Majesty's Government have no representative at Mecca or Medina, and that practical consular intervention in these places is at present impossible.

No undertaking affecting British subjects in the Hedjaz will be of value unless King Hussein thereby admits the competence of the Indian vice-consul at Jeddah, in default of special appointments at Mecca and Medina, to visit the Holy Places in an

[7360]

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official capacity and to act, if necessary, on behalf of our nationals there. At present the consular district of Jeddah is described as "the eastern coast of the Red Sea"; this, in His Majesty's opinion, runs no further eastward than the Mecca Gate of Jeddah town.

2. The words "British subject" will require precise definition if future difficulties are to be avoided. Strict insistence upon an interpretation analogous to that with which Greek and Italian consular authorities in Egypt have made us familiar would entail responsibilities, more particularly in Mecca, of the greatest embarrassment; the King would, in his own phrase, be left with no other subjects than "Qoreish Bedous and the pariah dogs of the streets." One-third of Mecca is Indian, by any comprehensive definition.

We cannot well champion against the local authorities all the Indians, Somalis, Adenese, Afghanis, Hadhramis, Soudanese and Egyptians in the Hedjaz. Yet all these are entitled to the good offices of His Majesty's consuls abroad.

And if, on the one hand, His Majesty's Government cannot, without something like an annexation of the Hedjaz, assert capitulatory rights over all such persons, it appears equally impossible to disclaim them all; the one course is as unfair to the individuals as is the other to the Government concerned.

The ideal solution would be that the Hedjaz should be considered not as a national entity, but simply as the "Belad-ul-Muslimin," and, as such, administered as an essentially neutral State under international Moslem control, vested in Arab, Indian, Turkish, Egyptian, Moroccan and other representatives. We could then accept King Hussein's often implied contention that community of religion should transcend differences of nationality, and the international status of the Hedjaz, which in fact exists only by virtue of the attraction it exercises over the Moslem world, would be logically established.

But in this ideal republic there would be no exclusively Arab monopolies of trade, no discrimination against non-Arabs in the administration and in the Courts, and no general fear of a despotic ruler. All these things are found in the Hedjaz of King Hussein.

We cannot, in justice, abandon all the British subjects and British protected persons resident in the Hedjaz to the Hashimite Government. We cannot, on the other hand, without great embarrassment to King Hussein, spread the Union Jack over all residents in the Hedjaz who have any colour of British nationality or protection. Some formula must be found, binding us to accept as Hashimite subjects persons who might, by a more comprehensive definition, be considered as entitled to British protection, and binding the Hedjaz Government, for their part, to accept as British subjects, or as British protected persons, some whose claims they have hitherto vigorously contested.

The persons affected—the case of residents only being for the moment considered—fall into four categories:—

- (a.) British subjects born in the United Kingdom, the British colonies, India and other British possessions, and the wives or widows of such persons.
- (b.) Persons naturalised in the United Kingdom, the British colonies or India, not "originaires" of the Hedjaz, and the wives or widows of such persons.
- (c.) The children and other descendants of the above born in the Hedjaz.
- (d.) Persons, not being full British subjects, entitled to the protection and good offices of His Majesty's consuls abroad, e.g., Egyptians, Soudanese, Afghanis, Hadhramis, &c.

I would suggest that classes (a) and (b) should, without exception, in default of a declaration of alienage, be recognised as British subjects in the Hedjaz, provided always that they can establish their claims by production of a British passport, a British certificate of registration or a birth certificate.

Further, that persons of class (c) should be accorded British protection if they have already been issued with British certificates of registration, if they hold British passports or if their names are endorsed upon their father's certificate of registration or passport. Adoption of Hashimite or other nationality by a father should not make a son, if of age and duly registered at the British consulate, a Hashimite subject (*cf.* the Qabuli case).

Finally, that no measure of British protection in the Hedjaz should be extended to the persons mentioned in category (d), unless they hold personal papers issued under British authority.

The following considerations are cogent:—

As explained in our despatch No. 12 to the Foreign Office of the 29th January last, there are very large numbers of Hedjaz residents who consider themselves to be British subjects but who are at present deterred, by considerations of self-interest, from parading this conviction. They have dissembled hitherto, but they have had considerable excuse for so dissembling. The majority, presumably, have no British papers immediately available, and it would be a somewhat drastic penalising for the past suddenly to confront them with an undertaking by which His Majesty's Government disowns them and theirs. Really, they have never yet had the alternatives of choice definitely put before them. These persons, mostly of categories (c) and (d), will be moved, in a degree proportionate to the attraction of declared British protection, to present their claims. Some fixed period of time, not less than six months, should, I think, be allowed for this, and provision should be made against inhibitory action by the King, and against a possible ruling by him that any who proceed to India to obtain British Indian papers must, in leaving the country, presumably sever their connection with the Hedjaz.

It will have to be a matter for discussion which of the papers of Egyptians and other British protected persons are considered as issued under direct British authority, and there will doubtless be some outcry against this and other aspects of the undertaking. But it seems better to make as clean a cut as possible, rather than to leave the matter for endless future disputes. Afghanis, Hadhramis and the nationals of such mandated territories as Palestine and Mesopotamia appear to me to fall on one side; Adenese, Nigerians, Somalis and, at present, Egyptians and Soudanese on the other. I would recommend that a regular fetish be made of personal papers in all these cases; otherwise we must remain responsible for a host of nondescript Moslems, the local extension of preferential treatment to whom has something of artificiality and much embarrassment.

Outside the Hedjaz those people of this class not admitted to British protection might or might not travel as Arab subjects, but they would be local Hashimite subjects in the Hedjaz. If any question of their repatriation from the Hedjaz were raised, the good offices of the British consulate might be invoked at the discretion of the consul for the purpose of communicating with the competent authorities abroad.

It should, perhaps, be laid down that any resident of the Hedjaz is a Hashimite subject, unless and until he can show proof to the contrary. For many years an average of approximately 100 persons only have registered themselves at this consulate. This small proportion of the possible total is, perhaps, in part explained by the absence of a British representative in Mecca or Medina; but after such prolonged neglect to assert themselves as British subjects, it seems more fitting that claimants should be required to prove that they have not, in fact, definitely identified themselves with the Hedjaz, rather than that their silence and their claim should be alike accepted without discussion, and the burden of proof thrown upon the Government to which they have hitherto given practical allegiance.

3. Pilgrims are in a class by themselves. As a rule they have passports, return-tickets or other documentary evidence that their connection with the Hedjaz is temporary only, and the King appears ready to admit that they are, indeed, foreigners and not Arabs. For him, however, they are Pilgrims before they are anything else; one might almost say; before they are human. By His Majesty's conception of his kingly rôle, he is not only the absolute and personal monarch of all who are born in, or who reside in the Hedjaz; he is also the benevolent despot of all who come on pilgrimage to his country, a host very much master in his own house. Pilgrim treatment is irrespective of nationality. Pilgrims are condemned to the discomforts of unnecessary quarantine indiscriminately, whether they are Turks or Tibetans. They are subject to the same bullying, robbery and exploitation whether they are Indians, Egyptians or Congolese. Consular representations on behalf of victims are taken by King Hussein as an affront, both to himself, as the most responsible for his guests' discomfort and, in some degree, to the democratic religion which brought them to the Hedjaz.

He appears, indeed, to be of opinion that pilgrimage is made more meritorious by hardships; he certainly resents intervention by the consulates in details of such exclusively Moslem interest as pilgrimage quarantine and pilgrims' hospitals.

In the circumstances it seems best to avoid any semblance of interference in the routine of a Mahomedan religious duty. The amelioration of pilgrimage conditions



should be brought about by pressure from representative Moslem associations rather than from diplomatic agencies and consulates; these latter cannot well undertake to guarantee to their nationals a pilgrimage as secure and effortless as a Cook's tour. To protest every time a British pilgrim suffered discomfort on the Haj would be ineffectual as well as invidious, and I think that we should confine our protection of British subjects making the Haj to the submission and support of their claims in respect of desert brigandage, to the provision of passages and to the disposal of the estates of those who die in this country.

There are many directions in which the King might be asked to adopt more business-like methods or to introduce practical reforms, but their examination hardly falls within the scope of this minute.

4. It is difficult to make recommendations as to the measure of active support which should be implicit in British protection in the Hedjaz.

Are we to intervene with protests and thunder whenever a British subject suffers by reason of the lack of public security on the main caravan routes or from the iniquities of the Hedjaz Customs administration? Are we to fight the battles of every British subject who finds himself aggrieved by hostile discrimination in, for instance, the allocation to Jeddah merchants of camels to transport goods to Mecca? At present, Indians and Arabs alike suffer more or less in silence, but under the régime of the Capitulations the former will not be slow to make their sufferings vocal and to appeal for official support in their various enterprises. The position in the Hedjaz is, it is to be hoped, exceptional, in that such British claims would be almost invariably against the Government, not against individuals.

Nothing will induce the King to exempt British subjects from the normal working of his administration. He is too insistent upon his "sovereign rights" to brook such humiliation as preferential treatment for foreigners, or one law for the Arabs and another for his Indian neighbour.

But if we press for no more than equality of treatment, we expose our nationals to the extortions, sudden imprisonments, and general insecurity of life and property which characterise local government.

It should, I think, be very clearly laid down that, while we are willing that British subjects in the Hedjaz, who are, after all, under no obligation to reside in this country, should, for the normal purposes of administration, be considered as on the same footing as their Arab neighbours, paying the same Customs dues and taxes, and the same respect to established law, we reserve the right to protest against any proved injustice or against any attempt to bring abnormal or discriminating pressure to bear on British subjects to their detriment, financial or otherwise. Such representations on our part could be backed, if necessary, by the withholding of the subsidy.

5. The quarrels of British subjects *inter se* can be settled, if the parties so desire, in the British Consular Court. The King should be asked to give all necessary assistance to the consul to make his decisions, imprisonments, deportation, &c., effective.

There are in the Hedjaz no Mixed Tribunals. Justice is administered by the Sharia Courts and, in Jeddah, by a "Commercial Court," to which merchants have the option of referring disputes about business matters. Cases between British and non-British subjects might continue to be heard by these courts, or, where the defendant is British, by the Consular Court on the defendant's application, and, in default of special objections, by the local authorities.

Criminal cases in which the accused is British should, I think, be tried by the consul. The reference of cases in which British subjects are interested to the local courts should always be reported by the local authorities to the consulate.

6. At present, non-Hashimite nationality is a disqualification for the acquisition of immovable property. Only an Arab subject can own such property, and many British subjects before the war adopted Turkish nationality to attain this object. It may be desired to request King Hussein to remove this disability.

7. The obligation to register themselves annually should be binding upon all British subjects in the Hedjaz. Failure to do so for a fixed period of years should entail loss of capitulatory rights.

8. I would again emphasise the necessity of an extension to Mecca and Medina of consular competence. Without it, any undertaking is worthless.

9. In closing, it may well, without flippancy, be said that the most important local consideration affecting any agreement which King Hussein may be required to give as to the recognition of British subjects in the Hedjaz is the character of King Hussein himself.

Throughout his often obscure communications, there is always rigid insistence upon his "sovereign rights," which are, apparently, as extensive as they are easily susceptible of affront. The suggestion that he considers his claims over his co-religionists in the Hedjaz to transcend any accident of nationality is insistent, and I make no apology for giving it emphasis in this context, since the embittered and ambitious temper of the King is the most essential consideration in every discussion in which he is engaged. And the régime of the Capitulations is a subject which he has hitherto refused even to discuss.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH, *Vice Consul*.

[E 8432/4/91]

No. 57.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 22, 1921.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 14th and 20th July and to express his great disappointment that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston has not seen his way to co-operate in checking the alienation of Indian Moslem sentiment, even to the extent of supporting the suggestion that, in connection with the negotiations for a treaty with the Hedjaz Government, King Hussein might take the opportunity to make a public and formal indication of his recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz. Mr. Montagu, I am to point out, has not suggested that any pressure should be brought to bear on King Hussein in this connection; nor did my letter of the 4th instant do more than suggest that King Hussein should publicly indicate his recognition of the religious suzerainty of the Caliph over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu recognises the objection to the insertion of a clause having this intention in the treaty itself, and he also recognises that there may be similar objections (though they seem to him much less cogent) even to the insertion of a clause to the effect that, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, King Hussein is entirely free to proclaim his recognition of the Caliph to the extent indicated, but he finds it difficult to believe that Colonel Lawrence, if he were so instructed, would not be able to afford King Hussein an opportunity, in the course of the negotiations, of formulating an expression of his recognition of the Caliph as religious suzerain of the Holy Places, which might be made public at the time of the signature of the treaty.

Of the effect of such a declaration (made, as it would obviously be, under the auspices of His Majesty's Government) upon Moslem opinion in India Mr. Secretary Montagu has no doubt whatever. It would, he believes, be widely regarded, not only as satisfactory in itself, but also, and by persons who at present impugn the motives of His Majesty's Government in these matters, as evidence of the sincerity of His Majesty's Government in conveying to the representatives of Moslem opinion in India, in connection with a possible revision of the Treaty of Sévres, the assurance that "it is not the intention of the Allies to interfere in the slightest degree with the spiritual relationship between the Caliph and the inhabitants of the territories which are no longer to be Turkish" (Mr. Montagu's letter to the Indian Moslem delegation dated the 29th April, 1921).

Mr. Secretary Montagu therefore trusts that Lord Curzon will see his way, even at so late a stage, to instruct Colonel Lawrence to endeavour to find an opportunity of indicating to King Hussein that a pronouncement in the sense indicated above would, in so far as it would give satisfaction to Indian Moslem sentiment, be equally a matter of satisfaction to His Majesty's Government.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Colonial Office with reference to that Department's letter of the 13th July to your address.

I am, &c.

L. D. WAKELY.



[E 8471/104/93]

No. 58.

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 2116.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 22nd July, 1921, explaining the announcement made by General Gouraud of the amnesty in Syria.

*Paris, July 23, 1921.*

Enclosure in No. 58.

*Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR une note du 16 de ce mois, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu rappeler les communications échangées les 17 et 26 mai et le 3 juin dernier avec le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, en vue d'établir autant que possible la simultanéité des mesures générales de clémence qui seraient prises en Mésopotamie et en Syrie.

Par cette même note, Sir Milne Cheetham fait savoir que le Marquess Curzon of Kedleston avait pris connaissance des paroles prononcées à Damas le 20 juin dernier par le Général Gouraud annonçant qu' "une mesure de clémence générale serait prise en faveur des condamnés du conseil de guerre de Damas d'août 1920, à l'exception de ceux qui sont coupables de délits de droit commun." Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté désirerait savoir s'il doit en conclure qu'une amnistie est en fait prononcée ou si, au contraire, conformément aux renseignements recueillis par l'Ambassade britannique, une mesure d'amnistie ne peut résulter que d'une décision du Parlement français.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur de faire savoir à Sir Milne Cheetham que, d'après la législation française, deux espèces différentes de mesures de clémence peuvent être prises en faveur de condamnés : d'une part, l'amnistie résultant d'une loi et qui efface entièrement la condamnation avec toutes ses conséquences ; d'autre part, la grâce, prononcée par décret du Président de la République sur la proposition du Gouvernement, qui, sans effacer la condamnation, fait remise aux condamnés de tout ou partie de leur peine.

Les renseignements recueillis par l'Ambassade britannique au sujet de l'amnistie sont donc exacts.

La mesure de clémence envisagée par le Général Gouraud à l'égard des condamnés de Damas est une mesure de grâce qu'il a prié le Gouvernement français de proposer au Président de la République.

Il y a tout lieu de penser que cette procédure de grâce suivie par le Ministère de la Guerre aboutira à très bref délai.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 22 juillet 1921.*

[E 8424/4/91]

No. 59.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Milne Cheetham (Paris).*

(No. 2039.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1921.*

I TRANSMIT to you the accompanying copy of a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Lawrence,\* instructing him as to the lines on which he should endeavour to negotiate a treaty between the King of Hedjaz and His Majesty's Government.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence left England for Cairo *en route* for Jeddah on the 8th July, and I have to request that you will make a communication to the French Government on the following lines in explanation of Colonel Lawrence's mission.

3. His Majesty's Government, as they have publicly stated in Parliament, contemplate the grant of subsidies to certain Arab rulers in the Arabian peninsula in

\* See No. 52.



[E 8557/5148/89]

No. 60\*.

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 26.)*

LE consul général d'Angleterre à Beyrouth a demandé au Haut-Commissaire du Gouvernement français en Syrie de reconnaître les Égyptiens comme protégés britanniques dans les conditions de l'article 107 du Traité de Sèvres et d'admettre l'assistance du drogman anglais aux procès intéressant les Égyptiens.

Le Gouvernement français se propose d'inviter le Général Gouraud à accéder à cette demande, à condition que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté accorde une promesse de réciprocité pour le traitement des Syriens établis en Égypte. Il va sans dire, toutefois, que cette situation cesserait le jour où, par suite de l'attribution des mandats, les Capitulations pourraient être suspendues.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de demander à son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est disposé à donner son assentiment à cette proposition.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 25 juillet 1921.*

an endeavour to check inter-tribal warfare and to prevent aggression against neighbouring Arab territories for the administration of which they are responsible. In order to make this policy effective, it is essential to include the King of the Hedjaz, but before actually granting him a subsidy His Majesty's Government desire to secure King Hussein's assent to the issue of some form of public declaration whereby he would recognise the mandatory principle and, in particular, the mandatory status of Great Britain in Palestine and Mesopotamia and of France in Syria, and his signature to an agreement with His Majesty's Government. This agreement is primarily designed to facilitate a peaceful settlement of frontier and other disputes affecting the Hedjaz and to safeguard so far as possible the interests of British subjects and, in particular, Indian Moslems resident in the Hedjaz, and to obtain some improvement in the King's quarantine and pilgrimage arrangements in conformity with international conventions. The agreement will be carefully drafted to avoid the appearance of interfering with the independent status of the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and its provisions will not give His Majesty's Government any privileged political or economic position.

4. In making a communication in the above sense to the French Government, you should add that His Majesty's Government feel sure that the French Government will welcome the successful conclusion of such negotiations, the main effect of which will be to facilitate their common task in these Arab areas.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 8432/4/91]

No. 60.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd July regarding the proposal to obtain King Hussein's recognition of the suzerainty of the Khalif over the Holy Places.

2. It would appear clear from the terms of your letter under reply that it is not an assurance from the Allies of non-interference in Khalifate matters which is required to check the alienation of Indian Moslem sentiment, but an actual interference, however veiled and indirect, in such matters, taking the form of instructions to one of His Majesty's officials to prompt King Hussein publicly to declare his recognition of the Khalif's suzerainty. The effect to be produced on Indian Moslem opinion is, in fact, dependent on the declaration being "made, as it would obviously be made, under the auspices of His Majesty's Government." In the circumstances, Lord Curzon fails to understand how such a declaration is to be regarded as "evidence of His Majesty's Government's sincerity" in conveying to the representatives of India the said Allied assurance regarding non-interference in Khalifate matters, and he is forced to conclude that the Indian Moslems who are prepared to welcome both the declaration and the assurance, in spite of their inconsistency, are moved primarily not by religious but by political motives.

3. With the policy underlying the Allied assurance, Lord Curzon is in entire agreement. Indeed, it would appear to be the only possible policy for a Government to pursue, which rules—and is in world-wide relations with other Governments who rule—a number of Moslems of different race, holding differing views as to the Khalifate, but united in resenting to a hypersensitive degree any appearance of interference by a Christian Government in their spiritual affairs.

4. After a careful consideration of the arguments advanced in your letter, Lord Curzon does not, therefore, feel justified in sanctioning a departure from this well-established policy in an endeavour to placate the political grievances which, it is admitted, arise mainly from quite other sources, of one section, however important, of British Moslem opinion, and he regrets that he is not prepared to send the desired instructions to Colonel Lawrence.

5. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.



*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 60. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, July 10, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 21st June to the 10th July, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
*British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure in No. 61.

*Jeddah Report, June 21–July 7, 1921.*

(Secret.)

*Ottoman Bank.*

I OUTLINED in my report of the 20th June the King's order for the deportation of M. Émile Hanna, the manager of the local branch of the Ottoman Bank. In spite of all my protests, by telegram and by letter, and demand for delay, the only concession the King would make was to postpone the departure of M. Hanna for ten days, *i.e.*, until the 2nd July. As the King would not allow time for another manager to come to Jeddah to take over from M. Hanna and avoided, in his correspondence, all reference to a new manager—except that he did not recognise an Ottoman bank—I instructed M. Hanna to leave here on the 2nd July. He locked up the important documents in the bank safes and handed over to me the keys along with some money and other valuables. The bank is left in charge of three native caretakers.

I have not been able to find out the reason for the King's action. During his visit here he gave orders that Ahmed Mullah Nyaz, the landlord of the Ottoman Bank, should, along with his son Aziz, be deported, and they left for Massaua by the first available boat. The reason given, as in M. Hanna's case, was for talking politically against the King, but again I can find no proof that this is so. The man's reputation is good, and he is said to have lived quietly, attended to his business, and taken no interest in politics. In his position as landlord, he occasionally visited the Ottoman Bank and took coffee with M. Hanna.

The French consulate joined me in an official protest to the King on the closing of the Ottoman Bank, but the King replied that, according to international rights, the Hashimite Government had a right to close the bank, as they had never consented to its being opened.

As I explained in my telegram No. 172 of the 26th June, the King's action in deporting M. Hanna has had a bad effect on foreign subjects in Jeddah, who realise that they have no security and no protection under the autocratic rule of King Hussein.

#### *Gold Smuggling out of the Hedjaz.*

On the 26th June the King gave orders that all the Salama family, well-known pilots in Jeddah and pilots for the Blue Funnel and other shipping companies, should proceed to Mecca to be tried for gold smuggling. As the Blue Funnel boat "Tydeus" was expected on the 27th June, the agent of that line asked me if I could arrange for one of the brothers to remain until the "Tydeus" had gone. I accordingly asked King Hussein to postpone the trial of one brother for twenty-four hours, so that the "Tydeus" might be piloted into and away from Jeddah. The King replied that he was very much grieved that the British agent should take care of people who were working against the Government and its interests. I replied that I had no wish to interfere when a Hashimite subject broke the laws of the country, but that all I asked was that, in the interests of British shipping, the trial of one member of the family might be delayed until the "Tydeus" had come to Jeddah. The King left two of the brothers in Jeddah, but found the family guilty and is said to have imposed a fine of 10 000*l.* As many notables in Jeddah are involved in this gold smuggling, it is

expected that eventually the King will pardon the Salama family, and I understand that a petition from the Jeddah merchants will be submitted to the King.

The Salama family are excellent pilots, much superior to the average Jeddah inhabitant, and very pro-British in their sympathies.

#### *Political.*

On the 26th June the King sent me the following telegram: "As four months have expired since you have been informed of the substance of Mr. Lloyd George's wire, and two months have expired since my letter of the 24th Shaban, 1339, and so far without result, it is to be expected that a man may be personally vexed, especially when he is without personal ambition. Therefore, as I did not ask for anything that is beyond the power of Great Britain, or even cause her trouble, will you please inform me of your opinion?" The letter referred to was given in full in my report of the 10th May, but I am not clear whether the King wishes a reply about Syria, or about Ibn Saud and the Idrissi, but he probably refers to both.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mecca is constantly referring, in ordinary correspondence, to the Hedjaz Railway line rights which should be reserved for the Hashimite Government. In one letter he refers to the occupation of "Shallalat" (Waterfalls)—by which I presume he means the Yarmuk valley—which should be the property of this Government. In another he refers to the equipment, locomotives, cars, &c., belonging to the railway which was unlawfully taken. These remarks are in letters in reply to correspondence on telegraph bills and other local business.

#### *Pilgrimage.*

There are now approximately 44,000 pilgrims in the Hedjaz. So far none have arrived from the north. We are expecting about 3,000 from Egypt, and the Mahmal is due to arrive about the 2nd August. The hire for the camels for the Mahmal escort has been raised to 9*l.* gold per camel for the round trip. The rate in 1918 was 4*l.* per camel, in 1919 5*l.* per camel, and in 1920 7*l.* per camel. The reason given for the increase is the high price of forage—owing to the poor rains during the past four years—and the scarcity of camels.

The contractor appointed by the Government asked first for 12*l.*, then reduced it to 10*l.*, and finally to 9*l.*, but refused to take less.

There was a high mortality among pilgrims in the big caravan which left Mecca for Medina on the 17th June. Hundreds are said to have died from heat exhaustion during the first three days. Emir Zeid confirmed this news in our conversation yesterday.

#### *General.*

1. Emir Zeid, with the Queen of the Hedjaz, arrived in Jeddah in the morning of the 8th July for a change of air. I called on the Emir on the day of his arrival. King Hussein is expected to arrive in Jeddah about the 20th July.

2. Sheikh Mohamed-el-Sagoff, a Sheikh Osada of Mecca and brother of the King's private secretary, has left for Aden with Sheikh Ahmed Mukhtar and four servants. He said at first he was travelling on private business to Lahej, but later said he was going on Government service. Our agents say he is on a visit to the Idrissi.

3. On the 27th June King Hussein sent me a wire to say that Emir Ali had informed him that the Wahhabis attacked El Hankieh, 100 miles north-east of Medina, but that they had been repulsed by the garrison and had left forty-eight dead on the field of battle. This does not agree with our intelligence report, which said that Hankieh was in the hands of the Wahhabis.

4. All the foreign consulates in Jeddah have been informed that from the 1st Zu-el-Qa'da (7th July) they will be charged for the telephone and for letters and telegrams to Mecca. Up to the present all telephones have been free and official telegrams and letters have been sent to Mecca free of charge.

5. It is said that King Hussein is trying to get the signature of many important Indian pilgrims to a declaration that the sanitary arrangements made by the Hashimite Government are adequate, that there are sufficient hospitals, and that no more hospitals for pilgrims are required. In the meantime the local dispensary doctor asked my permission to borrow one hypodermic syringe and one thermometer from the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, as he could not obtain them from the Hashimite Government.



*Press ("El Qibla").*

No. 493 contains an account of Feisal's departure, and gives the text of a Royal letter of introduction from King Hussein to the people of Mesopotamia.

No. 495 contains a leading article written in vituperative language, addressed to General Gouraud on receipt of the rumour in Mecca that he had been wounded near Damascus.

There is also a telegram from Feisal announcing his arrival at Basra, and copies of telegrams received by King Hussein from the Naqib of Basra and from Emir Ali, head of the reception committee.

No. 496 contains a very long and vague leading article dealing with the Eastern question and criticising the policy of both Great Britain and of France.

It also contains a denial of a statement published in an Egyptian paper that the roads to Mecca and Medina are unsafe.

In No. 497 the leading article deals with the question of peace in the East, and advises the Allies to hasten a settlement, and to stop the ancient quarrel between East and West.

It also contains the announcement of Feisal's arrival in Bagdad, Feisal having wired to King Hussein that he had been enthusiastically received.

No. 498 again refers to the attack on General Gouraud, and quotes a passage from "El Ahram," No. 13469. A passage is also published from a correspondent in Syria saying that the people of Damascus were awaiting the return of Feisal, but being disappointed have turned to his brother Abdullah.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

*Shipping Intelligence to July 10, 1921.*

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st June and the 10th July, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1921	1921		Packages.
Nurani ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Port Soudan ..	June 22 ..	June 22 ..	..	..
Mansourah ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	June 22 ..	" 23 ..	467	4,987
Koweit ..	" ..	Basrah ..	Basrah ..	" 23 ..	" 24 ..	440	124
Dakahlieh ..	" ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 25 ..	" 25 ..	40	1,107
Tydeus ..	" ..	Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	" 27 ..	" 27 ..	652	12 tons.
Africa ..	" ..	Aden ..	Yembo ..	" 27 ..	" 29 ..	..	2,015
Dakahlieh ..	" ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	July 1 ..	July 2 ..	742	2,552
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 1 ..	" 1 ..	..	729
Haarlem ..	Dutch ..	Mombasa ..	Hamburg ..	" 2 ..	" 2 ..	49	19 tons.
Honayun ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 3 ..	" 6 ..	925	14,461
Massaua ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 3 ..	" 4 ..	106	4,457
Sultania ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 4 ..	" 6 ..	1,407	5,441
Mansourah ..	" ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 5 ..	" 5 ..	84	635
Nairung ..	" ..	Bombay ..	..	" 9 ..	..	761	22,832

[E 8868/4/91]

No. 62.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. L. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 2, 1921.

MILITARY position of King Hussein: Jeddah 40 men, Mecca 50 men, Taif 500 men, 30 automatics, some German Maxims, 60 mounted infantry. Troops are regularly paid, but are underfed and dissatisfied; 300 are Syrians trained by Turks, remainder Meccans of little military value. They would fight Wahabis, since they would not anyhow receive quarter. Fort in Taif is strong, but only rationed for two days. There are no artillerymen. Civil and tribal population offer no resistance to the Wahabis and would not in any conditions, as they live in terror of them and dislike

King Hussein's methods and meanness. Hedjaz outpost lies 28 miles east-south-east of Taif, thence to Taraba, in Khalid's hands. Country a plain of hard gravel. It appears certain that any expedition of 1,000 armed Wahabis could take Taif and Mecca, but Khalid does not dispose so many and distrusts Ibn Saud. He has approached Sherif Sharaf with a view to conciliation, but Sharaf is too afraid of King Hussein to suggest measure which would be violently refused.

I will report position in North Hedjaz later when I have discussed it with Ali.

[E 8941/4/91]

No. 63.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 5.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 4, 1921.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo, regarding his suggestion that the King of the Hedjaz should be moved to recognise publicly the spiritual suzerainty of the caliph over the holy places in the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu greatly regrets that the Secretary of State fails to appreciate the feelings entertained on the subject by that very large and important section of Moslem British subjects which is domiciled in India. Yet their attitude is very simple and consistent, and the defect in logic which the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston seeks to bring home to them does not exist. They maintain—whether correctly or not is beside the point—that the loss of the holy places in the Hedjaz to the Ottoman Empire is an interference with the caliphate, which they regard as vested in the Sultan of Turkey; and, inasmuch as they consider that Great Britain is largely responsible for this loss, they ask that His Majesty's Government will make it plain that so far as they are concerned it need not involve an interference with the spiritual attributes of the caliphate. The Prime Minister when he received the Indian deputation recognised the justice of this point of view, and undertook to endeavour to secure that the Treaty of Sèvres should be amended so as to meet it. Meanwhile, the negotiations with the King of the Hedjaz afford a two-fold opportunity, which Mr. Montagu is most reluctant to lose, of demonstrating the desire of His Majesty's Government to dissociate themselves from interference with the caliphate, viz., either by the inclusion in the treaty of a clause to that effect, as was suggested in Mr. Wakely's letter of the 17th June to the Colonial Office, or by a declaration—manifestly obtained by His Majesty's Government from King Hussein—recognising the religious suzerainty of the caliph over the holy places. Mr. Montagu still prefers the former as being at once more direct and more effective.

Mr. Montagu trusts that he has made it clear that it is not necessary to attribute any political *arrière-pensées* to the Indian Moslems in order to explain their attitude. He is asking for no modification in the policy of His Majesty's Government, but he feels that he is entitled to expect that Lord Curzon will assist the Government of India in making that policy palatable to a community whose discontent may have consequences extending beyond India.

I have, &c.

F. W. DUKE

[E 9070/4/91]

No. 64.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. L. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 7, 1921.

FOLLOWING is broad outline of the present situation:—

King accepts articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19 with unimportant modifications, which will be sent to you if you wish me to continue.

King asks for elimination of article 1 and article 3, since they offer benefits not coveted by him.

King refuses article 14, and offers instead that consular officers should be permitted on the bench in Arab court when mixed cases are heard.



King refuses article 15, but offers instead to recognise British "advice and assistance," "guardianship" or any word except "mandate." He suggests a term for the treaty (say, seven years) before renewal and preferential treatment for British subjects in all concessions granted in Hedjaz.

I gave him loan of 80,000 rupees in advance of subsidy at the end of to-day's interview on my own responsibility. He was in urgent need of it and proportionately grateful, and will be in as great need next time we meet and as ready to be grateful. Now he has gone to Mecca, leaving Zeid and Ali. "Clematis," probably detailed to take me south, due here 12th August, so you should instruct me by then. I might get little more out of him, but I prefer to keep some dregs of influence for Versailles Treaty ratification. I regret premature payment, but I had no alternative; it has been a very bad week for both of us.

[E 9142/4/91]

No. 65.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. L. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 10, 1921.

FOLLOWING from Emir Ali:—

"A month ago Ibn Saud caught Rashid Pennid Hai. Then Agab-bin-Agil surprised Emir of Boreida on the way, killed him and captured all his train, but was killed himself.

"Then Northern Shammar, under Mol Rimal with Jerba and Rualla units, arrived and relieved Hai.

"Last news incomplete, but generally reported the defeat of army and death of Abu Sharrein, Ibn Saud's son and commander.

"Rashid has accorded with Rualla and is on good terms with Ali, to whom he has surrendered Howeit Ali, also garrisons Hanakiyeh and Kheibar. Kheibar trouble was between clans of Aida and not political.

"Huteim have nominally gone to Ibn Saud and Ali has blockaded them, but they are not really hostile. Ali says that he holds nearly half the Ateiba and desert. Situation is improving from his point of view. He regards crisis of Akhwan danger as possibly over.

"Medina itself safe, since he has enrolled as gendarmerie many of villagers near it, paying them 3l. a month on three years' contract.

"He hopes to stay some months in Mecca to exercise pressure on father in a direction of rational behaviour.

"Details of specific Wahabi attack last week follow for communication to Colonial Office for necessary action."

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 9203/4/91]

No. 66.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. L. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 11, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 78 of 9th August.

I put in importance treaty first, ratification of Versailles second, declaration third, and have only pressed for first as yet. Third can hardly go through in present shape owing to attitude towards shereef of French Syrian press, which makes it neither tactful nor dignified of him to give them such a bouquet; but after the treaty signature consultation with King Hussein will produce something less.

[E 9070/4/91]

No. 67.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1921.*

FOLLOWING for Colonel Lawrence:—

Your telegram No. L 8 of 7th August and previous telegrams: Negotiations for treaty with King Hussein.

I congratulate you on extent to which you have persuaded Hussein to accept treaty and in circumstances I approve your action in advancing part of the subsidy. You should bear in mind, however, extent to which 20,000l. has already been debited against Hussein by Colonial Office for advances to Feisal, &c. Colonial Office are telegraphing to you direct on this point.

Reference home of precise wording agreed to by Hussein is unnecessary, and I accept your qualification as to unimportance of modifications.

I agree to drop articles 1 and 3. Article 4 will doubtless give us in practice all we want.

I am prepared to accept in principle King's proposal for article 14, but powers of consular officer require definition. Following wording would do:—

"In all cases where a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty is a party to a case before the Courts of His Majesty King Hussein, a British consular representative shall take part in the proceedings as one of the judges. In cases where the British subject is the defendant in a civil matter or accused in a criminal matter, the decision must be concurred in by the British consular representative in order to be effective."

If you cannot obtain this, I would accept following instead of "the decision . . . effective:" "and the decision is not concurred in by the British consular representative, the decision shall not be carried out pending discussion between His Majesty and the British representative in the Hedjaz."

I should like to keep the existing provision about cases involving personal status, but do not attach great importance to it. In any case I am prepared to keep last sentence of existing article 14 if King desires it.

If Hussein agrees to publish substance of declaration, I would agree to drop present article 15 and accept in substitution something like the following article:—

"His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty with regard to Mesopotamia and Palestine in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and undertakes that in such matters as affect these countries and come within his influence he will do all he can to assist His Britannic Majesty."

I would keep or drop second paragraph of existing article 15 as Hussein prefers.

Following article should be added to treaty:—

"This treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for seven years after such date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other, six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years, of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have given such notice."

In explaining your mission to the French we have told them officially that the treaty gives us no economic preference. You should therefore thank Hussein and say that we do not wish to ask for such special favours.

In practice, preference can doubtless be relied on.



[E 9271/4/91]

No. 68.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 2313.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a communication received from M. Briand respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence's visit to the King of the Hedjaz.

*Paris, August 13, 1921.*

Enclosure in No. 68.

*M. Briand to Lord Hardinge.*

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 13 août 1921.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

VOUS avez bien voulu, d'ordre du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, me faire connaître le 4 août que le Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence s'est rendu au Hedjaz pour y négocier un traité avec le Roi du Hedjaz. Le Gouvernement britannique envisage l'attribution aux principaux chefs arabes de la presqu'île arabique, de subsides destinés à mettre fin à la guerre entre les tribus et à rétablir la paix dans les confins des territoires soumis à l'administration britannique.

Pour que le Roi Hussein, dont la collaboration à cette politique est indispensable, puisse y participer, le Gouvernement britannique estime nécessaire qu'il se lie par une déclaration publique reconnaissant le principe des mandats confiés à la Grande-Bretagne et à la France, en Mésopotamie, en Palestine et en Syrie. En même temps, le Roi devrait conclure un traité mettant fin aux disputes de frontière, sauvegardant les intérêts des sujets britanniques résidant au Hedjaz, notamment des musulmans, et apportant des améliorations à l'organisation du pèlerinage. Cet arrangement serait préparé soigneusement de manière à éviter toute apparence d'intervention dans le statut de l'indépendance du Hedjaz et ses dispositions ne donneraient au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique aucune position privilégiée soit au point de vue politique, soit au point de vue économique.

Je m'empresse de vous faire connaître que je prends volontiers acte de ces déclarations. Le Gouvernement français envisage en effet avec faveur l'idée que le Gouvernement britannique pourra conclure avec le Roi Hussein un tel accord qui, sans créer aucune situation privilégiée, serait de nature à diminuer les conflits des frontières et surtout à faire reconnaître par le Roi Hussein un régime plus régulier et moins contraire aux intérêts étrangers.

Le Gouvernement français attacherait une importance particulière à ce que le Roi Hussein renoncât à sa théorie insoutenable d'après laquelle tout musulman débarquant au Hedjaz devient *ipso facto* son ressortissant. Il y aurait un très grand avantage à ce que le statut des étrangers fût celui du régime capitulaire. S'il est un pays qui n'est pas mûr pour l'abolition des Capitulations, c'est en effet avant tout le Hedjaz, qui, en tant que partie de la Turquie, y était soumis. On signale de nombreux cas de sujets étrangers molestés, même à Djeddah, contre tout droit. Le Roi devrait, enfin, se lier par des règles fixes en matière douanière ou économique et renoncer au régime d'arbitraire sans limite qui, d'après les informations du Gouvernement français, ne serait pas loin de le rendre odieux à son peuple.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

A. BRIAND.

[E 9308/4/91]

No. 69.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. L 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, August 15, 1921.*

YOUR telegram No. 79 of 13th August: Hedjaz Treaty.

Alternative to article 15. I do not understand "special position in accordance with covenant." Position depends presumably on McMahon letters and San Remo. We may interpret it agreed with covenant but cannot base [sic] it so. I suggest

either missing out reference to League or substitution of phrase "adviser and assistant" from covenant without mentioning source, or insertion after Palestine "which will be exercised."

Your telegram has crossed with one of mine about declaration which I do not think Hussein will accept in present conditions. French have made it very difficult for him to mention them publicly. I should prefer to get our own treaty signed safely before introducing it.

Please inform Colonial Office I am due Aden 18th August.

[E 9396/9396/91]

No. 70.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, August 17, 1921.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to transmit to you herewith, for the consideration of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a despatch which has been received from the Resident, Aden, submitting the draft of an agreement with the Sultan of Lahej, and to inform you that, subject to the concurrence of his Lordship, Mr. Churchill proposes to approve the terms thereof.

2. Mr. Churchill assumes that payment for the war materials referred to in the second paragraph of article 5 of the draft agreement will be made either by the Abdali Sultan himself or from the funds at the disposal of the India Office.

A similar letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

(For the Under-Secretary of State),

H. YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

*Major-General Scott to Mr. Churchill.*

Sir,

*Aden Residency, July 13, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the High Commissioner, Egypt's letter dated the 16th June, 1920 (copy attached), in which he asked me to arrange for the insertion of articles 2 and 3 of the agreement of 1881 in the new Subehi Agreement with the Abdali Sultan of Lahej.

2. His Highness the Sultan was extremely averse from the insertion of the two articles as they stand, but, subject to the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the new agreement as a whole, he has accepted them in the modified form shown in the agreement which I have attached to this letter.

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the new agreement are identical with the corresponding articles of the draft agreement forwarded by the High Commissioner, Egypt, to the Foreign Office under his No. 128, dated the 26th March, 1919.

The first paragraph of article 4 of the new agreement is identical with article 2 of the agreement of 1881.

The second paragraph containing a protection clause has been added at the wish of His Highness the Sultan, who laid great stress on its insertion.

By the treaty of 1839, made between Commander Haines and the Abdali, the British Government and the Abdali are bound to make a common cause in the event of an attack upon the territory of either, but no protection treaty has been made since that date, although an allusion to British protection has been made in section 7 of the agreement with the Abdali Sultan for the purchase of Sheikh Othman, printed on p. 95 of Aitchison's Treaties, vol. xiii. The recent aggressive policy of the Imam has, however, made the Abdali, along with other sheikhs and Sultans in the Aden Protectorate, extremely nervous, and he desires this ratification of our old promise of protection.

Article 5 is the article 3 of the 1881 agreement modified to meet the wishes of the Sultan, who undertakes not to erect forts on the seashore without the permission of the Resident, but objects to the proposed right of veto in connection with other buildings, as the exercise of this right might, in his opinion, interfere with legitimate trade development in his territory.

The words "other than natural-born slaves of the Abdali and his subjects" have been added after "slaves" in order to permit the Abdalis to be accompanied by their

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household slaves born in Abdali territory in the event of their leaving an Abdali port for trade or other purposes.

I consider these modifications to be reasonable, and recommend their acceptance.

The second paragraph of article 5 contains stipulations regarding the supply of arms and ammunition to the Abdali Sultan.

The British Government is interested in the complete suppression of the arms traffic, and by this agreement throws certain responsible duties on the Sultan, so that it is reasonable that as a *quid pro quo* he should be supplied with arms and ammunition sufficient for the protection of his State and for the performance of the duties connected with the control of the marauding Subehis now allocated to him.

The Sultan considers that in the past his predecessors have suffered from delay in the delivery of arms and ammunition acknowledged to be necessary. In order to obviate such delay in the future, he desires the insertion of the final sentence of the article.

Under these terms it will be incumbent on His Majesty's Government to maintain a reserve of arms and ammunition in the Aden arsenal to meet any contingency that might occur. As this would not amount to anything excessive, I recommend its addition and acceptance of the whole article.

It should, I consider, be our policy to support, as far as we possibly can, the power of the Abdali Sultans of Lahej, who proved themselves during the war the only really loyal Arab rulers in the Yemen. A strong loyal ruler in Lahej acts as a buffer for the protection of Aden from land attack by possibly hostile Arab chieftains. I consider this treaty will give the Abdali Sultan the backing he needs to consolidate his influence, and will thus further our own interests, and I therefore recommend it for acceptance.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT,

Political Resident, Aden.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Major-General Scott (Aden).

Sir,

Cairo, June 16, 1920.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 22nd April, I have the honour to inform you that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has decided that it is desirable to insert articles 2 and 3 of the 1881 agreement in the new Subehi treaty with the Sultan of Lahej.

I accordingly transmit the copies of the treaty forwarded under cover of your despatch of the 6th March, 1919, and should be glad if you will arrange for the insertion of the articles in question.

It has been decided to postpone the ratification of the treaty till the settlement of the future political status of Arabia.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.

Enclosure 3 in No. 70.

Subehi Agreement with the Sultan of Lahej.

BY virtue of the friendly relations existing between the British Government and the Sultans of Lahej, His Highness Sultan Sir Abdul Karim-bin-Fadl-bin-Ali, K.C.I.E., hereby offers to maintain security on the trade route lying in the Subehi country, and to settle all transgressions perpetrated by the Subehis against merchants and others travelling on the trade route. So long as this offer remains operative, Major-General T. E. Scott, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., the Political Resident, engages on behalf of the British Government to accept the following proposals:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

All stipends granted by the Government to the Subehis shall be made over to the Sultan for disbursement. No Subehis will be admitted into Aden as guests except with the written recommendation of the Sultan, nor will they be given presents in Aden unless the Sultan so desires.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Should necessity arise for the dismissal of a Subehi sheikh and the appointment of his successor, or if the suspension of a stipend on account of dissatisfaction, transgression or bad conduct of any sheikh be thought advisable, the Sultan, after consultation with the Political Resident, shall carry out the necessary arrangements.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Should any event of a serious nature take place on the trade route in the Subehi country, and on this account it be found necessary to punish any of the Subehis, the Sultan shall report the case to the Political Resident, and both the Political Resident and the Sultan shall, after consultation, act conjointly to deal effectively with the offenders.

#### ARTICLE 4.

No treaty or agreement of any kind is to be entered into with any other State for the sale, mortgage, lease or hire or gift of any portion of the territory now or hereafter subject to the authority of the Sultans of the Abdali without the consent of the British Government.

In return for the above, the Resident undertakes on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain to protect fully the territory now or hereafter subject to the authority of the Sultans of the Abdalis.

#### ARTICLE 5.

No forts are to be erected by the Abdali Sultans on the sea coast without the permission of the Resident, Aden, but they can erect any other buildings they desire, and open any part of their coast for commercial intercourse. No arms, ammunition, slaves other than natural-born slaves of the Abdali and his subjects, spirituous or intoxicating drugs are to be landed or embarked on any part of the coast now or hereafter subject to the Abdalis jurisdiction without the sanction of the Resident being previously obtained.

In return for the above, the Resident undertakes on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Great Britain to supply the Sultan of Lahej and his successors with reasonable quantities of war materials, ammunition, instruments and arms whenever he asks, for the purpose of instructing, training and arming his permanent soldiers and tribesmen, as also for storage in his magazine for precautionary measures in connection with internal security. The Sultan will also be supplied with arms, ammunition and other war materials that may be required for defensive operations, also for offensive operations which are undertaken with the consent of the Resident for the safety of his or British interests or the maintenance of order on the routes. These supplies will be given by the Resident at Aden from the Aden arsenal without delay on a reference in such quantities as may be necessary and agreed upon by the Sultan and Resident in consultation.

[E 8941/4/91]

No. 71.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1921.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th August regarding the Khalifate and the holy places of the Hedjaz.

2. The letter from this Department of the 25th July dealt with the last suggestion made by your Department that Colonel Lawrence should be instructed to persuade King Hussein publicly to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif. If your letter of the 4th August is rightly understood, this action on the part of His Majesty's Government would be judged by Indian Moslems to be consistent with His Majesty's Government's declared policy of non-interference in Khalifate matters, since it would be merely intended to set right an alleged previous interference by His Majesty's Government with the Khalifate—the separation through the war of the Hedjaz and its holy cities from Turkey—and would only amount to public evidence



that "so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, it (the loss of the holy places in the Hedjaz to the Ottoman Empire) need not involve our interference with the spiritual attributes of the Khalifate."

3. Lord Curzon does not wish to question Mr. Montagu's analysis of the Indian Moslems' attitude. The analysis, however, surely amounts to this. A temporal development has, in their view, affected the spiritual position of the Khalifate. (Incidentally their suggestion of action by His Majesty's Government with regard to the spiritual aspect of this development seems meaningless if the Khalifate has no temporal function.) At the same time His Majesty's Government are invited to say that the temporal development has not affected the spiritual position of the Khalifate. Lord Curzon is therefore surprised that the Indian Moslem attitude should be regarded by the India Office as "simple and consistent," that the question of its correctness should be discounted as "beside the point," and that the suggested explanation of some political *arrière-pensée* should be dismissed. He doubts, however, whether further dialectical discussion between Departments over the logic and accuracy of the Indian Moslem view or over the motives of the supporters of the Indian Khalifate agitation would be fruitful.

4. From your letter under reply the proposal to make, what must appear to all Moslems save those of India, so public and direct an interference with Khalifate matters appears, indeed, no longer to be pressed, and the suggestion originally put forward in Mr. Wakely's letter of the 17th June to the Colonial Office is preferred, namely, the insertion in the treaty with King Hussein of an article "demonstrating," according to your letter of the 4th August, "His Majesty's Government's desire to dissociate themselves from interference with the Khalifate," but actually, according to your letter of the 17th June, to be worded as follows: "So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned there is nothing to prevent the religious suzerainty of the Khalif over the holy places in the Hedjaz."

5. Before dealing further with this suggestion, Lord Curzon would recall that he has already reluctantly consented to support the amendment of article 139 of the Turkish Treaty, in the sense desired by Mr. Montagu and accepted by the Prime Minister, in order to show that the treaty is not intended to interfere with the "spiritual" attributes of the Khalifate. Copies of extracts from the private letters exchanged between Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu on this point are enclosed for convenience of reference.\* Lord Curzon's reluctance to consent to this change was due not only to his firm belief that the attributes of the Khalifate cannot, like those of the Papacy, be divided into spiritual and temporal, but also to the fact that, holding this view, he was not prepared to accept the contention of the India Office that the correctness of the Indian Moslem attitude was immaterial, and that His Majesty's Government were justified in embodying a wrong thesis in a treaty, provided only that their action placated the considerable body of opinion which persisted in maintaining and pressing the thesis.

6. The proposed amendment of article 139, though based on a wrong view regarding the Khalifate, did not seem to Lord Curzon particularly harmful, because it was consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government not to interfere with the Khalifate and with the assurance to this effect given by Mr. Montagu to the Indian Moslem delegation in his letter of the 29th April last. As Mr. Montagu will also note from the enclosed extracts from private correspondence, Lord Curzon was even prepared to elaborate this assurance by adding that the spiritual relationship of King Hussein to the Khalif is a matter for them to settle between themselves. If the assurance, or something like it, is to be put into a treaty provision, the treaty with Turkey would seem the appropriate place. Lord Curzon would, however, see no particular objection to the insertion of such an assurance also in the treaty with King Hussein did he not consider that, even if it met the wishes of Indian Moslems, which seems doubtful, it would be regarded with such suspicion by King Hussein that it would probably wreck the chances of a successful issue of the negotiations as a whole. King Hussein would inevitably believe that such a clause, brought forward now by His Majesty's Government without his request, was designed to influence his relations with the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif.

7. The form of clause suggested in the India Office letter to the Colonial Office of the 17th June, and again in your letter under reply (see the end of paragraph 4 above) goes, however, further than a mere assurance of non-interference with the Khalifate. The acceptance of this clause by King Hussein as part of a treaty could only imply

\* Not printed.

that, at His Majesty's Government's wish, he accepted the Khalif's religious suzerainty over the holy places. King Hussein could hardly accept a clause with this implication for the obvious reason that, in the absence (to any but the Indian Moslem mind) of any clear division between the religious and non-religious attributes of the Khalifate a recognition of the Sultan's religious suzerainty over Mecca and Medina could only open the path to a political interference by the Turks in the affairs of the Hedjaz to the prejudice of its independence.

8. For the rest, King Hussein is believed in some quarters himself to aspire to the Khalifate over Arab Moslems. It must be frankly admitted that, from the point of view of this Department, there would be much to be said for this step, if only because it would weaken the power of the Sultan of Turkey—or rather the Turkish Government—to misuse, as in the past, the prestige of the Khalifate in the Moslem world for political purposes. Lord Curzon is well aware, however, that the step would be disagreeable to Indian Moslems, who, for whatever motives, are anxious to maintain the power and prestige of the Sultan Khalif. In so delicate a situation the only policy for His Majesty's Government to pursue is clearly one of remaining scrupulously aloof, leaving it to the Moslems themselves, inside and outside India, to settle not only whom they will regard as Khalif, but whether the Khalifate carries with it any such particular powers as religious or spiritual suzerainty—and, if so, in what precise form—over the holy places of the Hedjaz.

9. In conclusion, and at the risk of repetition, Lord Curzon wishes to make it quite clear that while he is reluctantly prepared to meet the views of Indian Moslems to the extent of disclaiming any interference by His Majesty's Government in the so-called spiritual attributes of the Khalifate, he is not ready to go further in the direction which they desire in seeking directly or indirectly to influence Moslems either to recognise the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif, or to endow him with any special "spiritual" prerogatives in any part of the Moslem world.

10. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 9617/455/91]

No. 72.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 67. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, July 31, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th–31st July, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 72.

Jeddah Report, July 11–31, 1921.

(Secret.)

Pilgrimage.

THE number of pilgrims who have arrived by sea is 51,459. A considerable number are expected during the first week in August, and the total number will be approximately the same as last year.

So far the public security has been very good. The Jeddah–Mecca road is perfectly safe and the caravans from Medina have returned safely. There is no doubt King Hussein takes a great personal interest in the Medina caravans, and the steps taken this year have been entirely satisfactory. One is apt to forget that in the time of the Turks the public security in the Hedjaz was very bad and no foreign consul could walk even outside the gates of Jeddah without an escort. Shereef Ahmed Mansour, the King's envoy, failed to come to terms with the Hamada so the Medina caravans



have gone via Gar, where the "shukdufs" must be left behind, owing to the nature of the road, until the return journey.

No report has been received of any prevalent sickness among the pilgrims and the health conditions at present are satisfactory.

#### General.

1. The Emir of Katsina, accompanied by his suite and Mr. Webster, arrived at Jeddah on the Blue Funnel boat "Elpenor" on the morning of the 29th July. He was met on board by the Kaimakam of Jeddah, the commandant of the Shereeffian forces in Jeddah and myself. On disembarkation at the quay he was met by the Emir Zeid, and a guard of honour was drawn up to receive him. A house in Jeddah was placed at his disposal, and the party left for Mecca in motor-cars on the 31st July. Mr. Webster is remaining at the British agency. The Emir is to be a royal guest during his visit, and a house in Mecca has been prepared for him. The King will arrange for his journey to Medina after he has seen Emir Ali.

2. Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Haddad Pasha (accompanied by his son and an aide-de-camp), Abdul Malak (Arab agent in Cairo) and Captain Brooke (late Royal Air Force) arrived on the Italian boat "Massaua" on the 29th July. They also were met on board by the kaimakam, the commandant of Jeddah and myself, and were received with a guard of honour on disembarkation.

3. King Hussein arrived from Mecca in the afternoon of the 29th. Accompanied by Colonel Lawrence and Mr. Webster I called on him in the evening.

4. Captain Brooke has come to Jeddah to see the King with regard to the formation of a Hedjaz flying unit. The idea is to have a contract with the King by which he will arrange all the personnel and running of aeroplanes at a fixed sum per annum. If the King accepts these conditions, he proposes to have an aerodrome at Jeddah and another at Taif. The cost is estimated at about 12,000*l.* yearly. The four aeroplanes ordered by the King and for which he paid 350*l.* each (there is an extra engine with each aeroplane) will arrive on the "Tantah" on the 6th August.

5. The Ottoman Bank in Alexandria have sent another manager in place of M. Emile Hanna. So far the Hashimite authorities have raised no objection.

6. Fuad-el-Khatib, who held the position of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the war, has been appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I was very anxious for this appointment. Fuad-el-Khatib was employed in the Intelligence Department of the Soudan Government, and King Hussein frequently wrote to him asking him to return to the Hedjaz. On my representation to the Director of Intelligence, Soudan Government, Fuad was allowed to come to Mecca, nominally on two months' pilgrimage duty, to see the King. The King promptly offered him the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Fuad has accepted. The only question is his future. He has had considerable service in the Soudan Government and has no security of tenure in his office here. As he is a loyal friend to His Majesty's Government and an efficient Secretary for Foreign Affairs I would prefer that the Soudan Government should again second him for a period of years, though I can appreciate the difficulties incurred thereby by the Soudan Government. In the event of the King's favourable consideration of the questions now being discussed with Colonel Lawrence, I shall probably telegraph to your Lordship in the hope that you will endeavour to induce the Soudan Government to agree to the seconding of Fuad-el-Khatib.

7. Emir Ali left Medina on the 20th July and is travelling by the eastern route to Mecca. He has a considerable force with him, as 600 camels were sent for him from Mecca. He is expected in Mecca about the 3rd August and will proceed at once to Jeddah to join in the discussions between King Hussein and Colonel Lawrence.

#### Current Rumours.

1. That Hail is surrounded by Ibn Saud's forces. That Ibn Rashid has asked for help from Nuri Shaalan and will give back Jof to him in return for his help. It is reported that one of Ibn Saud's sons has been killed in action.

2. King Hussein has asked Shereef Shahaat of Medina to come on the pilgrimage as he wishes to see him. Shereef Shahaat has refused to leave Medina.

3. The Medina military and civil expenses are estimated at 13,000*l.*

4. It is said that the French have been in communication with Ibn Rashid. Their chief agent is a man called Mohamed-el-Magrabi, son of Abdul Kadir Magrabi, a merchant of Medina. This man is also in touch with Ibn Sabah of Koweit.

Mohamed-el-Magrabi has had an extraordinary career. He is quite young and was sent to Jerusalem at the beginning of the war, where he was studying at Saleh-ud-Din College. After the fall of Jerusalem he went to Damascus, and from Syrian merchants there he received 400*l.* worth of goods and went to Ibn Rashid, where he declared himself a friend of the Shereef of Mecca. After the fall of Damascus he was sent by Ibn Rashid to Emir Abdulla, who received him well and gave him money and presents for Ibn Rashid. He was also received by King Hussein in Mecca as an agent of Ibn Rashid, and it is said that King Hussein paid him 2,000*l.* He spent the money, received from the King and Emir Abdulla, among the Arabs at Hail and then went to Damascus, where he met the French authorities and was well received by them. He then went to Ibn Sabah of Koweit, where he was again well received and given 500 bags of coffee, 500 bags of rice and 500 bags of sugar. From Koweit he went to Damascus via Basra and Bagdad. He came to the Hedjaz about five months ago, but the King had heard that he was on a special mission on behalf of the French and he was coldly received both here and at Yenbo. After his arrival in Medina he again disappeared, and is now supposed to be with the French in Cairo or in Damascus.

#### Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 499 contains, for the information of the pilgrims and to protect them against extortion, a revised list of charges for camel hire. These are as follows:—

	PT.
Hire of camel for "shukduf" from Jeddah to Mecca	126
Hire of camel for kit from Jeddah to Mecca	118
Hire for "shukduf" from Jeddah to Mecca	40
Pass for kit	5

These charges are calculated at the rate of 20 piastres to the mejidieh, 140 piastres to the £ sterling and 9 piastres to the rupee.

Hire of camel for "shukduf" from Mecca to Medina and back is 95 mejidiehs: 55 mejidiehs to be paid before leaving Mecca, 30 mejidiehs on arrival at Medina and the balance of 10 mejidiehs on return to Mecca. "Shukduf" hire is to be charged according to the condition of the "shukduf," and is to be assessed between 5 and 6 mejidiehs.

In No. 500 it is stated that a pilgrim of note had the honour of an interview with King Hussein and expressed gratitude for the comfort and security afforded to Medina pilgrims.

No. 501 contains various articles dealing with the arrangements made by the Government for the comfort of the pilgrims, and quotes, as an example of the interest displayed by the Government, the recovery of a sum of money stolen from a pilgrim.

No. 502 contains the following:—

The King left Mecca two days ago to settle a boundary dispute near Arafat between two tribes. The matter was satisfactorily settled through the good offices of His Majesty.

An "official proclamation" denying the rumour that "Al Qibla" is the official mouthpiece of the Government.

An "official proclamation" warning pilgrims against proceeding to Taif on foot, unless they are accompanied by a guide and have made proper provision for water *en route*, owing to their ignorance of the road and the extreme heat. Any pilgrim failing to comply with this order will be turned back by the police.

No. 503 contains a notification of the award of the Third Class of the Order of El Nahda to Commander F. R. Campbell, R.I.M.S. "Northbrook."

No. 504 publishes the following telegram from Mousa Kazim, President of the Palestine Delegation to King Hussein, to which His Majesty replied, saying that it was the duty of every Arab to devote all his powers to the Arab cause:—

"The Palestine sub-delegate is sailing for London to discuss various questions relating to Palestine, to combat the idea of a national home for the Jews and to ask for constitutional Government.

"The delegation asks for your Majesty's help."

No. 505 notifies the departure for Jeddah of King Hussein in connection with important affairs.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.



## Enclosure 2 in No. 72.

*Shipping Intelligence to July 31, 1921.*

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 31st July, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked	Cargo Discharged.
							Packets
Asmara ..	Italian	.. Massaua ..	Suez ..	11 July	12 July	..	3,738
Mansourah ..	British	.. Port Soudan ..	" ..	11 "	12 "	634	1,676
Massaua ..	Italian	.. Suez ..	Massaua ..	13 "	13 "	71	374
Shuja ..	British	.. Basra ..	" ..	13 "	" ..	1,378	42
Shushtar ..	"	.. Bombay and Karachi	Bombay ..	15 "	17 "	810	822
Tantah ..	"	.. Suez ..	Port Soudan	15 "	15 "	20	3,085
Massaua ..	Italian	.. Massaua ..	Suez ..	17 "	18 "	..	397
Jeddah ..	British	.. Bombay ..	" ..	19 "	" ..	1,187	11,857
Homayun ..	"	.. Aden ..	" ..	19 "	" ..	12	1,163
Tantah ..	"	.. Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	2 "	24 "	902	3,501
Dakahliah ..	"	.. Suez ..	" ..	22 "	23 "	891	"
Keneh ..	"	.. " ..	" ..	23 "	24 "	674	"
Themis ..	Egyptian	.. Alexandria ..	" ..	25 "	" ..	121	30,861
Oanfa ..	British	.. Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	26 "	26 "	292	12 tons
Elpenor ..	"	.. Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	29 "	29 "	10	100 "
Massaua ..	Italian	.. Suez ..	Massaua ..	29 "	29 "	256	801
Asmara ..	"	.. Massaua and Port Soudan	" ..	31 "	" ..	126	3,589

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 19th July and left on the 22nd July

[E 9396/9396/91]

No. 73.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1921.*

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th August enclosing the draft of an agreement with the Sultan of Lahej.

2. Although Lahëj, being in the Arabian peninsula, is in one of the "prohibited" areas under article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention, it is also within the Aden protectorate, and His Majesty's Government have held that it is within their right to ship arms for Government use to any part of the British Empire. The convention would not, therefore, appear to be infringed by the controlled supply of arms to the Abdali Sultan for the purpose of keeping order within his territories.

3. The arrangements for such supply indicated in the final article of the draft agreement appear, moreover, to be in accordance with articles 7 and 9 of the Arms Traffic Convention. If, however, as Lord Curzon assumes, it is the intention to communicate the final agreement to the League of Nations and publish it, it might be advisable to insert a paragraph in the agreement to the effect that the Sultan will regard himself as bound by any general agreement with regard to the trade in, and possession of, arms to which His Majesty's Government may be or become a party.

4. Lord Curzon would venture to draw attention to the provision regarding domestic slaves in article 5 of the draft. This provision may be a perfectly proper one from the point of view of local practice, but it might be misinterpreted by the League and by some sections of public opinion in this country, if and when the agreement is communicated to the League and published. The point is not one, however, in which this Department is directly concerned and it has doubtless not escaped Mr. Churchill's attention.

5. Subject to these observations Lord Curzon concurs in the draft agreement.

6. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I have, &amp;c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 9673/117/89]

No. 74.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 2378.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 22nd August, respecting the attack on Djebel Druse by Assad-el-Attrache.

*Paris, August 23, 1921.*

Enclosure in No. 74.

*Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

LE Général Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la République en Syrie, vient de faire connaître au Département des Affaires étrangères qu'un agent de l'Emir Abdullah, nommé Assad-el-Attrache, s'est rendu le 12 août accompagné de dix-sept cavaliers à Soudeida, capitale de l'État du Djebel Druse, sur la frontière de Transjordanie, et a traversé la ville avec un drapeau chérifien, déclarant qu'il venait prendre possession du pays au nom du Chérif Abdullah et arborer son drapeau.

Assad-el-Attrache est d'ailleurs toujours au Djebel Druse, d'où le Gouvernement français va le faire expulser.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, prie l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique de bien vouloir appeler toute l'attention du Gouvernement anglais sur cette violation des droits du mandat français de Syrie de la part de l'Emir Abdullah, installé par l'autorité britannique elle-même en Transjordanie malgré les avis formels du Gouvernement français, lequel est parfaitement renseigné sur les tendances de ce protégé britannique et n'a cessé de craindre des incidents de ce genre. L'Emir Abdullah est d'ailleurs compromis dans la tentative d'assassinat du Général Gouraud, perpétrée par des gens à son service ou de son entourage.

Le Gouvernement britannique ne saurait décliner une certaine responsabilité dans les actes de l'Emir Abdullah et le Gouvernement de la République compte qu'il trouvera les moyens d'y mettre fin.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,  
le 22 août 1921.*

[E 9308/4/91]

No. 75.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1921.*

FOLLOWING for Colonel Lawrence on return from Aden:—

"Your telegram No. L. 14 of 15th August: Hedjaz Treaty.

"You may omit reference in article 15 to 'Covenant of League of Nations.' If Hussein refuses to recognise French position in Syria by issue of declaration or substance of it, you should press, as you suggest in your telegram No. L. 12, for ratification of Treaty of Versailles, which can be put forward by us—at any rate to the French—as a recognition in principle of French mandatory position in Syria, even though Hussein may dispute contention. I agree that you should obtain signature of treaty, even if declaration and ratification prove impossible."



[E 9835/4/91]

No. 76.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 30.)*

Sir,

*India Office, August 29, 1921.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Montagu to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 17th August regarding the Khalifat and the Holy Places of the Hedjaz.

Mr. Montagu desires to express his regret that the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston declines to take the action which he has advocated in the interests of the relations between the British Government and the Moslems of India.

He recognises that no useful purpose will be served in prolonging the present correspondence.

I am, &amp;c.

H. GARRETT.

[E 10092/455/91]

No. 77.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 71. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, August 20, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st to 20th August, 1921.

(Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.)

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

*Jeddah Report, August 1 to 20, 1921.*

(Secret.)

*Pilgrimage.*

THE total number of pilgrims who arrived by sea was 57,255. This is only 1,329 fewer than last year. All the pilgrims arrived in good time, there were plenty of camels for transport, and the conditions were excellent. The 13th August was pilgrimage day, and in the evening of the 16th all the pilgrims returned to Mecca. Telephonic reports from Fuad-el-Khatib, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and from Captain Salamatullah, Officer Commanding the Indian Pilgrims' Hospital, stated that the health of the pilgrims was very good, and that there was very little sickness at Arafat and Mona. The returning pilgrims will begin to arrive in Jeddah about the 21st August, and it is expected that the first pilgrim boat will leave Jeddah on the 23rd August. A detailed account of the pilgrimage will be furnished in a special report.

The Holy Carpet arrived on the 5th August, and H.M.S. "Cornflower" was here to salute her arrival. All the ships in harbour were dressed in honour of the occasion. The Mahmal was disembarked the same day, and the procession took place the following morning. In the afternoon of the 6th the annual reception in honour of the event was held at the British agency. About eighty guests were present, including his Highness Emir Zeid, Haddad Pasha, all foreign consuls, local notables, officers of H.M.S. "Cornflower," and captains of ships. The Mahmal left for Mecca on the 7th August.

*General.*

King Hussein visited H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the 5th, and left for Mecca on the afternoon of the 7th.

[E 8557/5148/89]

No. 76\*.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Scott (Cairo).*

(No. 962.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1921.*

WITH reference to Lord Allenby's despatch No. 576 of the 1st July and to Mr. Palmer's despatches Nos. 52 and 87 of the 16th April and the 25th June respectively to the Foreign Office, I have to transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence with the French Ambassador about the treatment to be accorded to Egyptians in Syria and to Syrians in Egypt.\*

2. Though I do not consider it likely that the French Government's suggestion will commend itself to the Egyptian Government, I shall await your observations before expressing to Count de Saint-Aulaire the views of His Majesty's Government on the French proposal.

3. In his despatch No. 294 of the 14th April, Lord Allenby enquired what these views were in connection with the scheme for judicial reform in Egypt. As this scheme is unlikely to materialise for some time to come, it is perhaps unnecessary to consider the problem in the light of its effect upon the draft Judicature Laws.

4. Quite apart from the political disadvantages to the Egyptian Government were Syrian residents in Egypt to become assimilated to the French colony—disadvantages which are clearly outlined in Mr. Greg's letter of the 24th February to Mr. Furness enclosed in Lord Allenby's above-mentioned despatch—it would not be an opportune moment to ask the Egyptian Government to invite the Mixed Courts as at present constituted to extend their jurisdiction to Syrians who have hitherto been justiciable in the Native Courts. Such a course would seem directly contrary to the draft Egyptian Nationality Law, with which Egyptian Ministers are acquainted, and its mere suggestion would in all probability be particularly wounding to Egyptian *amour-propre*.

5. On the general aspect of the problem neither His Majesty's Government nor the Egyptian Government would seem likely to derive any advantage from the large increase in the number and interests of the French colony in Egypt which acquiescence in Count de Saint-Aulaire's request would involve. Moreover, the relative number of Syrians in Egypt is out of all proportion to the few Egyptians to be found in Syria.

6. On these grounds alone I should be inclined to reject the French Ambassador's proposal, but my hands would be greatly strengthened if I could show that these views were shared by the Egyptian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 8557/5148/89]

No. 76†.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the note which you were so good as to address to me on the 25th July last with regard to the recognition as British-protected persons of Egyptians resident in Syria.

2. So far as I am aware, no request for such recognition has been addressed to the French High Commissioner by any of His Majesty's consular officers in Syria. On the other hand, His Majesty's consul at Damascus reported on the 16th April that instructions had been sent by the High Commissioner to the French delegate in Damascus that Egyptians—at all events, those resident in the State of Damascus—were to be accorded the full advantages of the Capitulations, and that the privilege had been granted unconditionally. Further, he was assured on that occasion by M. le Commandant Catroux that no request for reciprocal treatment of Syrians in Egypt would be based upon it.

3. I am, however, referring the proposal of your Excellency's Government to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo for the recommendations of the competent authorities, and upon the receipt of his reply I shall not fail to address a further communication to you.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

\* See Nos. 60\* and 76†.



Emir Ali arrived from Mecca in the morning of the 9th, and Colonel Lawrence and I had two long conversations with him—in the morning at his house and in the evening at the agency. He gave us a full description of the conditions existing around Hail and of the progress of the war between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. This was fully reported to you in Colonel Lawrence's telegram No. L. 11 of the 10th August.

Emir Ali took the direct route from Medina to Mecca. At Sefeina he pursued and defeated a party of Arabs, who were said to be carrying Wahabi banners, but whom he considered a simple raiding party. Emir Ali returned to Mecca on the 10th August. Emir Zeid, accompanied by Fuad-el-Khatib, left in the morning of the 12th.

Her Majesty the Queen and her daughters remained in Jeddah during the pilgrimage.

Colonel Lawrence left on H.M.S. "Clematis" for Aden on the 15th. He proceeded direct to Aden, but will call at Hodeida, Kamaran and Jeizan on the return journey, and will arrive in Jeddah at the end of August. The King will then come down to Jeddah, and discussions will be resumed.

#### *Local Affairs.*

1. The Director-General of Quarantine, who is also in charge of the condenser, ordered 500 tons of best Natal coal from Gellatly, Hankey and Co. On its arrival, he refused to accept delivery on the ground that it was not up to standard, was full of coal dust, and contained many stones. As Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. reported the matter to the agency, I asked two chief engineers from the pilgrim ships to survey the coal. They reported that it was up to the standard of best Natal coal, that it was very small, but contained very little coal dust. I have written to the Director-General of Quarantine asking him if he will accept this survey or whether I shall report the matter to Mecca.

2. The quarantine authorities have decided to medically examine all pilgrims prior to embarkation, and to give them a certificate of health at 5 piastres per head. They have written to the shipping companies asking them not to issue any tickets to pilgrims unless they are in possession of these health certificates. I have protested against this, and have been in telephonic communication with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject. I pointed out that there would be considerable delay to the steamers, that, as the pilgrimage was clean, I could see no necessity for it, and that, according to the convention, medical examination of returning pilgrims was only carried out at the request of the consular authority concerned.

As I suspected, it is simply for the sake of revenue that this has been instituted, and I understand now that the mutawwifs will receive the health certificates and send the money to the quarantine authorities, and that only those pilgrims who have no mutawwifs will be examined. I am still hopeful that my representations will have the desired effect.

#### *Press ("Al Qibla").*

There is nothing of importance in Nos. 506 and 507.

In No. 508 "one of the readers" replies to an article written by Sheikh Rashid Rida, editor of a review in Egypt, criticising the actions of King Hussein and his sons in Syria. It also announces the gift of 4,000 rupees by Saleh Bey Abdel Wahid of Basra, for educational purposes.

No. 509 contains an official proclamation informing pilgrims that claims in respect of some 960 packages at present lying at the customs will not be entertained after 30.2.1340.

There is also an article on the pilgrimage giving an account of the scenes at Mecca and Arafat, and another describing the arrival of the Mahmal.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.



Enclosure 2 in No. 77.

*Shipping Intelligence to August 10, 1921.*

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 1st and 10th August, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
Asmara	Italian	..	Suez	..	Aug. 1 ..	..	Packages.
Nairung	British	..	Port Soudan	..	" 1 ..	..	..
Koweit	"	Basra	..	Aug. 1 ..	..	1,066	1
Keneh	"	Suez	..	" 2 ..	..	698	2 cars
Akbar	"	Bombay	..	" 4 ..	..	999	11,433
Themis S.	Egyptian	..	Suez	..	Aug. 4 ..	..	..
Hwah Jah	Chinese	Basra	..	Aug. 4 ..	..	537	..
Dakablieh	British	Suez	..	" 5 ..	..	980	..
Tantah	"	..	Port Soudan	" 5 ..	Aug. 6 ..	193	2 aeroplanes
Zayani	"	Basra	..	" 7 ..	..	899	4
Nairung	"	Port Soudan	..	" 7 ..	..	298	4,468 and 500 tons coal

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on August 4, and left on August 6.  
H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on August 14, and left on August 15.

Owing to the absence on pilgrimage of the staffs of the local shipping agents it has not been possible to obtain complete returns of ships that have arrived between the 11th and 20th. This information will be furnished with the next report.

[E 10090/4/91]

No. 78.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 6, 1921.

SIX Italian aeroplanes have been landed at Jeddah. They were consigned to Massowah, but probably intended for Jeddah, and landed by arrangement between Italian Government and King Hussein.

The four are Caudron biplanes, 130 h.p. Rhone engine, 90-litre tank capacity, Italian built. There are also two Maurice Farmans for training purposes. One Italian pilot and one Italian mechanic pilot are with them.

Eight Spads are reported to be on the way also, consigned to Massowah, but probably intended for Hedjaz.

I think that King Hussein means shortly to reoccupy Khurma, using troops from Medina, brought by Ali, and these aeroplanes.

Tribes around Khurma are now in favour of King Hussein.

Colonel Lawrence is advising Ali against this step.

[E 10152/4/91]

No. 79.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 7.)*

(No. L. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 6, 1921.

ON my return King Hussein went back on his decision and demanded, firstly, return of all States in Arabia except his own to pre-war boundaries; secondly, cession to him of all areas so vacated; thirdly, right to appoint all kadis and muftis in Arabia, Mesopotamia and Palestine; fourthly, recognition of his supremacy over all Arab rulers everywhere. My reply made him send for dagger and swear to abdicate and kill himself. I said we would continue negotiations with his successor. Ali then took strong line and formed commission of himself, Zeid, Haddad and Fuad to discuss with me.

Things are now going in most friendly and rational way. Hussein not formally superseded, but has certainly lost much of his power; the sons dictate to him, and Queen, who is of our party, lectures him at night. I look upon assumption of responsibility by Ali as a most happy event, and I am taking the opportunity to get his ideas on paper concerning all outstanding Arab questions without committing either side in any way. We will go on with treaty in two or three days.

Marshall's health unsatisfactory, and he may take opportunity of my being here to take short cruise in "Clematis."

[E 10185/4/91]

No. 80.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 8.)*

(No. L. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 8, 1921.

FOLLOWING are final modifications which Ali hopes that you will accept urgently:—

Throughout, except in article 17, substitution of His Hashimite Majesty or Arab Hashimite Government for Hedjaz.

Articles 4, 5 and 7: Omit the words "now" and "or in future may be."

Article 6: Omit undertaking to communicate future treaties.

Article 8: Insert after London "out of respect to religious zeal of Mecca, His Britannic Majesty will not appoint British agent there, but may."

King Hussein wants British to agree to take charge of interests of Hashimite subjects where he has no representative.

Article 14: "King Hussein agrees that in all cases which arise in territory of the Arab-Hashimite Government in which British subject or person enjoying protection of His Britannic Majesty is plaintiff [? group omitted] or British consular agent shall attend Hashimite Court, and judgment shall not be executed until British agent has had opportunity to make diplomatic representations to Arab-Hashimite Government." Last sentence as in existing article.

All courts in Hedjaz are Shari, so consular agent cannot be qualified to sit as judge, as in your telegram No. 79. King Hussein proposes function [sic] to report to British agent.

King Hussein would like clause renouncing all Capitulation rights, except where retained in the treaty.

Ali agrees to the ratification of the Versailles [? group omitted].

[E 10185/4/91]

No. 81.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 9, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. L 16 of 8th September: Negotiations with King Hussein.

What is precise significance of proposed substitution of "His Hashimite Majesty" or "Arab-Hashimite Government" for "Hedjaz"? Is it merely to provide for possible temporary or permanent elimination of Hussein during currency of the treaty, or is it in order that claims may subsequently be put forward to territory outside the Hedjaz as ordinarily understood? It must be remembered that we have only recognised a "King of the Hedjaz" (see preamble of Versailles Treaty), and "Hedjaz" alone is mentioned in annex to Covenant of the League of Nations in that treaty as member of the League.

Colonial Office are being consulted regarding suggested changes in articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, but it is noted that result of change in article 7 implicitly leaves Hedjaz free to intrigue against or attack Ibn Rashid and Imam.

Colonial Office and India Office are being consulted as to proposed insertion in article 8 and proposed draft of article 14. Former seems *prima facie* acceptable, but I should be glad of Major Marshall's observations as to practical value of latter. It would hardly seem to give us sufficient protection unless, in cases where a British subject is defendant or accused, judgment is not executed until His Majesty's representative actually concurs.



Acceptance of Hussein's proposal regarding protection of Hashimite subjects is not possible owing to inevitable difficulties, e.g., in Syria. In any case it is not usual to include such a provision in a treaty, and applications to protect Hashimite subjects in specific countries such as United States of America, where there might be no objection, can later perhaps be favourably considered. You can doubtless find formula for refusal in these lines which will not offend Hussein.

I do not think we can insert in treaty formal renunciation of capitulatory rights. As British consular agent cannot act as judge, it is very doubtful how proposed judicial system under treaty will work, and in any case knowledge of such renunciation must prejudice security of trade and prevent economic development of any part of Hedjaz by European capital and skill. It would not, therefore, be in true interests of Hedjaz. You should endeavour to dissuade Hussein on these lines.

It must also be borne in mind that French Government in any case are determined to insist on continuance of Capitulations, and we can hardly put our nationals in principle in a worse position than theirs.

Is draft of article 15 suggested in my telegram No. 79 of 13th August accepted? Presumably declaration in any form cannot be obtained.

[E 10226/4/91]

No. 82

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. L 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 9th September.

King has returned to Mecca for three days.

"Arab-Hashimite Government" was Hussein's suggestion; it seems to me a convenient style, since his present area is in places less, and in places more, than Turkish Hedjaz, and in view of fluid character of his State, a family, rather than a geographical, title may save us [group undecypherable]ment. It does not conflict with or deny, use of "Hedjaz" in Versailles Treaty, and cannot involve, assist or hinder any claim to be ruler of anything inside or outside Hedjaz limits. King's full title is "Hussein, Founder of Hashimite State and King Warden of Precincts of City of God and of his Forefathers' Arch-Messenger."

Possibilities you suggest by changes in article 7 are not immediate, since evidently Rashid has joined Hedjaz. Hussein pointed out that old form licensed us to conclude treaties with even Hedjaz chiefs so long as frontiers are not definitive. King's unbounded greed prompts him to try to wangle universal dominion, but Ali may be relied on to check him henceforward.

They expect us to refuse to protect Hashimites abroad.

New article 15, as it is modified in your telegram No. 89, accepted. Declaration refused, since King hopes to obtain French favours comparable with our own in exchange for complaisant attitude; and our credit here is not good enough to carry their account.

Unnumbered articles to-morrow.

[E 10227/4/91]

No. 83.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 1 to Colonel Lawrence.

I agree with Lawrence that all necessary rights can be obtained in treaty without introducing Capitulations. I would suggest the following six points:—

1. Consular agent may attend Jeddah Court when British subject is plaintiff or defendant.

2. That a sentence be not promulgated pending issue of negotiations between Hussein and British agent.

3. That consular bail be admitted.

4. That cases between British subjects be tried by Consular Court.
5. That no British subject be deported except through British agent.
6. That every British pilgrim be in possession of counterfoil passport of type now issued to Indian pilgrims.

These deposited here make them registered British subjects for the purpose of these privileges.

We have reason to believe that Hussein will accept these points under pressure.

[E 10274/4/91]

No. 84.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. L 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 11, 1921.

## CAPITULATIONS.

Present position is that since 1916 Great Britain has not pressed. King Hussein has not admitted any claim based on Capitulations. Other Powers are in same position, and Arabs do not intend to modify their attitude. Meanwhile, trial of foreign subjects proceeding in Hashimite court without any consular agent present, and if any changes of procedure are now made in our favour it will be by virtue of treaty. It would be refused on account of Capitulations.

Consequently I do not consider that "inferiority in principle" will be set up by our renunciation of Capitulations after embodiment in treaty of all privileges contained in them which appear to His Majesty's Government practicable and useful. Nor do I think that determination of French Government to maintain Capitulations will be efficacious; they will only attempt it for lack of a corresponding treaty, and if they insist too much King Hussein will ask them to leave the country. He feels immune in Mecca from reprisals and would like to be a martyr. We can ourselves only incline him to our point of view by exploitation of his remaining good nature, by stoppage of subsidies, by blockade of Jeddah, or by losing Ibn Saud on him.

I recommend that you should inform me what other points in Capitulations are worthy of insertion in treaty, and that we buy King Hussein's consent to treaty by renunciation of the rest to avoid future conflict in respect of authority of Capitulations Treaty.

Marshall telegraphing separately.

[E 10358/4/91]

No. 85.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 14.)*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 13, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN paid, for his ten aeroplanes, cash from Hedjaz revenue, which this year will amount to about 320,000l. Six Italian machines were ordered to spite us when we refused export licence for four British. One has been assembled and twice failed to reach Taif.

The pilot is leaving the country, and King Hussein is sick at having paid 2,500l. for such rubbish. I believe that two pilots and two mechanics, British, are being sent to operate our machines.

Landing ground prepared at Mecca and Taif, where I fear tribal conditions fully justify Ali's determination to show his aeroplanes. In accordance with your telegram I will ask him not to, but his refusal will be probably prudent; I think he can be persuaded not to allow flight beyond Taif. Ibn Saud might be informed that they have no machine guns or bombs. I am also getting Ali put off Khorma, since he has sent me documentary evidence that Tarabaranyabisha belonged to Turkish Hedjaz, and he will wait for Ibn Saud's reply. Present situation is intolerable, and must be regulated somehow.



[E 10247/7250/89]

No. 86.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 2448.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1921.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 638 of the 23rd August and your despatch No. 1378 of the 23rd August, I have to request that your Excellency will reply to the note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the raid of Assad-el-Attrash on Zuweida on the following lines:—

2. His Majesty's Government at once called for a report from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine on the allegations contained in the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd August, as regards the complicity of the Emir Abdullah in the raid on Zuweida and in harbouring the persons responsible for the attack on General Gouraud. Sir H. Samuel has now telegraphed that the Emir Abdullah disclaims all responsibility for the attack on Zuweida, which is understood to have been liquidated by the surrender of Al Attrash to the French authorities. It is not understood that any charge of direct complicity of the Emir in the attack on General Gouraud is made, but the question of the whereabouts of those responsible and the surrender of any persons who may be seized in Transjordan is reported by Sir H. Samuel to be now under direct discussion between himself, the Emir Abdullah and certain French officers sent expressly for this purpose to Jerusalem by General Gouraud.

3. In their note under reply, the French Government assert that His Majesty's Government cannot decline a certain responsibility for Abdullah's activities. His Majesty's Government have no wish to disclaim such responsibility, but it is only fair that the manner in which His Majesty's Government interpret it should be understood. As the French Government are aware, His Majesty's Government have felt bound by the statements made to the King of the Hedjaz in support of Arab Nationalist aspirations during the war and by such declarations of policy as the proclamation issued by Lord Allenby on the 9th November, 1918, to do their utmost in Mesopotamia and in the Arab territories east of the Jordan falling within their mandatory zone to establish a form of administration acceptable to the people. Having deliberately fostered the growth of Nationalist sentiments through the Shereefian channel as a weapon against the Turks, His Majesty's Government could not disregard these sentiments when the war was over. In the matter of the encouragement thus given to the Shereefian family, His Majesty's Government were not in exactly the same position as the French Government, since, with the concurrence of the French Government, it was His Majesty's officers who conducted the actual negotiations with King Hussein. His Majesty's Government do not wish to reopen a subject which has in the past caused considerable controversy between the two Governments, but it must be frankly admitted that the French Government, on grounds the justice of which His Majesty's Government do not wish to discuss, have regarded themselves, in their relations with the Arab Nationalists and their Shereefian leaders, as under no such obligations as His Majesty's Government. This divergence of view has been reflected in a divergence of policy, and this divergence of policy is directly or indirectly the reason why the zone of Transjordan, for which His Majesty's Government are responsible, has become the refuge of a large number of Arabs exiled from Syria, whether for political or other reasons, and bitterly anti-French in sentiment.

4. When the Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Palestine in March with a view to determine in consultation with the local British authorities the lines of future policy in Transjordan, the authority of the Emir Abdullah was already accepted over a large part of that area, and the nationalism of the inhabitants had been stimulated by the presence of the exiles from Syria. It would not have been possible for His Majesty's Government with the resources at their disposal to drive the Emir or these exiles from the country, and such action would in any case have been entirely at variance with His Majesty's Government's professed policy.

5. In the circumstances the temporary arrangement reached with the Emir by Mr. Churchill, one of the essential features of which was the Emir's promise to check anti-French activities, presented the only policy which His Majesty's Government could properly adopt. The guiding lines of this policy as well as its risks were frankly explained by Mr. Churchill to M. de Caix personally at the time, and also in writing later to General Gouraud. A copy of Mr. Churchill's letter to the general is enclosed for the information of the French Government.

6. Mr. Churchill received neither a reply to nor an acknowledgment of this letter, but assuming that it had safely reached General Gouraud, he had hoped that a solution of the difficult problems caused by the presence of the Syrian exiles in Transjordan might be promoted from the French side by the amnesty discussed in that letter. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware no such full amnesty has yet been declared by the French Government.

7. While account must be taken of the natural sympathies of the Emir Abdullah and the limitations on his authority imposed by the scantiness of his resources, His Majesty's Government have hitherto received no concrete evidence that the Emir has not used his personal influence to prevent and discourage anti-French activities in accordance with the assurance given to Mr. Churchill. In itself the fact that the chief of an important Druze family should have raised the Shereefian flag in his native town of Zuweida and asserted that he was about to seize Jebel Druze on behalf of the Emir does not necessarily constitute a breach of faith on behalf of the Emir, and without further proof His Majesty's Government are unable to reject the Emir's assurance that he did not plan or encourage the raid. Further, it is clear that if instead of doing his utmost to restrain anti-French action the Emir had thrown in his lot with the wilder elements and the Syrian exiles, a situation far more unsatisfactory than the existing one would have arisen.

8. At the same time the French Government may rest assured that in spite of the difficulties which the divergent policies of the two Governments may create, His Majesty's Government are determined to do all that they can to give effect to the assurances already given by Mr. Churchill to M. de Caix and General Gouraud to prevent any form of anti-French activity being directed or encouraged from the zones under the British mandate, and they are now in consultation with Sir Herbert Samuel as to the adoption of fresh measures with this purpose.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 86.

*Mr. Churchill to General Gouraud.*

My dear General,

*En route to Alexandria, March 31, 1921.*

I AM extremely disappointed not to have seen you during my visit to Palestine. Had it been possible for me to have postponed my departure for England I would gladly have done so, but the pressure of my work at home when Parliament is sitting is considerable, and I have already been away for nearly five weeks.

I had, however, a valuable and pleasant interview with M. de Caix, to whom, at his request, I explained the general orientation of our policy. On the whole it is leaning to a Shereefian solution, but of course we shall be guided by the wishes of the people both in Iraq and elsewhere.

As regards Transjordan, I am most anxious to give you effective security from raids and annoyance of all kinds. I have made an arrangement with Abdullah of an informal and temporary character whereby he is to use his whole influence to prevent any disturbances in the French zone arising out of Transjordan. He will promote the organisation of local levies under the command of British officers, and will develop the local administration now existing. I shall not send a British garrison into Transjordan at present, but air forces will be employed in support of the local levies.

Undoubtedly the Emir Abdullah in the existing situation has power to create considerable disturbances. It remains to be seen whether he will have equal power to prevent them. It is by his success or failure in this respect that he must be judged. I hope you will do what you can to assist me in this respect. His principal difficulty will be the Syrian exiles, who are roaming about in Transjordan homeless and hungry. I heard with much pleasure from M. de Caix that you were contemplating the possibility of an amnesty at no distant date. Such a course would undoubtedly be a very great help to the pacification of Transjordan, and to securing the French zone against annoyance from that quarter. In this connection you may be interested to know that we intend to proclaim a general amnesty, with certain necessary exceptions, in Mesopotamia early in April. If it were possible to synchronise the date of the French and British amnesty it would have the advantage of appearing to be an act taken in common by our two nations, and would give the impression to the Arab world that we were working hand in hand. I cannot long delay the amnesty in Mesopotamia, but if



there was any chance of its synchronising with similar action upon your Excellency's part I would delay it until the eve of Ramadan. If you think this suggestion helpful perhaps you will communicate with Sir Herbert Samuel, who will at once inform me.

I have arranged with Abdullah that Ali Khouli, of whom you spoke to me, shall be removed from his present position and sent to a district remote from the French zone; and I have given the strictest instruction to everyone serving under the Colonial Office to do everything in their power to further and facilitate French interests and the security of French territory. I am sure I can count upon similar aid from you. It is a great advantage that a French soldier, who is so greatly honoured throughout the British service, should at the present juncture be in charge of French interests in the Middle East.

With sincere regards, &c.  
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

[E 10400/4/91]

No. 87.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)*

Sir,

*India Office, September 15, 1921.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 14th September, relative to the Hedjaz negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that, subject to the one suggestion below, he concurs in the terms of the draft telegram to Colonel Lawrence enclosed therein.

Mr. Montagu has had his attention drawn to the limiting clause with which articles 12 and 14 conclude. It appears to him that, as it stands, this clause, strictly interpreted, would have the effect of debarring from the operation of the articles in question all British subjects habitually resident in any part of the world outside Jeddah, &c., and that, to convey the meaning which, he presumes, was intended when the clause was drafted, it would be necessary to insert between "habitually resident" and "outside Jeddah" the words "in the Hedjaz" or "in the territory of His Hashimite Majesty." He would suggest that, if Lord Curzon agrees, Colonel Lawrence should be instructed to this effect, to avoid any possibility of dispute hereafter as to the meaning of this clause.

A copy of this letter has been communicated to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.  
L. D. WAKELY.

[E 10432/4/91]

No. 88.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. L 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, September 16, 1921.*

WHEN he ratified Treaty of Versailles King Hussein prefixed, without our knowledge, phrase "provided that the independence [group undecypherable] Arabs is respected." Will this affect validity of the act?

I have not had reply to my telegrams Nos. 18 and 19.

[E 10247/7255/89]

No. 89.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.*

COLONIAL Office ask us to inform you that Sir H. Samuel telegraphed on 2nd September that Abramson persuaded Abdullah, after long discussion, to try to arrest men who are wanted by French according to a list of those inculpated in murder of Gouraud handed to Sir H. Samuel on 25th September. Abdullah said that he was being asked to sacrifice everything, and was losing all chance of achieving his hopes. He wants to be allowed to come to London at an early date as least undignified method of retiring from Transjordan, personal connection with which he wishes to end. Sir H. Samuel presumed that decision must await Young's and your arrival.

[E 10247/7255/89]

No. 90.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.*

MY telegram No. 4 of 16th September.

Colonial Office are therefore anxious that you should be free to visit Transjordan as soon as possible and consult with Sir H. Samuel as to future policy there.

After receipt of my reply to your telegrams Nos. L 18 and L 19, which will be expedited, please endeavour to expedite conclusion of your negotiations with King Hussein. If you then consider that they are still likely to be protracted, Major Marshall could perhaps take them over from you and you might discuss matters with him and report.

[E 10400/4/91]

No. 91.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1921.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. L 16, 18 and 19 of 10th and 11th September: Negotiations with King Hussein.

Proposed substitution of "His Hashimite Majesty" or "Arab-Hashimite Government" for "Hedjaz" is approved. I should prefer former. Words "in the territory of" will in consequence require to be inserted in several articles.

Proposed changes in articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 are accepted.

Insertion in article 8 is accepted, but I would prefer words "special religious character" instead of "zeal," unless Hussein sets particular store by his wording for propaganda purposes.

Articles 12 to 14. If you can incorporate in treaty six safeguards specified in Jeddah telegram No. 78, I will accept a provision in treaty renouncing Capitulations otherwise than as provided for in treaty. In concluding clause of articles 12 and 14, words "in the territory of His Hashimite Majesty" should be inserted between "habitually resident" and "outside Jeddah."

[E 10509/10509/91]

No. 92.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 17, 1921.*

KING HUSSEIN has telegraphed to the King asking that Prince of Wales may visit Jeddah either privately or officially on his way to India. On the supposition that negotiations for treaty do not take turn for the worse, and that Prince's time-table permits, presumably the Prince would have to land, or could King Hussein visit him on board off Jeddah?

(Confidential.)

Please telegraph your views.

[E 10358/4/91]

No. 93.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 17, 1921.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 13th September: Aeroplanes for King Hussein.

Friendly representations have been made to Italian Government, in order that we may be consulted in future before armaments are licensed for export to the Hedjaz.

[7360]

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I am also considering whether condition should not be attached to any future payment of King's subsidy, either that our subsidy is not spent on armaments without consulting us, or, since King's yearly revenue is so large, that King buys no armaments without prior consultation with us.

Is King's desire to have our subsidy and treaty such that he will conclude latter if either condition is attached to payment of subsidy?

Colonial Office are being asked to have Ibn Saud informed as suggested.

[E 10510/10509/91]

No. 94.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 18, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 17th September to Lawrence: Visit of Prince of Wales to Jedah.

Ali would meet the Prince on board and bring him ashore to visit King Hussein. King would return visit on board. Six day [group undecypherable] hours probably sufficient.

Treaty almost certain to be signed Tuesday morning.

Visit probably would have good effect.

Lawrence concurs.

[E 10432/4/91]

No. 95.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Colonel Lawrence (Jeddah).*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 19, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. L 21 of 16th September: Ratification of Treaty of Versailles.

Technically King Hussein's addition destroys validity of ratification, which is merely a formal endorsement of a signed treaty, and a signatory Power has no right whatever to introduce a condition into ratification which he did not indicate at the time of signature. While for political reasons and in view of King's ignorance of international law and formalities we might ignore his insertion, French Government, in whose interests we were largely anxious to obtain Hussein's ratification as recognising their position in Syria, will almost certainly reject its validity if modified by his reservation. If it is not too late you should do your best to make Hussein withdraw it.

[E 10524/4/91]

No. 96.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. L 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 19, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 17th September.

Perhaps it is not understood by you what rubbish Italian aeroplanes here are (warp control, low ceiling, short range) and how disgusted King Hussein will be with this very expensive purchase. Admirable lesson for him. If, however, we wish him to consult us before arming himself, we must in return promise and give him our best advice and help. He will then willingly accept conditions. What drove him to Italy was barren Foreign Office attitude towards his requests for aeroplanes and armoured cars. If you give him reasons he will rely on our advice not merely in buying, but in using, them later. In fact, Ali has approached me in this sense. Italian influence about King Hussein is active.

King Hussein's deficit this year, expenditure beyond income, is 70,000L. He is introducing new taxation to meet larger deficit expected next year.

[E 10556/10556/89]

No. 97.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. L 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 20, 1921.

FRENCH consul told Ali this afternoon French Government wish him to go incognito to Paris to discuss terms on which he would accept the Kingdom of Syria. Ali asked for details.

[E 10524/4/91]

No. 98.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1921.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the payment of a subsidy to King Hussein, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram from Colonel Lawrence regarding the proposal to attach a condition to the next payment of King Hussein's subsidy that the latter should consult His Majesty's Government before purchasing arms or ammunition.\*

2. Colonel Lawrence seems to be under some misapprehension regarding the alleged omission of the Foreign Office to inform King Hussein of their reasons for not facilitating the import of aeroplanes and armoured cars into the Hedjaz. As long ago as the 13th January last Lord Curzon, in a conversation with the then Emir Feisal, a copy of the report of which is enclosed herein,† explained fully the objections to the supply of these armaments. As Emir Feisal was then putting forward his request on behalf of King Hussein, it was presumed that he would report the result fully to his father.

3. It is not clear from the enclosed telegram whether or not Colonel Lawrence recommends attaching any condition to the next payment of the subsidy, but since, in Lord Curzon's view, it is probable that King Hussein will only be guided by His Majesty's Government's advice so long as this advice harmonises with his own opinion of his interests, and since it will always be open to His Majesty's Government to withhold altogether or postpone the payment of instalments of the subsidy, it is probably unwise, if not useless, to jeopardise the signature of the agreement by attaching formal conditions regarding armaments to the payment of the subsidy at this stage. Subject to Mr. Churchill's concurrence, Lord Curzon therefore proposes to instruct Colonel Lawrence that, if and when the next instalment of the subsidy is paid, he should make it quite clear to the King that His Majesty's Government expect to be consulted regarding the employment of this money for the purchase of arms and ammunition outside the Hedjaz.

I am, &amp;c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 10623/4/91]

No. 99.

*Colonel Lawrence to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. L 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 22, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN had approved each clause in treaty and announced publicly his forthcoming signature of it. When Ali presented him with text for ratification [groups omitted] shouted and struck at him, and then sent us eight contradictory sets of prior conditions and stipulations, all unacceptable. Ali says that the old man is mad and is preparing with Zeid to obtain his formal abdication.

Ali and Zeid have behaved splendidly, and they may change things in the next week. I have left Marshall text of treaty, and if King Hussein climbs down he will receive signature; but meanwhile, or till I reach England and report, I suggest that no changes or new line of policy be taken by you.

I have asked King Hussein to return 80,000 rupees paid him in advance of subsidy on his promise to sign.

\* See No. 95.

† See Part VI, No. 134.



[E 10714/9382/88]

No. 100.

*Mr. Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Rome, September 17, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 27th August last respecting the audience which Mr. Ronald Storrs had had with the Pope, I have the honour to report that Mr. Storrs and I yesterday paid a visit to the Cardinal Secretary of State at his home at the small village of Ussita, in the Marche.

His Eminence was to have returned to Rome early this month, but owing to the recent death of his nephew his return was postponed continually, until finally I was informed that he would only be back in Rome to-night. As Mr. Storrs had to leave yesterday evening to catch his boat at Brindisi, we arranged at short notice to go up to Ussita. The cardinal received us at 8 A.M. yesterday morning, and expressed his regret that Mr. Storrs should have had to come so far in order to see him, and that our visit had to be so short. Turning to affairs in Palestine, his Eminence discussed the the French protectorate. He said that the line the French took was hard to understand. They had informed the Holy See in writing that they had renounced the protectorate, but not the liturgical honours which under the Capitulations had been rendered to the French consul. The honours were only an accessory of the protectorate, and had no meaning once the protectorate no longer existed. M. Doucet, the late French Chargé d'Affaires, had declared that the San Remo Agreement had no binding character, that the British text which his Eminence had shown him was incorrect and incomplete, and, in reply to the cardinal's request to be shown the correct one, he had merely repeated that the French Government still insisted on having the honours continued. In the circumstances the line the Vatican took was that the matter was one for settlement between the British and French Governments, and that their only proper course was to maintain the *status quo* so long as the Treaty of Peace was not ratified and the Capitulations remained in force.

His Eminence then discussed the Jewish question. He said that His Majesty's Government were fortunate in that the Jews in England were of a well-to-do and orderly class, and contrasted them with the bulk of the Jews in Roumania, Poland and Hungary. In Hungary he said they numbered 5 per cent. of the population and yet were in control. The allusion, of course, was clear, and his Eminence showed that it was not the immigration of Jews in considerable numbers into Palestine that caused misgivings so much as the possibility that they might one day control the administration. On questions of minor importance his Eminence did not touch, but he listened with interest to Mr. Storrs' explanation of various points which had been the subject of complaint either on the part of the Patriarch or in the press. He made no allusion to the Holy Places. Finally, his Eminence expressed himself as confident that Mr. Storrs would help to dissipate any causes of misunderstanding, and would show himself friendly to the interests of the Church.

Mr. Storrs also met, while here, Mgr. Biasiotti, who unofficially represents Mgr. Barlassina in Rome. It is evident that some of the difficulties caused by the Patriarch's personality are well realised, and I understand that he has been recommended to adopt a more friendly tone and attitude towards the British authorities. Mgr. Biasiotti also intimated that we might before long expect to see an English ecclesiastic attached to the Patriarchate as a liaison officer with members of the administration.

Mgr. Biasiotti was present at the station last night to bid farewell to Mr. Storrs, and informed him that the Pope had desired to be remembered to him on his departure.

Mr. Storrs' visit, I think, has been most useful, and he has done much to reassure the Holy See of the goodwill and intentions of His Majesty's Government and of the Palestine administration to ensure justice to all.

I have, &amp;c.

CECIL DORMER.

[E 10829/455/91]

No. 101.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 75. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, September 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah Report for the period 21st August to 10th September, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

*Jeddah Report, August 21 to September 10, 1921.*

(Secret.)

*Pilgrimage.*

THE pilgrimage has been a most successful one, and the majority of the pilgrims reporting here on their return were highly delighted with the arrangements. They said that the public security was excellent, that there was very little sickness, and that all the ceremonials connected with the "Haj" were very impressive. The pilgrims began to arrive in Jeddah about the 20th August, and the first pilgrim boat left for south on the 24th August. Thereafter there was a steady departure of pilgrims, and already over 27,000 have left the country.

King Hussein took a great personal interest this year in the pilgrims, and as a result of his example they were everywhere respected. There is no example in the past history of the Hedjaz of such universal courtesy to pilgrims. The King daily received pilgrims of all classes, heard their complaints, talked to them politely, and in many cases sided with them against the mutarrifs and local people. The more important ones were invited to an interview and to take food at the King's table. He was frequently seen surrounded by crowds of pilgrims exhorting the camelmen to carry the guests of God comfortably and safely.

Unfortunately, this year the local authorities have made great difficulties about the embarkation of pilgrims, and in consequence the majority of steamers have been delayed. This has been particularly marked in the case of the Holt steamers. Last year the pilgrims were well on their way to the boat before she had anchored. This year the pilgrims are not allowed to leave their houses until the boat has anchored, and not allowed to leave the quay until the bill of health has been inspected. Further, the local quarantine authorities have refused to visit the Holt steamers, which have always remained in the outer harbour, and have insisted on the medical officer coming ashore with his papers. As a proof that this is mere officiousness on the part of Dr. Thabet, the local quarantine doctor, he has since visited an Italian steamer in the same anchorage. I have represented all these things to the Hashimite Government, but so far without any satisfaction.

The booking of Indian pilgrims for the Indian steamers has not been satisfactory, and I regret to say that there seems no doubt that Abdullah Zeinal Aly Reza, the kaïmakam, has abused his official position for the sake of business. The Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company and the Arab Steamers (Turner, Morrison and Co.) have two agents—Haji Zeinal Aly Reza for the former and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. for the latter—while the opposition line of steamers, the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, have as agent Abdullah-bin-Kassawani. In order to fight this company the Bombay-Persia Line gave a single-fare passage for 45 rupees, and they took 300 single-ticket holders on the "Akbar," 400 on the "Nairung," 700 on the "Shuja" and 200 on the "Nurani," for all of which boats Haji Zeinal Aly Reza is agent. The result is that some 235 return-ticket holders, who were here before the "Nurani" sailed, have been left behind, while the "Sultania," of the Persian Gulf Line, left with about 500 pilgrims instead of 1,500.

The "Koweit," of which Messrs Gellatly, Hankey and Co. are the agents, has been here since the 1st August, and the "Nurani" arrived here full of cargo on the 24th August. The latter was discharged with the greatest possible speed, and at once



booked up. I sent for the representative of Haji Zeinal Aly Reza and explained that the "Koweit," which carried 400 pilgrims more than the "Nurani," could take all the "Nurani" pilgrims plus the 300 booked for the "Koweit," and that, as both boats belonged to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., this should be done. I wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., but the "Nurani" left, and the 300 pilgrims for the "Koweit" had to remain in Jeddah. They have been appealing to me daily. I again wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., asking that the "Koweit" might sail, but they replied instructing Haji Zeinal Aly Reza, who is not agent for that boat, to feed the return-ticket holders, and that the boat should wait until the return of the Medina pilgrims. I have now wired to the Government of India, as the Medina pilgrims will probably not return until early in October, and many of the pilgrims now here are clamouring to return to India for business reasons.

Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. have given all possible assistance, and have frequently wired to Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. explaining the situation.

The Kaïmakam of Jeddah, Abdullah Aly Reza, is the head of the firm of Haji Zeinal Aly Reza. He, as kaïmakam, controls the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah. When the Indian pilgrims arrive here, the vast majority are sent by the mutarrifs' brokers to his office to book passages. Many of the pilgrims can neither read nor write, and are given receipts for steamers other than they expected. I have definite evidence that more than 100 pilgrims who wanted tickets for the "Jeddah," for which boat Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. are the agents, were given tickets for a different boat. He was booking pilgrims for the "Nurani" before that boat had left Port Soudan, while I recall that last year, in his official capacity as kaïmakam, he forbade Mr. Khandwani to book pilgrims for the "Zayani" before that boat arrived in Jeddah harbour. His control over the lightermen is also considerable.

There is no doubt that the jealousy between shipping companies and between different agents of the same company is not in the interests of pilgrims, and, unless the companies concerned can come to some understanding, I would suggest some control from this office or a special official sent by the Government of India to control the embarkation of Indian pilgrims, as is done by the Egyptian Government.

I have received an interesting report on the medical arrangements at Mecca during the pilgrimage. The hospitals are very short of medicines—in one there is no sulphate of soda and no sulphate of magnesium—and the key for the medical store-room is in the charge of Dr. Thabit, the quarantine doctor at Jeddah. My informant reports that the sanitary service of Mecca is very bad, and is neglected to a degree difficult to believe.

On the 7th September I received a telegram from the Public Health Department, Cairo, that an Egyptian pilgrim on the steamship "Kenah" had died from gastro-enteritis, and that, from cases of diarrhoea from the same boat, vibrios, giving high agglutination with cholera serum, had been isolated. Up to the present there has not been any suspicious case in either Mecca or Jeddah, and I have not received any report of any cases from boats proceeding to the East. Perhaps, as last year, they have found a certain number of cholera carriers.

#### Italian Steamers.

For some months three small Italian steamers of the trawler class, the "G. 38," "Serpentaria" and "Charpoli," have been trading in the Red Sea and calling frequently at Jeddah. These steamers belong to a man named Channele, of Massowa. Each boat carries 1,500-2,000 bags or 150-200 deck passengers. Except for a small number of pilgrims, no passengers travel by these boats. The freight charged is, from Massowa to Aden, 10 piastres a bag, and, from Jeddah to Yembo, Rabegh and other ports, 7½ piastres. The amount they can make is not sufficient for the heavy expenses that they have to bear, and they must have been running at a loss since the commencement of the venture. I can find no evidence that they are trading in forbidden materials. Their agent here is a local Hadramic merchant called Ali Umara. I have heard that the boats are going to be withdrawn.

The steamship "Nilo" is another Italian boat which trades in the Red Sea. She belongs to M. Uglo Rossi, an Italian, of Massowa. She takes 5,000 bags and 324 deck passengers. She has not called at Jeddah during the last six months.

Two new Italian steamers of a larger class recently arrived from Italy. These are the "Vincenzo" and the "Paulo." The former takes 250 deck passengers and 2,000 bags, and the latter 450 deck passengers and 4,500 bags. These were formerly coastguard steamers of the Italian Government, and were sold to an Italian Company, Amedeo, Garibaldi and Co. There are said to be two or three steamers of the same

class on the way. The local agent is Haji Zeinal Aly Reza. These boats brought no cargo from Italy, but six aeroplanes (*vide infra*). I have reported all particulars about these steamers to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea.

#### Italian Aeroplanes.

As I reported in my telegram No. 76 of the 6th September, four Coudron biplanes and two Maurice Farman aeroplanes have arrived from Italy. They were consigned to Massowa, but were landed here, and one Coudron biplane has flown three times since its arrival, but only over and around Jeddah. One Italian pilot and one Italian mechanic pilot are in charge of these machines. I do not know if the King has bought any of these aeroplanes, but it is reported that one is going to Taif, and this is in keeping with what I reported in my telegram—that King Hussein is going to reoccupy Khurma after his return to Mecca, using the troops brought by Emir Ali from Medina. The tribes round Khurma are now in the King's favour, and he should have no difficulty in occupying Khurma, but whether he will be able to remain there is doubtful.

Colonel Lawrence has been advising Emir Ali against this expedition until after the signing of our treaty and the question of Hedjaz boundaries has been raised between us and Ibn Saud. I do not think, however, that his advice will be taken.

Eight other aeroplanes—Spads—are on their way. They also are consigned to Massowa.

I have since heard that King Hussein has bought the six aeroplanes at the price of 450l. per aeroplane. One of the Coudron's started for Taif, but had to return. The reason given was that they lost their way—an Arab officer was acting as guide—but understand the engine was not running properly, and that this was the true reason of the return. The King is said to be very angry.

#### Political and General.

1. Under cover of my despatch No. 73 of the 31st August I transmitted to your Lordship two letters received by King Hussein from Mohammed-bin-Rashid and Ibrahim-el-Salin-al-Subhan, his Prime Minister. They give interesting news of the present position in Hail. Mohammed-bin-Tellal is now ruler there, but whether as Regent for Mishal or not it is difficult to say. He mentions Mishal in his letter to the King. Abdullah-el-Netaab, a cousin of Mishal, has taken refuge with Ibn Saud.

2. The Hashimite Government report that Sheikh Nasir, of the Auza tribe, and three other men sent by Ibn Saud have arrived at Kheibar for the purpose of intriguing against the Hashimite Government.

3. There was a good deal of anti-British talk during this year's pilgrimage. Some Egyptians were talking of raising a jihad in Egypt and driving the British into the sea. Mohammed the Bunu, a West African from the Soudan, is also talking in the same strain with regard to a jihad in Nigeria.

4. On the occasion of Emir Feisal's accession 101 guns were fired at Jeddah and a series of speeches were delivered at the Government buildings. These speeches were all in the same strain—independence of the Arabs and realisation of their aspirations. In the evening Emir Zeid held a reception at the barracks. Haddad Pasha delivered the only speech. He pointed out the part Great Britain had played, and told the Arabs frankly that they had much to learn, and that they could only do this by association with European Powers. This speech, somewhat to his surprise, has been published in full in "Al Qibla" (No. 512).

5. Colonel Lawrence returned on H.M.S. "Clematis" on the 29th August. King Hussein and Emir Ali arrived on the 2nd September, and negotiations were resumed on the 3rd September. These are still going on, but are proceeding satisfactorily, and the King has signified his intention to go to Mecca on the 10th and to return to Jeddah after three or four days.

#### Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 510 contains an article on the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah. It praises the arrangements made by the Hashimite Government, but says they were spoilt by the fact that the shipping agents had failed to supply the necessary steamers in time. "Al Qibla" expresses sympathy with the poor pilgrims.

This, of course, is not true. The steamers have been considerably delayed owing to the lack of pilgrims and through difficulties created by the local Government. Last year the majority of the Holt steamers arrived in the morning and left the same



afternoon. This year they are sometimes here for two or three days, and always for twenty-four hours.

No. 511 contains an account of the ceremonies at Mecca in honour of the Emir Feisal's accession. King Hussein's speech is given in full.

An Egyptian named Abdul Rahim Tarah, a teacher in a secondary school in Egypt, who has been appointed Egyptian correspondent to "Al Qibla," recited poems on this occasion. These poems were in praise of the King and his family, and expressed the hope that the aspirations of the Arabs in Palestine and Syria might be realised.

No. 512 contains Haddad Pasha's speech in full.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

*Shipping Intelligence.*

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th August and the 10th September, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
Tantah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	Aug. 11	Aug. 13	..	Packages. 530
Asmara	Italian	Massaua	"	" 13	" 13	..	260
Vergemere	British	Port Soudan	"	" 14	" ..	..	846
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 16	..	926
Sultania	"	Bombay	Bombay	" 16	" 31	492	7,927
Mansourah	"	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	..	709
Teenhai	"	Liverpool	Batavia	" 22	" 26	836	..
Kumaus	"	"	Singapore	" 23	" 25	998	..
Vincenzo	Italian	"	Yembo	" ..	" 23	96	..
Nurani	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 24	" 31	751	16,321
Akbar	"	"	"	" ..	" 24	1,168	..
Zayani	"	"	"	" ..	" 24	922	..
Jeddah	"	"	"	" ..	" 25	1,183	..
Keneh	"	"	Tor	" ..	" 25	750	..
Dakalieh	"	"	"	" ..	" 25	840	..
Nairung	"	"	Bombay	" ..	" 25	765	..
Tantah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25	" 26	699	1,354
Paulo	Italian	"	Hodeidah	" ..	" 27	448	..
Titan	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 25	" 27	1,290	..
Djembar	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 26	" 29	1,335	..
Shuja	British	"	Bombay	" ..	" 27	1,415	..
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 27	" 27	..	331
Asmara	"	Suez	Massaua	" 27	" 27	..	204
Demodocus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 27	" 30	1,196	..
Homayun	"	"	Basra	" ..	" 28	894	..
Hwah Jah	Chinese	"	Batavia	" ..	" 28	1,402	..
Warina	British	Rangoon	Aden	" 28	Sept. 6	..	54,262
Netley Abbey	"	Amsterdam	Zanzibar	" 29	Aug. 29	12	..
Agapenor	"	Liverpool	Singapore	" 29	Sept. 3	1,360	..
Tantah	"	Port Soudan	Suez	" 31	" 1	79	1,294
Tantalus	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 31	" 1	606	..
Vincenzo	Italian	Yembo	Suakin and Hodeidah	" ..	" 1	267	..
Dakalieh	British	Tor	Tor	Sept. 1	" 3	780	..
Keneh	"	"	"	" 1	" 3	514	..
Antenor	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia	" 1	" 4	989	..
Antiochus	British	Liverpool	Singapore	" 4	" 5	999	..
Buitenzorg	Dutch	Rotterdam	Batavia	" 5	" 7	1,950	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 5	" 5	466	598
Massaua	Italian	"	Massaua	" 5	" 5	..	44
Celebes	Dutch	America	Batavia	" 6	" 8	1,438	..
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 10	" 10	..	155
Rotti	Dutch	"	"	" 10	" ..	..	..

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 29th August and left on the 31st August, 1921.